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Abstract
This thesis explores the application of quality risk management (QRM) in
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies and its effectiveness at managing
risk to the patient. The objective of the research described in this thesis was to
characterize a maturity state of QRM implementation in which the patient is adequately
protected from the risks associated with medicinal products of inadequate quality. The
research was conducted over three phases: first, to determine whether patients are better
protected since the publication of ICH Q9, a commonly employed guidance on the
application of QRM; second, to characterize the industry with regard to QRM maturity,
including the effectiveness of QRM application, the behaviors, attitudes, and
motivations of the people working with and within QRM, and the governance and
oversight of QRM efforts; and third, to construct a mature QRM program and
associated maturity measurement tool to accelerate improvements in QRM and better
protect the patient. The research employed a mixed methods approach, including the
research methods of literature review, philosophical dialogues, benchmarking survey,
semi-structured interview, and pilot case studies. The research concluded that the
patient is no better protected since the inception of QRM and the level of QRM maturity
throughout the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries remains rather low.
However, the research also indicated that progression towards the more mature QRM
model proposed in thesis may help firms perform QRM in a more effective manner,
resulting in improved management of risk to the patient.
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1 Chapter One: Introduction

This thesis outlines the objectives and progress of the research study into quality risk
management maturity within the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries,
based upon the International Council on Harmonisation (ICH) Guidelines Q8
Pharmaceutical Development, Q9 Quality Risk Management, and Q10 Pharmaceutical
Quality System. The research study commenced in July 2014 for the explicit purpose
of inquiring as to the value that Quality Risk Management (QRM) brings to the patient,
and how best to define, measure, and accelerate risk maturity in the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries. For the purposes of this thesis, the term “risk maturity”
is used interchangeably with “quality risk management maturity” and is defined as the
level of effectiveness of a QRM program to bring value to the patient.

This thesis consists of four sections and twelve chapters in total, as shown in Table 1-1.
This chapter serves as a general introduction to the industrial and regulatory climate in
which the research is being conducted, as well as the focus of the research and problem
it addresses.

Section One, inclusive of Chapters Two and Three, describes the foundations of the
research.

Chapter Two provides an overview of the literature review conducted, including a
critical analysis of the ICH guidelines that serve as a primary input into the research.
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Table 1-1: General Structure of the Thesis

Section
Section One: A Brief
History of Risk and
Research
Section Two:
Characterizing the
Current State

Section Three:
Recoding QRM to
Better Protect the
Patient
Section Four:
Implications of the
Research

Chapter
Chapter Two: Initial Literature Review
Chapter Three: The Research Approach
Chapter Four: Have Patients Realized the Benefits of
QRM?
Chapter Five: How Mature is Industry in its QRM
Application?
Chapter Six: Learning from Risk Management Practices
in Other Industries
Chapter Seven: What QRM Maturity Looks Like People
Chapter Eight: What QRM Maturity Looks Like Process
Chapter Nine: What QRM Maturity Looks Like Governance
Chapter Ten: Measuring QRM Maturity
Chapter Eleven: Focus Areas for Future Research
Chapter Twelve: Conclusion and Recommendations

Chapter Three explores the ontological underpinning of the research, the research
question, the methods and methodology, and reviews the progression of the research
throughout its tenure.

Section Two includes Chapters Four, Five, and Six, targeted at characterizing the
current state of quality risk management in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
industries.

Chapter Four explores the extent to which the patient has realized the benefits of QRM
through improved quality of medicines.

Chapter Five details the current state of industry with regard to QRM practices and
perceptions.
16

Chapter Six explores the application of risk management in other industries, including
medical devices, aerospace, and nuclear power, and explains key learnings that were
applied in later stages of the research.

Section Three of this thesis, composed of Chapters Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, defines
the ideal state with regard to QRM and provides a comprehensive tool kit to assist
industry with progressing towards this ideal state.

Chapter Seven focuses on the people working within the ideal QRM program, including
the knowledge and culture necessary to enable risk maturity.

Chapter Eight re-envisions the QRM process to strengthen the link between QRM
activities and patient protection.

Chapter Nine outlines the purpose of governance within a mature QRM program and
defines critical elements and structure necessary to achieve excellence.

Chapter Ten completes Section Three by describing a measurement tool to gauge the
level of risk maturity at a given company and facilitate progression towards the ideal
state.

Section Four, the final section of the thesis, summarizes the research effort and suggests
areas for continued evolution of QRM.

Chapter Eleven provides suggested focus areas for future research into QRM.
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Chapter Twelve concludes the research effort and offers recommendations to industry
and regulators to better manage risk to patients

The research study described in this thesis focuses on quality risk management (QRM),
a relatively recent concept that involves the application of risk management principles
and practices to the control and enhancement of drug product quality. The goals of
QRM are myriad, but in the researcher’s view may be summarized as follows:

Quality risk management aims to protect the patient through the understanding and
management of product quality risks.

The sections that follow will briefly introduce the climate in which pharmaceutical
and biopharmaceutical companies operate, the concepts of risk and risk management,
and the types of risks the research explores. Finally, the problem the research seeks to
address is presented.

1.1 Research context
Looking over the roughly 6,000 years of societal history, several scientific advances
stand out as truly transformational—advances that changed the world. The most
revolutionary of these was the dawn of modern medicine. Borne of necessity (and some
creativity), modern medicine has enabled a consistent, scientific approach to the
diagnosis and treatment of human disease, increasing the human lifespan and enhancing
the quality of the lives lived within it. The lion’s share of the credit for these
achievements goes to the advent of medicinal products. These products tackle the
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causes of human disease, alleviate debilitating symptoms, and empower our species to
focus beyond mere survival towards other endeavors; as a result, medicinal products
have enabled human progress. The pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries
(collectively termed “industry” throughout this thesis) are two of the bodies that
discover, develop, and manufacture these products for human use. The contribution of
these industries to human health is immeasurable; these industries are the engines
behind modern medicine.

Medicinal products are defined as “any substance or combination of substances
presenting as having properties for treating or preventing disease in human beings.” (1)
There are generally considered to be two types of medicinal products: pharmaceuticals
and biopharmaceuticals. 1 Both pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical products are
intended to affect the structure or function of human physiology in order to diagnose,
cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease. (2) Pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
products differ primarily in their manufacturing process, either through traditional
chemical isolation or synthesis or through a biological process involving natural
(biological) sources. The term “drug” is synonymous with “medicinal product” and is
used to describe both pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals.

Over time, the extent to which the world relies on drugs to protect and advance human
health has steadily increased. Worldwide revenue of the global pharmaceutical market
grew from US$390.2 billion in 2001 to $1.1 trillion in 2014, with global drug spending

1

Technology is increasingly blurring the lines between the typology of medicinal products. For example,
many newer products incorporate both a medical device and a medicinal product, or a biological product
with a pharmaceutical product, creating a new class called “combination products.” So as to not
unnecessarily complicate the concepts, this research paper will focus on pharmaceuticals and
biopharmaceuticals, irrespective of any associated sub-classifications.
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expected to reach $1.4 trillion by 2020. (3) Biopharmaceuticals are expected to capture
a larger proportion of spending in the near term, with expected revenues of $445 billion
by 2019. (4) These monetary figures are rough (and perhaps imprecise) surrogates for
the true measure of the breadth and strength of the drug industry—the number of
patients served. Regardless of debates around drug pricing, costs associated with
production and distribution, and access strategies in developed and emerging markets,
the number of patients with access to medicines continues to increase.

The success associated with treatment rates is undermined, however, by several very
real and very grave facts. Despite consistent progress in this area, not all patients who
need drugs have access to them. Of those patients who do, this access can be threatened
by myriad issues, including quality problems.

Consider, for example, Roche’s

antiretroviral medicine Viracept (nelfinavir). This product treats HIV-infected patients
of all ages, and was hailed as a medical breakthrough throughout the world for its
effectiveness in alleviating the symptoms and disease progression of HIV.

The

relatively low cost of the drug allowed for a relatively broad level of global access to
this product, particularly in historically underserved regions such as Africa-- that is,
until a manufacturing quality problem resulted in a temporary but significant market
withdrawal in 2007. A simple manufacturing issue (improper cleaning of a tank) had
resulted in the creation of a genotoxic impurity known as ethyl mesylate. A large-scale
recall of the drug was initiated in response, leading to a lack of treatment for large
patient populations with deadly consequences. (5) (6)

Another example of quality problems hindering access to life-saving medicines
occurred in 2009, due to a viral contamination event at the Genzyme plant that
manufactured the biopharmaceutical drugs Cerezyme and Fabrazyme. Cerezyme and
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Fabrazyme treat rare genetic diseases known as Gaucher’s and Fabry’s, respectively.
Both Gaucher’s and Fabry’s disease are lysosomal storage disorders—diseases in
which the body lacks certain enzymes necessary to break down fatty acids, resulting in
the buildup of these chemicals in the body. (7) (8) Left untreated, most patients
succumb to their disease. (9) (10) When a viral contamination event at Genzyme left
the company unable to continue to supply product to market, many patients had no
choice but to reduce their dosing schemes or forgo treatment altogether, ultimately
leading to several deaths. (11) (12) The impact of these drug shortages echo to the
present day—while the Fabrazyme shortage was resolved in July 2016, Cerezyme
remains on critical medicines shortage lists—a full seven years after the contamination
event. (13)

These incidents, among others, eroded the trust between industry and the public; after
all, these events were ultimately predictable and avoidable. One technique with a
proven history of success has been used in many industries (such as finance, nuclear
energy, and aerospace) to predict and avoid such crises. This technique, risk
management, is at the core of this research effort.

1.2 Overview of risk management principles and practices
“Risk” has become a ubiquitous term in contemporary society, but is used in such a
wide variety of contexts that its meaning has been blurred.

The International

Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines risk as “the effect of uncertainty on
objectives.” (14) Indeed, the world is riddled with uncertainty—a necessary byproduct
of our inability to foretell the future. In the event the future could be precisely predicted,
it could be controlled, rendering all types of endeavors successful. Unfortunately, this
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is not the world we live in, nor the world in which businesses operate. As such, “all
activities of an organization involve risk.” (15)

The mere existence of risk does not imply a foregone conclusion of failure, of course;
risk can be both defined and calculated, allowing the exercise of some influence in the
form of knowledge. 2 The magnitude of risk is calculated as the combination of the
probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm, exhibited in a simple
equation: (16)

Likelihood x Severity = Risk

This calculation captures the main concerns associated with risk—the chances that
some undesirable event will occur, and how bad it might be if it does. The level of
concern rises as egregious outcomes become increasingly likely, and subsides when
consequences are less severe or rarer. In this way, the concept and calculation of risk
reflects the general amount of apprehension with which we approach various activities.

It follows that the management of risks is necessary to increase the probability that an
identified goal will be achieved. For example, a thrill-seeking sky diver does not
blindly launch him or herself out of an airplane; rather, specific safety controls are
employed to ensure the jump will be successful. In the context of business, risk
management is defined both as “coordinated activities to direct and control an
organization with regard to risk” and the “systematic application of management

2

Because the term “risk” is both a concept and an equation, the term “hazard” has been introduced to
make a more clear distinction. Hazards are defined as “potential sources of harm,” (16) and serve to
replace the concept (noun) form of the term “risk.” However, because this distinction may confuse those
who do not specialize in risk management, in most cases throughout this report the terms “risk” and
“hazard” are used interchangeably.
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policies, procedures and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting,
establishing the context, and identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring
and reviewing risk.” (14) Using the latter definition, risk management is universally
acknowledged as a process consisting of the identification of risks, the analysis of risks
to determine their criticality (using, for example, the risk equation listed above), and
the disposition of risks based on organizational objectives. The risk management
process is then repeated as the internal or external business climate evolves. (15)

The goals of risk management vary based upon the intent of application. For example,
risk management may be employed to:

•

increase the likelihood of achieving objectives

•

encourage proactive management

•

increase awareness of the need to identify and treat risk throughout the
organization

•

improve the identification of opportunities and threats

•

comply with relevant legal and regulatory requirements and international
norms

•

improve mandatory and voluntary reporting

•

improve governance

•

improve stakeholder confidence and trust

•

establish a reliable basis for decision making and planning

•

improve controls

•

effectively allocate and use resources for risk treatment

•

improve operational effectiveness and efficiency;

•

enhance health and safety performance, as well as environmental protection

•

improve loss prevention and incident management

•

minimize losses

•

improve organizational learning, and

•

improve organizational resilience (15)
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Regardless of the individual goal for which risk management is invoked, it is always
used to help ensure business objectives are met. With regard to medicinal products,
therefore, risk management assures the safety of the patient and the effectiveness of the
drug. The application of risk management is vital to ensure the primary business
objective of these industries is met: to serve the patient.

1.3 The general focus of the research
Within the realm of medicinal products, one can identify two general categories of risk
to the patient: intrinsic risk and extrinsic risk. Table 1-2 delineates the various
characteristics of, and differences between, these two categories of risk. 3

Intrinsic risks are those inherent to a given drug, given the nature of certain biochemical
reactions within the body when exposed to a drug or its constituent parts. Intrinsic risks
generally surface during research and development and in the clinic, and are weighed
against the overall medical benefits of the product when determining whether the drug
is suitable for commercial sale. For example, while the risk of suicidal thoughts or
feelings might be considered acceptable in the context of an antidepressant medication
where such underlying urges may already be present, that same risk would be
unacceptable if it were to accompany a mild pain-reliever such as ibuprofen. The
acceptability of intrinsic risks is therefore relative, based on the therapeutic benefits a
drug delivers.

3

While some sources allude to these different types of risks, few make a clear distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic risk (excepting the FDA Risk Management Task Force (40)). As such, and because
this distinction is crucial to understand the scope and focus of the research, most of the ideas in this
section are the researcher’s alone.
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Table 1-2: Intrinsic vs. extrinsic risk

Intrinsic risks
Originate from

Types

The medicinal product itself
•
•
•

Adverse reactions
Risks communicated
via warnings /
precautions
Contraindications

Communicated to
patients

•
•
•

Labeling
Medication guides
Specific risk
management plans

Identified through

•
•

Clinical studies
Post-market
pharmacovigilance

Managed through

Potential
consequences to
patient

Market authorization holder
(MAH) to patient
communication and risk
management plans
Range from negligible to
life-threatening

Extrinsic risks
External events or
circumstances
• Dosing or medication
errors
• Counterfeiting or
tampering
• Shortages
• Quality risks (the focus
of this research)
• Special notices
(reactively identified
events)
• Almost never
(proactively identified
circumstances)
• Complaints
• Deviations
• Proactive quality risk
management
•
•

Corrective and
preventive action
(CAPA)
Risk
reduction/mitigation

Range from negligible to lifethreatening

Generally, intrinsic risks are communicated to patients and their healthcare providers
through product labeling. Labeling allows for the sharing of intrinsic risk information
so that patients, in consultation with their medical teams, can make informed decisions
regarding the course of their care. While requirements for drug product labeling vary
by region, in most instances the communication of intrinsic risks can be subdivided into
a number of categories, including adverse reactions, warnings and precautions, and
contraindications.

Adverse reactions (known in some regions as side effects or
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undesirable effects) are conditions that the patient might reasonably expect to occur
during use of the medicinal product that are undesirable in nature. (17) Adverse
reactions are numerous and variable, and may include (but are certainly not limited to)
dry mouth, drowsiness, stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. Side effects are
often discovered over the course of clinical trials, and may be further refined through
data from adverse event reporting, complaints, and pharmacovigilance activities that
occur in the commercial phase of the product lifecycle.

Warnings and precautions are extensions of adverse reactions that might threaten the
patient’s health and well-being, either because the adverse reaction is severe enough to
impact decisions regarding a patient’s care or because the adverse reaction might
require more specific precautions to be communicated to the patient. (18) For example,
the common analgesic and fever reducer paracetamol (called acetaminophen in the US)
comes with a warning regarding liver failure in doses in excess of recommendations.
(19) (20) Intrinsic risks grouped within warnings and precautions are often discovered
during drug development but may also be included to highlight logical consequences
of known side effects (as is the case, for example, when drugs that cite drowsiness as
an adverse reaction also include a precaution against driving and operating heavy
machinery). Warnings and precautions, therefore, are derived from risk assessments in
which the gravity of the risk (likelihood of harm, severity of the harm, or a combination
thereof) or consequences of drug administration might pose a threat to the patient in an
unintended way.

Contraindications are an additional class of intrinsic risk in which a causal relationship
between the drug and some other physiological condition (a disease condition or cohort
of the patient population) exists and may result in an adverse reaction. (18) For
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example, certain drugs may be contraindicated for use in children, pregnant or lactating
women, or the elderly, while others may be ill-advised for administration when the
patient is immunocompromised due to a co-existing condition. In addition, certain
drugs may interact with other drugs, resulting in serious consequences that jeopardize
the patient’s overall health, as is the case when two classes of antidepressant drugs
(monoamine oxidase inhibitors, or MAOIs, and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors,
or SSRIs) are used simultaneously. (21)

Regulatory authorities around the world base product approval decisions on a variety
of factors, the most important of which is the benefit-risk profile. 4 This evaluation
weighs the intrinsic risks of the product (such as the nature of adverse reactions that
may occur, the relative severity of the reactions, and their estimated or confirmed rate
of occurrence in the target patient population) against the medical benefits of the
product. In most cases, the benefits of the product must clearly outweigh the risks in
order to be considered appropriate for commercial use; panels of experts are often used
to guide the final decision, though quantitative risk assessment models may be
employed to calibrate the scientific judgment of decision-makers. (22) In some cases,
however, the data may reveal that the benefits outweigh the risks only in certain
circumstances, or certain risks are severe enough to warrant additional management to
ensure the benefit-risk profile remains favorable. In these instances, a regulatory
authority may call for the proposal and enactment of a risk management plan (RMP) to
manage these risks in a commercial setting.

4

In some regions, such as the US, and with some products, such as medical devices, the term “riskbenefit” is used to denote this concept.
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Risk management plans (referred to as Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies, or
REMS, in the US), are plans to manage intrinsic risk through the application of targeted
controls. The nature of the controls varies based on the risk, and are intended to assure
that the medical benefits of the drug product continue to outweigh the risks. (23) For
example, the medication isotretinoin (originally marketed under the brand name
Accutane) offers significant relief to patients with severe acne, a painful condition that
can negatively impact patients’ self-confidence. Isotretinoin is incredibly effective in
the treatment of acne, in most cases eliminating the condition altogether; however, it
can also cause severe birth defects. (24) Despite the fact that the drug’s labeling
documents a contraindication for pregnant women, a risk management plan was
deemed necessary in order to ensure that women would not become pregnant while
using the product. The REMS for isotretinoin, called iPledge, includes a medication
guide, a certification program for prescribing physicians and dispensing pharmacies,
and mandatory enrollment of patients in the iPledge program. Risk controls associated
with the iPledge program include limited prescribing allowances (no more than 30 days
of medication with no refills at any time), contraception counseling between the
healthcare provider and patient, two pregnancy tests performed prior to drug
administration with monthly follow up tests thereafter, certification from the patient
that she will use two forms of contraception throughout the treatment period, and other
similar controls. (25)

These additional risk controls are intended to ensure that the

benefits of isotretinoin (the treatment and potential elimination of severe acne)
outweigh the risks (severe birth defects) by preventing fetal exposure to the drug.

Regulators and industry acknowledge that the data obtained during drug development
and clinical testing may not be sufficient to reveal all intrinsic risks. As a result,
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ongoing pharmacovigilance is required.

Pharmacovigilance is “the science and

activities relating to the detection, assessment, understanding and prevention of adverse
effects or any other possible drug-related problems.” (26) Conducted in a post-market
environment, these programs enable the identification of signals that might indicate a
new intrinsic risk, or provide additional data regarding the frequency and severity of
known risks that can further inform the benefit-risk balance. (27) New information
gleaned from pharmacovigilance may result in the discontinuation of a product. For
example, the popular weight loss drug fenfluramine was discontinued in 1997 after
pharmacovigilance activities revealed a correlation with heart valve disease and
pulmonary hypertension, conditions not previously identified in clinical trials. (28)

Historically, pharmacological research and drug approval regulation have focused
primarily on these intrinsic risks; as such, intrinsic risks garnered the most industry and
regulatory scrutiny. Patients benefit from the broad communication of intrinsic risks
through mechanisms that include product labeling, as described above, as well as tightly
regulated risk management in the form of initial product approval decisions, risk
management plans that may be required during commercialization, and ongoing
pharmacovigilance. However, intrinsic risks are only a portion of the total risk a patient
may be exposed to during their use of a medicinal product. The other category of risks,
extrinsic risks, may have similarly grave consequences, yet have been comparatively
neglected until recent times.

Extrinsic risk can be defined as unintended risks to the patient arising from events or
circumstances unrelated to the drug product itself; for example, dosing errors,
counterfeiting or tampering, drug shortages, or risks introduced during manufacturing,
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packaging, labeling, distribution, or storage. A critical subset of these are quality
risks—risks to patients that are associated with the quality of the medicinal product.

Quality risks are a nefarious bunch. Because quality problems often manifest as failures
to meet specifications, and because drug specifications address chemical and
biochemical attributes of the product, quality problems are often invisible to the patient.
Quality problems can vary by manufacturer and batch—as such, the same drug might
expose patients to different quality risks, depending on the brand or product lot number.
Patients are rarely informed of the potential quality risks associated with a given
product, limiting their ability to make informed choices about their healthcare by
restricting their access to critical information. Finally, quality risks may greatly affect
the benefit-risk balance of product, since products are approved for sale based on a
favorable benefit-risk ratio, and quality risks introduce new considerations in that
equation.

Patients and healthcare providers have an inherent assumption that a product’s intrinsic
risk has been accepted through regulatory approval, and that the drug they administer
or receive is both safe and effective. Regulators and industry acknowledge, of course,
that deviations from cGMP and product-specific quality attributes could threaten the
critical link between an individual dose of a medicinal product and its marketing
authorization, thereby rendering the drug “adulterated.” In other words, any quality
risk imposed in addition to the drug’s intrinsic risk upsets the benefit-risk balance, and
should therefore be identified and controlled. Despite the criticality of quality risks,
they were overshadowed by the concern with intrinsic risks until recent times.
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1.4 Problem this research addresses
When patients take a medicine, they exercise their trust in the pharmaceutical industry.
They trust that the product is as it is labeled, and that no external circumstance might
put them at risk beyond that disclosed in the labeling.

They trust that drug

manufacturers have produced the product in safe and consistent way, and that their
health and safety is protected. The market does not distinguish between high or lowquality drugs, because acceptable quality is presumed to be present. (29)

As recent events attest—this assumption is far from the truth. While the sources of
quality problems, consequences of poor quality drug products, and the resultant patient
impact have been well documented, a rigorous inquiry into a methodological approach
to the resolution of these issues is notably absent. This research effort seeks to fill this
gap by defining the effective use of QRM, a key solution for the “quality problem.”
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Section One: A Brief History of Risk
and Research
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“Risk is like fire: If controlled it will help you; if uncontrolled it
will rise up and destroy you.”

- Theodore Roosevelt

"The easy way out usually leads back in."

-
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Peter Senge

2 Chapter Two: Introductory Literature Review

The research commenced with a review of the extant literature. There is a wealth of
texts on the topic of QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, from
sources spanning regulations, regulatory guidance documents, books, industry
whitepapers, peer-reviewed articles, presentations from regulators and industry
practitioners, and commentary and opinion pieces. Because the literature is rich with
different perspectives, many of which illustrate the evolving understanding of QRM
that is so pivotal to the research, the researcher has included, where applicable, a
thoughtful appraisal of various conceptual breakthroughs, thought leadership, and
shortcomings. The literature serves as a consistent element of the research design and
is drawn upon heavily in later chapters as well.

This chapter focuses on the literature review performed to orient the researcher in the
topic of QRM within industry. The chapter begins with a brief (and therefore selfconsciously incomplete) history of risk management in the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries.

The applicable ICH guidelines that serve as the

foundation of the research effort are then reviewed, followed by QRM-related books
and technical reports issued by industry thought leaders. The literature review as
documented in this chapter proceeds chronologically by source, rather than by theme,
in order to demonstrate the evolution of thinking on QRM related topics over time.

Additional chapters of the final thesis will include topic-specific literature reviews as
applicable to the phases of the research:
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•

Chapters Four and Five describe the conduct and outcomes of the Phase 1 and
2 research, focused on characterization the current state of industry with
regard to QRM implementation and benefit realization. The literature
discussed in these chapters support this baseline characterization, including
potential contributing factors that may have influenced the current state.

•

Chapter Six explores the application of risk management in industries with
longer and more mature histories of its use. The literature discussed in
Chapter Six will serve as the primary source for this external benchmarking.

•

Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine describe the conduct and outcomes of the
Phase 3 research, focused on defining a mature state of QRM application to
enable industry to perform QRM activities more effectively. The literature
discussed in these chapters will help define the ideal state from a variety of
perspectives, including regulation, industry, and academia.

Figure 2-A maps the various topics to be explored as part of the literature review
with the applicable chapters or section in which they are discussed.

Figure 2-A: Literature map
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Rather than proceeding chronologically by source, as in this chapter, the supplemental
literature reviews will discuss the literature by theme as the full breadth of ideas in the
research effort are introduced.

2.1 The emergence of quality risk management as a concept and a
discipline for medicinal products
2.1.1

Early pharmaceutical risk management

Risk management has been a foundational element of the regulation of healthcare
products since the inception of related regulatory bodies; indeed, one could argue that
the primary reason such regulatory bodies exist is to protect the public from health and
safety risks associated with medicinal product use.
Some sources date early formularies, known as pharmacopeias, back to first century
AD Greek texts (such as Pliny’s catalogue of medicinal herbs in Naturalis Historae).
(30) The earliest known regulation for such pharmacopeia was the Salerno Medical
Edict issued by Frederick II of Sicily in 1240, which required apothecaries to prepare
their medicinal remedies in the same way. (31) Such laws, which became increasingly
pervasive throughout the European continent during medieval times, recognized that
consistency across drug formulations was necessary in order to assure the intended
effects of the product, thereby minimizing risk to the patient.

The late 19th century saw additional drug legislation come into effect. In the US, the
first such legislation occurred following the Mexican-American war of 1846 – 1848,
during which American soldiers were administered various drugs for a host of maladies
(including malaria, yellow fever, and cholera). Many of these drugs were imported,
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and some proved to lack the safety and efficacy needed to fully protect the troops. The
large number of deaths that occurred in that period can be attributed not only to the
typical slaughter seen in wartime, but also to these faulty drugs. The US Import Drug
Act of 1848 was sanctioned to ensure that any such imported drug was subject to purity
and quality testing prior to passing through the border. (32) The Import Drug Act
established a theme for drug regulation the world over—advances in pharmaceutical
regulation general occur as a consequence of tragedy in the public eye, seeking to
manage risk to patient safety and health reactively.

In the US, which represents the world’s largest population of drug consumers, the
growth in both scope and statute of the FDA was borne of several highly publicized
tragedies. Figure 2-B illustrates this trend for selected early milestones in American
drug law. (31) (32) (33) (34)

This pattern of reactivity, where healthcare disaster is antecedent to advances in
regulatory science, continues to the present day. For example, the heparin scandal of
2008 led to many dozens of deaths, followed by a surge in attention to the management
of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) and control over the increasingly complex
supply chain. (35) (36) While this reactive process serves to prevent future injury and
death, one is left with a tinge of regret at the prospect that such tragedies could have
been anticipated and avoided with the application of right tools and the right conviction.
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1846 – 1848:
Troops die
due to poor
quality of
imported
medicines

1848:
Import Drug Act
passed

1905:
Upton Sinclair
publishes The
Jungle, an
expose on the
US
meatpacking
industry

1906:
Food and Drug Act
passed; FDA
created

1937:
Sulfanilamide
liquid kills 107
people due to
inclusion of
diethylene
glycol in
formulation

1938:
Federal Food,
Drug, and
Cosmetic Act
passed;
preapproval
required based on
safety data

1941:
Sulfathiazole
tablets kill or
injure 300
people due to
contamination
with
phenobarbital

1941:
FDA introduces
good
manufacturing
practices (GMPs)

1962:
Thalidomide
causes severe
birth defects
in ~10,000
babies born in
western
Europe

1962:
Kafauver-Harris
Drug Amendments
passed;
preapproval to
also include
efficacy data

Figure 2-B: (Select) timeline of US drug law milestones and public health tragedies

2.1.2

The precautionary principle

The precautionary principle represents one of the first proactive risk management
mindsets to reach the public sphere.

Originally discussed in the context of

environmental law making, the principle asserts that when faced with uncertainty
regarding a given risk, particularly when the consequences of the risk may have serious
and lasting effects, an abundance of caution must be used to provide the desired level
of protection to society. 5 (37) (38) The principle serves as a decision-making guideline
for regulators, to be invoked in circumstances where scientific evidence regarding a
certain risk is lacking. In these cases, a failure to actively avoid the risk could lead to
an incredible amount of damage, both of person and of cost; therefore, the only

5

While the precautionary principle was first formally implemented in 1974 in a German law on clear air
(39), the researcher suggests that the main tenets of the principle have been engrained in human nature
throughout our existence. The inherent risk- (and likewise uncertainty-) aversion of the species has
enabled survival over millennia, as otherwise our curiosity would most certainly have gotten the best of
us.
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appropriate response is to implement the appropriate measures (such as banning a given
substance) to protect the public while simultaneously seeking to increase understanding
of the risks. (37) (38)

As a decision aid, the precautionary principle can be viewed as a rudimentary risk
management process, as illustrated in Figure 2-C. (37) (38) (39)

The proactive nature of the precautionary principle stems from the early identification
of sources of uncertainty, combined with the concerted effort to avoid the associated
risk until the uncertainty can be reduced or eliminated. In this way, the concept of risk
is linked with scientific knowledge, such that appropriate risk management can only be
effectively applied where there is sufficient understanding upon which sound
conclusions can be drawn. The precautionary principle and the effects of uncertainty
will be explored further in Chapter Six.
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Potential risk

Conduct risk assessment;
make decisions based on
benefit-risk profile

NO

Is the risk
highly
uncertain?

YES
Evaluate the
potential
consequences of
the risk to
determine harmful
effects

Conduct scientific
studies to improve
understanding of
the risk and its
probability of
harm

NO

Are the
consequences
very severe?

YES

Evaluate costs and
benefits of
inaction

Will society be
adequately
protected in we do
nothing?

YES

NO
Take action (e.g.
withdraw or ban
substance)

Figure 2-C: Decision tree illustrating the application of the precautionary principle, as
proposed by the researcher
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2.1.3

Modern inquiries into the role of risk management in pharmaceutical
regulation

Modern exploration of risk management for pharmaceuticals arose with a 1999 report
to the FDA commissioner from the Task Force on Risk Management 6. This task force,
established by then-commissioner Dr. Jane Henney, was tasked with determining the
technical soundness, consistency, and validity of risk management activities ongoing
within FDA at the time, and the construction of recommendations to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of these activities. The final report from the Task Force,
entitled Managing the Risks from Medical Product Use: Creating a Risk Management
Framework, focused on the premarket risk assessments 7 performed in support of New
Drug Applications (NDAs) for pharmaceuticals, Biological License Applications
(BLAs) for biopharmaceuticals and biologics, and Premarket Approvals (PMAs) for
medical devices, as well as post-market surveillance activities. (40) The report did not
explore quality-related risk management, explaining that “injury from product defects
is unusual in the United States because of the great attention paid to product quality
control and quality assurance during manufacturing.” (40) Despite this claim, the report
goes on to cite several case studies of injury and death that, through a contemporary
understanding of product quality, could be traced to a lack of QRM.

6
Some earlier regulation and guidelines had sought to apply risk management processes from
engineering trades to medical devices, particularly in concert with design control. These began in 1993
in the EU with the issuance of 93/42/EEC, commonly known as the Medical Device Directive, followed
in the US with the issuance of “Design Control Guidance for Medical Device Manufacturers” in 1997.
Internationally, ISO 14971 from 2000 and ISO 13485 in 2003 strengthened the link between risk
management and product development. The application of risk management in medical devices is
discussed further in Chapter Six.
7
Premarket risk assessments are primarily comprised of the benefit-risk assessments described in
Chapter One.
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One example describes a spate of product mix-ups that led to the administration of the
wrong drug in a hospital setting, leading to three injuries and one death. The distributor,
Burroughs Wellcome, packaged the implicated product in a similar way to other
products—including a foil overlay with a transparent window through which the
original product labeling could be viewed. The design of this foil overlay allowed for
movement of the product within, allowing for the product label to slip below the
viewing window, rendering the contents of the package difficult to determine. Sadly,
this was the root cause of the injuries and death, as the incorrect product was
administered to unwitting patients. (40) The report did not acknowledge that the
application of QRM to the foil overlay design might have allowed for the anticipation
and avoidance of such use errors.

Despite the (perhaps myopic) scope of the report, several recommendations were
proposed to improve risk communication and early intervention in the event a potential
risk is realized. (40)

These recommendations ultimately contributed to the

implementation of several successful programs at FDA 8, serving their goal to leverage
improved data collection and risk management to better protect public health.

While the 1999 report from the FDA Task Force on Risk Management marked one of
the first contemporary, explicit inquiries into the existence and effectiveness of risk
management and risk-based decision making from regulatory authorities, the topic of
quality risk management was not addressed.

8

Improved data collection and risk communication programs include the formalization of REMS (Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy), a post-approval program intended to manage serious patient risks
associated with new medicinal products as described in Chapter One, and Sentinel, an improved adverse
event reporting system.
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A fully-formed concept for proactive risk management, inclusive of the management
of both intrinsic and extrinsic risks, emerged in August 2002 with the announcement of
a new FDA initiative, entitled Pharmaceutical cGMPs for the 21st Century – A RiskBased Approach. The objectives of this initiative were as follows:

•

“Encourage the early adoption of new technological advances by the
pharmaceutical industry

•

Facilitate industry application of modern quality management techniques,
including implementation of quality systems approaches, to all aspects of
pharmaceutical production and quality assurance

•

Encourage implementation of risk-based approaches that focus both industry
and Agency attention on critical areas

•

Ensure that regulatory review, compliance, and inspection policies are based
on state-of-the-art pharmaceutical science

•

Enhance the consistency and coordination of FDA’s drug quality regulatory
programs, in part, by further integrating quality systems approaches into the
Agency’s business processes and regulatory policies concerning review and
inspection activities” (41)

The final report on the initiative, issued in September 2004, laid out the framework
through which FDA intended to meet or encourage these objectives. While only one
of the goals explicitly listed risk management as a focus area, a careful reading of the
final report reveals that risk principles scaffold the plan.

The report foretold the adoption of a quality systems model for quality management
and regulation, to be applied by both industry and FDA alike. While the quality systems
concept had been implemented for some time within medical device regulation (for
example, within ISO 13485, Medical devices – quality management systems –
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requirements for regulatory purposes, and 21CFR820, Quality System Regulation), the
idea of such a system within pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical circles was novel.

Several advances in regulatory science had been made under the umbrella of the 21st
Century initiative, combining knowledge gained through state-of-the art science and
technology with a risk-based orientation. These include, for example:

•

Creation of a risk-based model for inspectional oversight 9

•

Issuance of a new guidance on Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 11,
Electronic Records, Electronic Signatures, to encourage the use of risk-based
approaches in the adoption of the requirements

•

Issuance of a new guidance on aseptic processing, entitled Sterile Drug
Products Produced by Aseptic Processing – Current Good Manufacturing
Practice, to emphasize the need to proactively prevent contamination during
sterile product manufacturing and to further encourage the adoption of risk
management principles in the assurance of sterility (41)

The 21st Century initiative marked a paradigm shift in pharmaceutical regulation; a
transition away from rule-based compliance (in which the emphasis was on following
statute, often at the expense of developing a deep understanding of products, processes,
and associated risks) towards a risk-based view of quality and compliance. In the
context of this research, perhaps the most interesting emphasis throughout the 21st
Century initiative final report is the repeated use of the phrase efficient risk
management. The implications here are, of course, that risk management, if not

9

The FDA employs a risk-based model to prioritize sites for inspection based on the type of products
made, the target patient population, historical compliance history, and trends associated with recent
quality and cGMP-related events. The model is codified in a September 2004 document entitled Riskbased Method for Prioritizing cGMP Inspections of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Sites – A Pilot Risk
Ranking Model. The PIC/S community published their model in January 2012, entitled A Recommended
Model for Risk-based Inspection Planning in the GMP Environment. While some variations in the risk
method exist, the two models are more similar than they are different, illustrating how regulatory
authorities often have convergent ideas of risk factors, regardless of their origin.
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performed properly, can be inefficient. This is quite a curious prospect, given that one
of the reasons a risk-based framework would be employed for a given problem is to
ensure that resources are efficiently allocated towards the things that matter most. The
concept that risk management should be performed in an efficient and effective manner
to yield an efficient and effective outcome for the patient, serves as a cornerstone of
this research study.

2.2 International Council on Harmonization (ICH) Guidelines
2.2.1

Introduction to ICH

The ICH is a cooperative effort comprised of regulatory authorities around the world,
working together to create a single set of harmonized guidelines through which the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries can operate. ICH was born of the
need to speed much-needed therapies to patients without the burden of excessively
divergent scientific and technical legislation around the world. (42)

The ICH espouses its mission as “…to make recommendations towards achieving
greater harmonization in the interpretation and application of technical guidelines and
requirements for pharmaceutical product registration, thereby reducing or obviating
duplication of testing carried out during the research and development of new human
medicines.” 10 (43) The mechanism through which ICH accomplishes this mission is
the creation of harmonized guidelines, aimed at providing industry with a clear

10

Note, though the ICH undertook some organizational changes and an associated rebranding in October
2015, this mission statement appears to date to 2000, a time when ICH was focused primarily on product
registration at the expense of later phases of product lifecycle management. It is now clear that the scope
of ICH has evolved beyond the early phases of research and development. Perhaps a new mission
statement covering the current scope of the ICH will be issued in the future.
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framework that, if followed, addresses many of the expectations of international
regulators. ICH guidelines are divided into four main categories, as indicated in Table
2-1.

This research study focuses on the more recent ICH Quality guidelines published
between June 2005 and May 2012 (ICH Q8(R2), Q9, Q10, and Q11), including a
prospective guideline (ICH Q12) that has not yet been published. Collectively, these
guidelines outline the framework within which QRM operates; therefore an
introduction to the general concepts is in order.

Table 2-1: ICH guideline categories

Prefix

Guideline Type

Q

Quality

E

Efficacy

S

Safety

M

Multidisciplinary

Examples and Highlights
“Harmonisation achievements in the Quality area include
pivotal milestones such as the conduct of stability studies,
defining relevant thresholds for impurities testing and a
more flexible approach to pharmaceutical quality based on
Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) risk management.”
(44)
“The work carried out by ICH under the Efficacy heading
is concerned with the design, conduct, safety and reporting
of clinical trials. It also covers novel types of medicines
derived from biotechnological processes and the use of
pharmacogenetics/genomics techniques to produce better
targeted medicines.” (44)
“ICH has produced a comprehensive set of safety
Guidelines to uncover potential risks like carcinogenicity,
genotoxicity and reprotoxicity. A recent breakthrough has
been a non-clinical testing strategy for assessing the QT
interval prolongation liability: the single most important
cause of drug withdrawals in recent years.” (44)
“… cross-cutting topics which do not fit uniquely into one
of the Quality, Safety and Efficacy categories. It includes
the ICH medical terminology (MedDRA), the Common
Technical Document (CTD) and the development of
Electronic Standards for the Transfer of Regulatory
Information (ESTRI).” (44)
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2.2.2

Quality Risk Management: ICH Q9

ICH Q9, Quality Risk Management, represents the first internationally recognized
guideline specifically addressing QRM for the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
industries. Published in June 2005, the guideline offers an overview of general quality
risk management principles, an example of a risk management lifecycle, discussion
around the activities that occur in each lifecycle phase, and a listing of risk tools and
quality system areas to which QRM can be applied. This section discusses ICH Q9 in
detail, including generally accepted interpretations of the intent and application of the
guideline.

In the introduction to the guideline, ICH acknowledges that risk management has been
used with much success in other industries, as well as to measure and monitor the
intrinsic risk of pharmaceuticals, as discussed in Chapter One. The introduction
describes the gap the guideline seeks to fulfill—that of a risk management framework
addressing quality risks that could ultimately impact the patient. (45) Rightly so, ICH
Q9 positions the patient at the heart of all QRM activities by acknowledging that,
despite the diversity of stakeholder interests (e.g. regulators, industry, healthcare
providers, etc.), the interests of the patient are paramount. In practice, industry often
uses product quality as a surrogate for the patient, since the impact of quality risks are
easier and more scientifically and statistically valid to measure. Provided product
quality is defined with an appropriate link to patient, as in Quality by Design (QbD;
discussed further in the following section), the application of such a proxy is fitting.

ICH Q9 moves on to immediately dispel a myth that had taken hold in prior industry
and regulatory cultures— the concept of zero risk. In older quality paradigms, drug
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manufacturers sought to eliminate risk from their products and processes, taking their
cue from regulators who implied, through regulatory publications and inspections, that
no degree of risk was acceptable. ICH, however, acknowledges that “the manufacturing
and use of a drug (medicinal) product, including its components, necessarily entail
some degree of risk.” (45) This perspective shifts the industry-regulator conversation
from one of absolutes, where quality was a black and white concept of right and wrong,
to one focused on balance, where the level of risk is managed to protect product quality
and patient safety. The challenge therefore transitions from achieving an esoteric
concept of “perfect” quality to understanding what constitutes acceptable risk and
striving to achieve that state—perhaps the most significant paradigm shifts to occur in
the history of drug manufacturing and regulation.

Some other misconceptions regarding risk management are addressed in ICH Q9. For
example, many associate risk management with the use of rigorous, detailed tools, such
as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA; one of the most common tools
employed by industry).

However, Q9 is careful to apply the principles of risk

management to the practice of risk management itself; the use of formal or less formal
approaches are acceptable, provided the effort is proportionate the risk of the product,
process, or system being assessed. (45)

This enables industry to embed risk

management in all measures of activities, without the need to undertake a formal,
resource-intensive exercise. In addition, Q9 is quite clear that the “appropriate use of
quality risk management can facilitate but does not obviate industry’s obligation to
comply with regulatory requirements and does not replace appropriate communications
between industry and regulators.” (45) Compliance with all applicable laws, of course,
is mandatory; risk management may not be used to justify non-compliance or to argue
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why a specific regulatory requirement need not be fulfilled in a specific instance.
Rather, QRM can be used to offer perspectives on how best to comply with statute, and
to characterize the aspects of quality that are not specifically associated with
compliance. This distinction is discussed in further detail in Chapter Five.

The benefits of a QRM approach are many, ICH Q9 continues. (45) Better assurance
of product quality, for example, may be achieved through the proactive identification
and avoidance or minimization of quality risks, as well as the identification of sources
of variability in the product and manufacturing process that may be targeted for
continuous improvement. The decision-making process can be enhanced, as QRM
provides a lens through which scientific data and information can be viewed to better
weigh options and understand potential outcomes of a given decision. Finally, QRM
can “…beneficially affect the extent and level of direct regulatory oversight,”
ostensibly by increasing regulator’s trust in a company’s self-awareness through
transparency of QRM efforts. (45) The degree to which the patient, through industry,
has been able to realize these benefits is further explored in Chapter Four.

Per ICH Q9, the benefits of risk management are to be achieved through the application
of a QRM lifecycle, an example of which is depicted in Figure 2-D. The QRM lifecycle
is an iterative process consisting of four primary phases: risk assessment, risk control,
risk review, and risk communication, each of which is facilitated by the application of
risk management tools. 11 While ICH Q9 acknowledges that other lifecycle models

11

Risk management tools and their role in the QRM process will be discussed further in Chapter Eight.
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might be used, the majority of industry has adopted the exact lifecycle model described
in the guideline. 12

Unsurprisingly, the first step in the QRM lifecycle is the initiation of the process. ICH
Q9 describes activities that might be performed during this initiation step, including the
identification of resources, leadership, and timelines, specifying the problem statement
(also referred to as the risk question), outlining expected deliverables, and gathering
applicable data and information that will serve as inputs into the risk management
effort. (45) However, Q9 fails to describe when or under what circumstances the QRM
process should be initiated; that is, what triggers might exist that should invoke this
critical first step. This gap will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Eight.

Figure 2-D: Quality Risk Management lifecycle, as per ICH Q9 (45)
12
An optimized QRM lifecycle, using ICH Q9 and other risk management standards, is proposed and
discussed in Chapter Eight.

50

After initiation, a risk assessment is performed. This phase of the QRM lifecycle seeks
to determine which risks associated with the product, process, or system under review
are unacceptable—a determination made in three general steps. First, hazards are
identified as applicable to the problem statement / risk question (risk identification).
Each hazard is then analyzed to determine its relative criticality (risk analysis), using
the risk equation (likelihood x severity = risk) introduced in Chapter One. Finally, the
identified and analyzed risks are compared with pre-defined criteria to determine their
acceptability (risk evaluation). (45) The risk assessment phase of the QRM lifecycle
typically draws most heavily upon the use of risk management tools, which allow for a
methodical, structured way to identify and analyze risks.

The next phase in the QRM lifecycle, risk control, focuses on reducing risks to an
acceptable level. 13 This phase is perhaps the most important of the QRM lifecycle, as
it is the point in the process in which control strategies are identified, implemented, and
continuously improved; risk control is the phase that assures adequate protection of the
patient. There are two general activities that occur in risk control; the first being a
concerted reduction in risk through the application of risk mitigation techniques (risk
reduction), and the second including a confirmation that the risk mitigation actions did
not adversely affect the overall risk profile through the introduction of new risks or an
increase in risk levels, the risks are adequately controlled (i.e. that the risk mitigation
actions and other risk controls are effective), and that the resultant risks are therefore
acceptable (risk acceptance). (45) In the event the risk remains unacceptable following

13

The name of this phase, as well as the activities that occur within it, reveals an implied principle of
QRM: risks are bad and must be controlled. This implication is not always the case, as we can learn
from other industries and risk management standards; some risks are positive and should be actively
pursued rather than reduced, eliminated, or avoided.
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risk reduction, the QRM lifecycle returns to the risk assessment phase, allowing the
practitioner to repeat the process.

Following risk control, there is an output. Though included in the QRM lifecycle
(Figure 2-D), ICH Q9 does not devote any narrative description regarding what such
an output or result might entail. Typically, this portion of the lifecycle is interpreted as
a documentation point—the point where the results of the risk assessment and risk
control outcomes are drafted into a report that describes the risk assessment outcomes
(often formatted to align with the risk management tool employed), risk reduction
efforts undertaken, and acceptability of the residual risk.

Once risk control is complete and the results have been documented, the risk review
phase of the QRM lifecycle begins. The objective of this phase is to ensure that prior
activities and associated deliverables remain accurate, relevant, and complete in light
of changing conditions.

Knowledge gained over the product lifecycle, ongoing

activities such as changes to the product, process, or system, unplanned events such as
deviations and customer complaints, and changes in the internal and external business
and regulatory climate have the potential to impact decisions made in the risk
assessment and risk acceptance phases of the lifecycle. (45) Risk review, therefore,
entails a periodic or event-driven review of these changes to determine whether the
original risk assessment should be updated (as might be the case when new or
previously-unrecognized hazards emerge, or the original estimates of likelihood and
severity have changed) and whether the acceptability of the risk may be affected as a
result. In this sense, ICH Q9 positions risk review as an opportunity to confirm the
continued validity of decisions made within the QRM process; it does not address a
mechanism to determine whether the QRM process (and encompassing program) itself
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has been effective with respect to reducing risk to the patient. This gap is the primary
focus of the research effort, as detailed in Chapter Three.

A critical and often overlooked element of the QRM lifecycle is risk communication.
Risk communication aims to ensure all applicable stakeholders are aware of risk
information, including such aspects as the “…existence, nature, form, probability,
severity, acceptability, control, treatment, detectability or other aspects of risks to
quality.” (45) Such communication most commonly occurs at the output stage of the
QRM lifecycle, leveraging the documentation associated with the risk assessment and
control activities as the primary mechanism to communicate; however, risk
communication can, and should, occur at other stages of the QRM lifecycle, based on
the nature and criticality of the identified risks. Risk communication can occur between
varieties of “interested parties”, as depicted in Figure 2-E.

Figure 2-E: Potential channels for risk communication
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A significant challenge in the communication of quality risks lies in the relatively
limited options for communication between QRM practitioners and decision makers
and the patient. Unlike intrinsic risks (such as known adverse reactions) which are
typically communicated through product labeling, extrinsic risks, including quality
risks, have no defined mechanism for communication. This challenge will be discussed
in further detail in Chapter Eight.

ICH Q9 concludes with two annexes: the first describing common risk management
tools that may be used to execute the QRM lifecycle, and the second describing
potential areas for QRM application within the quality system and product lifecycle.
(45) These annexes are of pivotal importance to the effective implementation of QRM
and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Eight.

Despite ICH’s insistence that the Q9 guideline “…is not intended to create any new
expectations beyond the current regulatory requirements,” (45) regulatory bodies the
world over embraced QRM and have since integrated it at the regional level. Some
examples are:

•

Inclusion of a new annex to the EU GMPs (Annex 20 14), as well as revisions
to other directives, annexes, and guidelines to incorporate the principles and
practices of quality risk management (46)

•

Inclusion of a new annex to the PIC/S GMP guide (also Annex 20) to adopt
ICH Q9 for all member countries (47)

14
Annex 20 has since been retired; the QRM requirements have been moved into Chapter 3 of the EU
GMPs.
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•

Publication of the World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines on quality
risk management (48)

In addition, QRM has evolved into the foundation of drug development and cGMP
platforms, as described in ICH Q8(R2), Q10, and Q11.

2.2.3

Quality by Design: ICH Q8(R2) and ICH Q11

ICH Q8, Pharmaceutical Development, (currently in its second revision) outlines the
process for the development of new pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical products,
based on the principles of Quality by Design (QbD). 15 This concept, as described in
ICH Q8(R2), brought drug development into the modern era.

In traditional developmental models, a candidate molecule was identified, formulated
based on pre-existing knowledge of chemistry and pharmacology (or in the case of
biopharmaceuticals, standard cell culture and purification processes), scaled to ensure
manufacturing processes could serve anticipated demand, and maintained over the
commercial life of the product. In many cases, manufacturers, marketing authorization
holders (MAHs), and regulators possessed little knowledge of why the product worked
and how the associated manufacturing processes supported the clinical effects of the
product. As a result, change was demonized; significant efforts were made to keep the
manufacturing process static, since the potential implications of change were largely
unknown. Over time, this led to antiquated products and associated manufacturing

15

The concept of Quality by Design (commonly described as building quality into the production of a
product, as opposed to Quality by Testing, or relying on the testing a product after production to ensure
compliance with specifications) was originally discussed by Joseph Juran in his 1992 book Juran on
Quality by Design: The New Steps for Planning Quality into Goods and Services. The pharmaceutical
industry, regulators, and patients the world over owe Juran a debt of gratitude for his ideas, many of
which are only just starting to permeate the fabric of industry. Juran was ahead of time in many respects,
and earned his informal title of quality guru.
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processes, a general reluctance to harnessing the newest available manufacturing
technology, and stalled efforts towards continuous improvement. 16

In QbD development models, the emphasis is on understanding the linkages between
the product and its clinical effects in the patient, the manufacturing process and the
product it delivers, and manufacturing systems and the processes they support. (49)
Quality risk management plays a pivotal role in a QbD development model, by helping
to improve the breadth and depth of product and process knowledge and enabling this
knowledge to serve as an input into manufacturing process design. The application of
QbD (and by extension, QRM) ensures that the manufacturing process delivers a
product that consistently meets its specifications, that the defined specifications have
meaning in a clinical context.

The first step in applying QbD principles to drug development is to define the Quality
Target Product Profile (QTPP); that is, the overarching quality characteristics of the
product to ensure quality, safety, efficacy, and usability. (49) A list of product attributes
can be created from the QTPP and preliminary developmental studies. Through the
application of QRM principles and tools, the product attributes can be further triaged
to identify those that are critical to the patient (Critical Quality Attributes or CQAs) and
those that are not. This distinction allows for the focused application of resources (for
example, technical and toxicological studies, preclinical and clinical protocol
development, and experimental design) to gain knowledge where it matters.

16

Section 2.2.5, describing ICH Q12, discusses the change-averse culture in additional detail.
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The identified CQAs are used as the input into manufacturing process development and
characterization. Given the large number of variables that exist in even the simplest
manufacturing process, the need to distinguish between those variables that are critical
to ensure the CQAs are met and those that are not becomes clear. Process parameters
or variables that have a direct link to CQAs are deemed Critical Process Parameters, or
CPPs, and are identified through the application of QRM. (49)

Manufacturing systems, including facilities, utilities, and equipment, are not discussed
in detail in ICH Q8(R2). However, these crucial components are often included in the
overarching QbD model, driven by necessity. 17 Where a manufacturer chooses to
extend their development efforts to manufacturing systems, a similar philosophy
applies; the equipment, utilities, and facilities are designed to ensure the CPPs of the
associated process are sufficiently controlled. (50) The attributes of manufacturing
systems that are linked to CPPs are often referred to as Critical Aspects (CAs). The
application of QRM to these principles is discussed further in Chapter Eight.

ICH Q11, Development and Manufacture of Drug Substances (Chemical Entities and
Biotechnological/Biological Entities), was published in 2012 and reiterates the general
concepts of QbD devised in ICH Q8(R2) as applied to of drug substances. 18 The novel
aspects of ICH Q11, when compared with ICH Q8(R2), surround the discussion of how
scientific knowledge and QRM can facilitate intended results in a drug development

17

Given that manufacturing processes are, by definition, run on equipment, using associated utilities,
within a specific-purpose facility, the exclusion of this topic from ICH Q8(R2) is peculiar. Other
regulatory guidances, such as the 2011 FDA guidance on Process Validation, have since stepped in to
fill this gap. (148; 252)
18
Drug substances are precursors to drug products, which combine the drug substance with other
ingredients to create the finished medicinal product form.
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landscape. ICH Q11 directs attention towards a number of applications of QRM in
product and process development, including:

•

The evaluation of options for the design of the manufacturing process

•

The identification of CQAs and CPPs

•

The identification of material attributes (e.g. starting materials, raw materials,
reagents, etc.) that may have an impact on CQAs

•

The identification of functional relationships that link material attributes and
process parameters to the CQAs

•

The prioritization of attributes or parameters for further study

•

The characterization of how downstream processing could affect the
acceptability of risk in upstream unit operations (e.g. how impurities present
early in the manufacturing process might be acceptable given the process
capability of downstream clearance and purification activities), and

•

The definition and continuous improvement of the control strategy and
associated monitoring program (51)

However, based on the relatively limited descriptions of how to employ QRM in ICH
Q11, inconsistencies and confusion may result. For example:

•

ICH Q11 notes that “either formal or informal risk management tools… can be
used.” (51) This statement could violate the tenants of ICH Q9, which notes
that the level of formality of QRM should be commensurate with the level of
risk. (45) Indeed, it is difficult to envision how the use of an informal risk tool
could be sufficient to characterize the critical elements of a product and
process and ensure their control as these are perhaps the highest risk aspects of
the product lifecycle.

•

ICH Q11 notes that “the risk assessment can also identify CQAs for which
there are inherent limitations in detectability in the drug substance (e.g., viral
safety). In these cases, such CQAs should be controlled at an appropriate point
upstream in the process,” and “when developing a control strategy, a
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manufacturer can consider implementing controls for a specific CQA at single
or multiple locations in the process, depending on the risk associated with the
CQA and the ability of individual controls to detect a potential problem. “ (51)
These quotes conflict with the very tenant they seek to explain—that quality
cannot be tested into the product, rather it must be built into the product by
design. These clauses from ICH Q11 imply that preventive controls should be
explored only in the event detection controls are insufficient.
•

Example 2 of ICH Q11 illustrates the risk ranking of process parameters,
indicating how QRM could be used to propose that low risk parameters be
changed without prior regulatory authorization, whereas changes to high risk
parameters would be subject to pre-approval. The use of risk ranking is
curious in this context, since it is not the level of risk that would enable this
determination but rather the severity of the impact a process parameter might
have on a CQA—one half of the risk equation. For example, a process
parameter would be considered critical in the event it exhibits a strong
statistical correlation with a given CQA—that is, if variation in the process
parameter has been demonstrated to lead to variation in one or more CQAs.
However, risk is not a measure of the likelihood that this correlation exists, but
rather the likelihood that unacceptable variation will occur, given the control
strategy. The ideal state, of course, is that all process parameters deemed
critical based on their functional relationship with a given CQA are wellcontrolled—meaning, have a low probability of affecting a CQA in the
context of the process and associated control strategy. The objective is to
ensure that all CPPs are likewise low risk.

It is possible that ambiguities of language and imprecision of examples in the regulatory
sphere, such as those illustrated above, could result in a reluctance to apply QRM, or
worse, incorrect application. The extent to which this has occurred in the past is
explored further in Chapter Five.
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2.2.4

QRM as an enabler: ICH Q10

ICH Q10, Pharmaceutical Quality System, was published in June 2008 and combined
the concepts of QbD, QRM, and GMP into an overarching quality management system
to be employed throughout the product lifecycle. This document was developed based
on existing requirements and guidance, such as ICH Q7, Good Manufacturing Practice
Guide for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients, ISO 9000, Quality Management Systems,
and regional GMP requirements. (52) ICH Q10 is often grouped with ICH Q8(R2) and
ICH Q9 when describing the fundamental paradigm shift that occurred in the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries in the late 2000s.

The objectives of ICH Q10 are to:

•

Achieve product realization, including the definition and attainment of quality
specifications as appropriate for the product and patient

•

Establish and maintain a state of control, including the definition of what this
state of control entails 19

•

Facilitate continual improvement by enhancing the level of control and
knowledge of the behaviors of the product and process interface (52)

In order to facilitate these goals, ICH Q10 reintroduced industry to the product lifecycle
and described how four primary quality system elements (process performance &
product quality monitoring, CAPA, change management, and management review)
should be employed over the various lifecycle stages. A sizable emphasis is placed on
19

Note, the concept of a “state of control” is also detailed in ICH Q8(R2). The concepts put forth in ICH
Q8(R2), Q9, and Q10 are synergistic but have slightly different perspectives: ICH Q8(R2) focuses on
product- and process-specific control, ICH Q9 focuses on control over risks to patient that might manifest
from products and/or processes, and ICH Q10 focuses on supplementary control through management
systems, such as change management systems and corrective/preventive action systems. Of course, the
totality of the control strategy should include each of these perspectives: process/product control, risk
control, and quality system control.
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management responsibilities, including ultimate accountability for the quality system
and its effectiveness. In addition, ICH Q10 squarely positioned QRM and knowledge
management as the two enablers of the quality system. Figure 2-F illustrates the
product lifecycle and the elements of the quality system.

Figure 2-F: The Pharmaceutical Quality System (53)

The product lifecycle begins with drug development, a topic discussed in detail in ICH
Q8(R2). Following technology transfer, the product is manufactured at commercial
scale for sale—products spend the majority of their lifecycle in this stage. The final
stage of the lifecycle is product discontinuation, which may be done for any number of
(usually business-driven) reasons, such as the expiration of patent protection or the
commercial availability of newer products for the target disease indication. Quality
risk management, knowledge management, and the four primary quality system
elements facilitate all aspects of the product lifecycle, from development through
discontinuation.
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Risk management principles and practices are embedded in all aspects of the quality
system, as illustrated in Table 2-2. The intersection of each quality system element
(column) and product lifecycle stage (row) identifies the benefits of applying QRM at
that stage.
Table 2-2: Matrix illustrating the primary functions of QRM at the intersection of quality
system elements and product lifecycle stages

Pharmaceutical
development

Technology
transfer

Process
performance and
product quality
monitoring system
Identify critical
quality attributes,
critical process
parameters,
preliminary control
strategy, and
monitoring
program

Finalize control
strategy and
monitoring
program

Commercial
manufacturing

Ensure continued
state of control,
identify and
implement
opportunities for
improvement

Product
discontinuation

Support ongoing
monitoring of
product in the field
and evaluation of
patient impact

CAPA system

Identify and
prioritize
sources of
variation for
further study,
correct known
issues (reactive
risk
management),
identify and
prevent
anticipated
issues
(proactive risk
management)

Change
management
system

Management
review

Identify, prioritize,
and implement
improvements

Confirm
acceptability of
residual risk
associated with
product and
process design

Ensure success of
transfer effort
through the
identification and
minimization of the
impact of variables
between sending
and receiving units

Create technology
transfer strategy

Identify and
prioritize changes
to reduce product
and process risk,
ensure changes are
implemented to
minimize the
introduction of new
risk

Identify new or
emergent risks,
track
implementation of
risk mitigation,
ensure appropriate
resource
allocation,
confirm continued
acceptability of
residual risk

Incorporate
learnings from latestage products to
newer products

Identify new risks
or emergent risks

As an enabler of the quality system, QRM is the “engine” that drives the quality system
over the product lifecycle, transforming information into knowledge and facilitating the
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identification of opportunities to improve the product and associated processes to better
serve the patient.

2.2.5

Lifecycle Management: ICH Q12

In September 2014, ICH announced a new effort to expand the portfolio of Quality
guidelines with the addition of ICH Q12, Technical and Regulatory Considerations for
Pharmaceutical Product Lifecycle Management. In the final concept paper for this
guideline, ICH acknowledged that, true its original name of the International
Conference on the Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, the majority of deliverables had focused on premarket requirements. There was a clear need, however, to extend the scope of the group
into later stages of the product lifecycle, since “the envisioned post-approval
‘operational flexibility’ [outlined in ICH Q8(R2) through Q11] has not been achieved.”
(54). In order to better facilitate this objective, the Q12 guideline will attempt to:

“…provide a framework to facilitate the management of post-approval Chemistry,
Manufacturing and Controls (CMC) changes in a more predictable and efficient
manner across the product lifecycle. Adoption of this guideline will promote
innovation and continual improvement, and strengthen quality assurance and reliable
supply of product, including proactive planning of supply chain adjustments. It will
allow regulators (assessors and inspectors) to better understand, and have more
confidence and trust in a firm’s Pharmaceutical Quality System (PQS) for
management of post-approval CMC changes.” (54)

ICH later changed its name to the International Council on Harmonization to better
align with the newly-envisioned scope of influence. (55)
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The announcement of this effort was lauded by industry, as the challenges associated
with regional differences in post-approval change management are many. (56) Each
country has a distinct set of requirements and expectations regarding how such changes
may be handled, whether through a firm’s change management program within their
quality system (with post-implementation communication to regulators), or through
rigorous pre-implementation regulatory approval. This poses logistical difficulties, as
companies must juggle inventory manufactured with different variations of change,
directing product to specific markets based on the CMC approval status of the
applicable regulatory authority. (57)

This often requires firms to continue

manufacturing product under an older manufacturing scheme to ensure consistent
supply of product to patients under the jurisdiction of regulatory bodies requiring preimplementation approval of the change. (58) Because of this, many have noted that the
global complexity associated with manufacturing change has discouraged innovation
and continual improvement.

Among other benefits, ICH Q12 is expected to more clearly link change management
with QRM and knowledge management, the two enablers of the quality system as
described in ICH Q10. (59) In addition, minimization of the regulatory hurdles
associated with product and process lifecycle management and post-approval change
management should spur renewed focus on improvement and innovation. ICH Q12 is
targeted for finalization in November 2017 and is eagerly awaited by industry and
regulators alike. (60)
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2.3 QRM guidance from industry, for industry
Following the publication of ICH Q9, industry eagerly embraced the opportunity to
share ideas and best practices related to QRM. The cadence of publication steadily
increased as ICH Q8(R2), ICH Q10, and ICH Q11 emerged, as thought leaders sought
to provide practical guidance to industry on the application of QRM. As outlined in the
literature map for this chapter (Figure 2-A), this section will focus on selected
publications addressing general, rather than specific, applications of QRM.

The first book published on the topic of QRM was one by renowned quality expert
James Vesper in June 2006, one year following the publication of ICH Q9. Entitled
Risk Assessment and Risk Management in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Clear and
Simple, the book posits risk management is nothing new; people (and industry) are
exposed to and must manage risk every day, whether they are exposed to hazards during
a daily commute to work or through the manufacture of sterile, life-saving medicines.
(61) Through this simple comparison, Vesper dispels any anxiety-provoking stigma
that might accompany the introduction of a new quality management tool and made the
concepts of QRM more accessible to and achievable by the reader. This pragmatic tone
quickly became the modus operandi within industry literature, as many subsequent
publications adopted a case study approach in lieu of rigorous philosophical discussion
on the principles and application of QRM.

Vesper’s book describes the objectives of and process for quality risk management, but
devotes much of the text to a discussion of risk tools and assessment methods. While
this was certainly appropriate given the low level of QRM knowledge within industry
at the time, combined with general (albeit misguided) perceptions that risk assessment
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was synonymous with risk management, the emphasis on risk tools is now viewed as a
very narrow scope indeed.

In 2012, the Parenteral Drug Association (PDA) published the first (and only) industry
whitepaper on the general principles and best practices associated with a QRM
program, Technical Report No. 54, Implementation of Quality Risk Management for
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Manufacturing Operations. 20 (62) In addition to
expanding upon ICH Q9 to offer additional guidance on QRM implementation, this
technical report expands the body of knowledge by introducing industry to three key
concepts to be applied in QRM: risk maturity, the formality spectrum, and human
heuristics.

PDA chose to begin the technical report with an introduction of risk maturity, which
serves as the foundation of this research effort and is discussed in detail throughout this
thesis. A brief review of where QRM should be applied throughout the product
lifecycle, as described in ICH Q8(R2), Q9, and Q10, is offered, followed by a
discussion of the different types of risk management: proactive and reactive. This
distinction is particularly important but had not been given much attention in the ICH
guidelines; the inclusion of this concept in the PDA technical report sets the tone for
future discussions within industry. In addition, PDA proceeds to examine the role of

20

While other whitepapers on QRM exist from PDA and its peer, the International Society for
Pharmaceutical Engineers (ISPE), those are focused on providing an overview, typically in case study
format, of how QRM can be applied to a specific problem or technology platform. For example, PDA’s
2008 Technical Report No. 44, Quality Risk Management for Aseptic Processes reviews QRM as applied
to product sterility; ISPE’s 2010 Baseline Guide Risk-based Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products
addresses only cross-contamination risks only; and ISPE’s 2011 Science and Risk-based Approach for
the Delivery of Facilities, System, and Equipment and Applied Risk Management for Commissioning and
Qualification focus solely on QRM application within engineering and qualification efforts. The
specificity and narrow scope of these whitepapers rendered them inappropriate for this chapter, although
the implications of these documents (and the targeted risk management mindset they represent) is
addressed in Chapters Five and Eight.
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governance in a QRM program, including organizational and managerial aspects that
are pivotal to the success of QRM; not least of these being transparency in
communication throughout all levels of a company. (62) This success factor has been
identified as an ongoing challenge, discussed further in Chapters Seven and Nine.

The PDA technical report also explores the concept of proportionality of risk
management, explaining the intent behind the clause in ICH Q9 that efforts in QRM
should be commensurate with the level of risk. (45) PDA relates proportionality to
various risk tools and the rigor with which they should be applied. For example, PDA
suggests that more formal tools, such as FMEA or HACCP, should be applied to more
critical and complex systems and leverage expert knowledge from a risk facilitator and
curated QRM team to execute the assessment, while less formal tools such as risk
ranking need not employ the services of QRM experts in all cases. PDA points out that
formality should not be considered a dichotomy (i.e. either formal or informal), but
rather is a spectrum that allows for various combinations of rigorous methods,
techniques, documentation options, and expertise to be employed as appropriate for the
risk question. (62)

The concept of human heuristics, as applicable to QRM exercises, is likewise reviewed
in PDA’s Technical Report No. 54. The influence of human heuristics on decisionmaking processes was first identified by decision science gurus Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, whose work earned a Noble Prize in Economics in 2002. 21 PDA
borrowed both from Kahneman/Tversky and from the Pharmaceutical Regulatory

21

While Kahneman and Tversky considered themselves cognitive psychologists, they are credited with
establishing a new field of study known as behavioral economics, for which the Nobel Prize was
awarded. Though the Prize went to Kahneman, it is broadly acknowledged that Tversky would have
been a co-recipient had he been alive to receive it. (119)
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Science Team’s (PRST) own Dr. Kevin O’Donnell, who made the critical linkage
between Kahneman’s work and QRM in 2010 through the publication of a two-part
article addressing subjectivity and uncertainty in QRM exercises. (63) (64) Human
heuristics are cognitive “shortcuts” that are used when judgments are made in the
presence of uncertainty; colloquially these are referred to as “rules of thumb.”
Heuristics have the potential to adversely affect the validity of risk analyses and risk
acceptance decisions, as the estimation of risks and their acceptability to the patient can
be greatly influenced by cognitive shortcuts at the expense of scientific knowledge.
PDA called attention to this phenomenon where other sources had neglected it; the
importance of human heuristics in QRM marks this as a breakthrough.

PDA Technical Report No. 54 was one of the earliest documents of its kind, focused
on the establishment of a QRM program to be integrated and applied within the product
lifecycle. Because of this strategic perspective and the best practices offered within the
text, this technical report has become one of the most widely referenced treatises on the
enabling function QRM plays in an effective quality system.

Risk

Management

Applications

in

Pharmaceutical

and

Biopharmaceutical

Manufacturing, edited by Mollah et al and published in 2013, offers a modern and much
more sophisticated treatise on QRM, including chapters on philosophical, academic,
and statistical topics that enabled a more comprehensive understanding of the benefits
and concepts underpinning QRM. (65) The book is comprised of chapters on various
QRM topics, compiled from myriad QRM experts; this book therefore represented the
perspectives of thought leaders on QRM at the time.
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Mollah et al provide a succinct business case for the application of risk management
for quality improvement before delving into how various risk management tools can
support the overarching QRM lifecycle. Acknowledging the difficulty of providing
discrete “rules” around the use of particular methodologies at the expense of others,
Walker and Busmann compare the advantages and limitations of the basic QRM toolkit
(e.g. those summarized in Annex I of ICH Q9). (66) A noticeable gap in the relevant
chapter surrounds tool selection—how to select the best fit risk tool for a particular
circumstance and risk question. This gap will be discussed further in Chapter Eight.

Long offers his expertise on regulatory expectations of QRM, including common
misunderstandings and pitfalls associated with risk implementation, in his chapter
“Risk Management: Regulatory Expectation, Risk Perception, and Organizational
Integration.” (67) Some instances of QRM misuse as described by Long include:

•

Lack of QRM usage (not assessing the risk to patient or product quality where
warranted by an event or circumstance)

•

Improper implementation of QRM (lack of evidence supporting risk-based
decisions, lack of sufficient product and process understanding)

•

Variable risk tolerance (deeming a given risk management “acceptable” in
some instances but not others, with no clear explanation)

•

Use of QRM to justify an expected outcome (“reverse engineering” a risk
assessment to justify a previously-determined decision or outcome) (67)

Perhaps the greatest contribution of Mollah et al’s book is Long’s chapter on probability
estimates and statistical techniques as they relate to QRM exercises. (68) Despite the
fact that probability is a full 50% of the risk calculus (likelihood x severity = risk), there
are very few sources available to industry QRM practitioners that explore this topic in
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a suitable depth. 22 Long addresses this topic head on, explaining general principles of
probability, the roles of uncertainty and heuristics in estimating probability, and the
benefits of moving towards more quantitative, data-driven assertions to support the
validity of QRM outcomes. (68) Indeed, as this researcher explored in a recent paper,
industry commonly confuses risk management tool categories (qualitative vs.
quantitative) with the application of quantitative risk analysis efforts, using actual
probability estimates grounded in scientific data. (69) Long’s direct inquiry into the
relationship between statistics and QRM makes a critical connection that is often
overlooked by industry practitioners.

Based on the depth of discussion to all manners of QRM topics, Risk Management
Applications in Pharmaceutical and Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing serves as a rich
source of knowledge that can enhance the level of expertise of its readership,
contributing to general increases of QRM maturity within industry.

Several key lines of inquiry were extracted from the general literature review to serve
as focus areas throughout the research effort. These include:

•

The need to concentrate on program effectiveness in reducing risk to the
patient when evaluating QRM maturity

•

The need to link QRM with medicinal product development and
characterization efforts (as in ICH Q8(R2) and Q11), as well as the
pharmaceutical quality system (as in ICH Q10)

22

The lack of attention paid to statistical consideration in risk analysis is particularly disappointing in
the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, which are grounded in sound science, the scientific
method, and associated mathematical and statistical ways of analyzing and understanding data. Given
the fact that, as Kahneman noted, people are poor “intuitive statisticians,” (119) the importance of
connecting QRM to objective and rigorous sources of knowledge is essential.
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•

The need to ensure that key concepts that influence QRM outcomes (or might
degrade the integrity of the QRM process) are integrated within the
overarching QRM program. Such concepts include:
o Risk tool selection, including the formality spectrum and
advantages/limitations of common risk management tools

Chapter Three of this thesis further details how these earmarked themes were
incorporated into the overarching research effort.
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3 Chapter Three: The Research Approach

This research study investigated the concept of effectiveness in quality risk
management in managing risk to the patient, in an effort to define a mature state of
QRM that can be used by industry to gauge their current level of QRM implementation
and progress on the path towards excellence.

Because effectiveness is a rather

intangible concept, stemming from combinations of business practices (processes),
attitudes and behaviors of those employing these processes, and the organizational
culture within which the people and processes operate, the research is primarily
qualitative in nature, although quantitative methods were also used. Mixed methods of
research were employed throughout the research effort, as best suited for the particular
aspect of the research question.

3.1 The researcher’s context
3.1.1

The researcher’s worldview

It is necessary for any researcher to examine their own philosophical worldviews prior
to commencing a research effort, as these represent the lens through which the research
is conducted and analyzed.

While these endeavors have many labels, including

paradigms, ontologies, and epistemologies, the researcher has selected the term
worldviews so as to minimize any potential for reductio ad absurdum. Many academics
undertaking a similar effort may position this process as one of selection—implying
that a particular worldview can be selected based on its appropriateness for the topic
under review. This researcher disagrees with this general approach, believing that each
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individual inherently possesses a natural inclination towards one worldview or another.
While worldviews may change over the course of a lifetime, they are relatively fixed
within the finite span of a research effort. Therefore the goal of this section is to
disclose, rather than to describe the selection of, this researcher’s viewpoint.

The best-fit worldview to reflect this researcher’s philosophical inclinations is
pragmatism. Pragmatists are not committed to any one idea of reality, be it an external
reality or one encased within the mind; the hallmark of pragmatism is that philosophy,
and the related concepts of reality and the nature of knowledge, is largely esoteric and
therefore irrelevant in any tangible sense. (70)

This researcher agrees that an

exploration of the nature of reality and what can be known is quite interesting, but of
little consequence with respect to the conduct of academic and industry research and
the resultant research outputs. Pragmatists are primarily concerned with finding what
works for a given problem, rather than aligning it with one particular ontological
position— this researcher agrees that “truth is what works at the time.” (71) With
regard to academic inquiry, pragmatism acknowledges that research occurs in a given
context, and therefore must be interpreted in light of that context. (71) For example, if
complete certainty regarding the future and complete knowledge of the behavior of
process variables in a system, for a given product, could be known, the field of risk
management need not exist. As a pragmatist, however, the researcher asserts that these
two conditions are not met (irrespective of whether they are theoretically plausible),
and therefore risk management principles and practices are necessary in order to
progress pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical operations and regulatory science in
any meaningful sense with respect to the patient. The context in which this research is
conducted is one of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge.
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Mixed methods research, as discussed in section 3.4, is particularly well-suited for a
pragmatic worldview, since this methodology allows for a large toolkit of different
methods from which the researcher can choose to best serve the research goals. (71)
This also enables the research process, as well as the research outputs, to have an impact
on industry practitioners, as engaging these stakeholders in a variety of ways stimulates
thinking and can effect change. Similarly, a pragmatic worldview allows the research
to focus on the development of tangible work product that can be applied and used by
stakeholders, the primary driver behind this researcher’s efforts. (70)

3.1.2

Insider perspective

The researcher’s desire to deliver a positive impact to industry is driven by her insider
perspective. With fourteen years in industry (as of this writing), the researcher is
equipped with a deep knowledge of industry practices and challenges, and has had
sufficient opportunity to see quality-based fads 23 rise and fall without gaining any longterm purchase, consuming an extreme amount of resources and intellectual capital in
their implementation only to see minimal benefits be realized as a result. Given the
criticality of the topic at hand and the amount of time, effort, and passion necessary to
advance the research effort, the researcher sought to simultaneously embark on a
rigorous academic inquiry and develop meaningful, tangible outputs to address the
needs of industry practitioners. As such, the researcher developed the overarching
research design with these goals in the forefront.

23

While some of these efforts, such as the principles and tools derived from Lean Manufacturing and Six
Sigma, remain in force in pockets or through faint echoes in other formats, a simple search of the
literature provides evidence of the temporal boundaries of these quality improvement schemes.
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The researcher’s own experiences within quality control and quality assurance have led,
ultimately, to a fervent enthusiasm for quality risk management. An early career in
various quality functions, including microbiology, product release, change control, and
deviation and CAPA management, led to a host of frustrations. A small error in aseptic
technique could contaminate thousands of doses that would have otherwise treated a
similar number of patients. A drug shortage situation could lead to deaths of many,
while the product awaits investigation into ultimately inconsequential deviations.
Seemingly minor changes, when implemented, could initiate a domino effect on a
manufacturing process significant enough to render it useless. It was only with an initial
foray into QRM that the researcher learned that such frustrations are both predictable
and preventable. The only obstacle standing in industry’s way was a map to guide them
there.

Insider research has both advantages and disadvantages, and inevitably lends color to
the research effort. Advantages of the insider perspective include:

•

Knowledge: Pre-existing knowledge of the research topic can shorten the time
needed for the researcher to orient herself, while allowing for a depth of
interpretation that might otherwise be absent.

•

Interaction: Researchers who are familiar with cultural and linguistic norms
in a given topic or within a given social group enable a more natural
interaction with research subjects, which is particularly useful when
qualitative research methods are employed.

•

Access: Researchers who are considered part of a given social group may
enjoy easier access to thought leaders within the group for the purposes of the
research. (72)
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Disadvantages of insider research include:

•

Excessive subjectivity: Insider status can serve as an impediment to
objectivity, as data is analyzed through an existing contextual framework that
may be too narrow.

•

Bias: “researcher bias in this context would refer to the process whereby the
researcher’s personal beliefs, experiences, and values influence the study
methodology, design, and/or results.” 24 (72)

The researcher acknowledges the disadvantages associated with an insider perspective,
particularly those associated with bias. The researcher has identified and discloses one
such bias that is present in the research process and outputs; namely, the underlying
assumption of the research question: QRM works. Of course, was this assumption to
be false, it is unlikely that the international regulatory community and industry at large
would have channeled so much energy into encouraging its adoption. 25 While this
fundamental assumption has been retained, the researcher has taken many pains to
minimize any potential bias in the research methods, construction of benchmarking
surveys and questionnaires, with all involved research subjects, and in the interpretation
of the results.

3.2 Ethics and privacy
The research plan received approval from the Research Ethics Committee on April 14,
2015. The was research conducted in accordance with DIT’s Ethical Guidelines. (73)

24

Of course, some sources claim that in certain circumstances, bias may be an advantage and should
therefore not be feared, since “the insiders’ biases may be a source of insight as well as error.” (97)
25
The researcher must likewise acknowledge that even this assumption should be challenged. Over the
course of the researcher, it became increasingly clear that there is currently no systematically-gathered
evidence to support this assumption. While personal experience and a wealth of anecdotes provide
support, Chapter Eleven of this thesis suggests that widespread evidence be gathered to, finally, confirm
or refute this assumption.
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The researcher has not (and will not) have any power over any of the involved research
subjects, each of whom agreed voluntarily to participate. Each subject has been (and
will continue to be) provided with an appropriate brief regarding the purpose of the
research, expected time commitments, and anticipated outcomes, and provided consent
in a documented format. Where requested, each subject’s identity was/will be kept
completely confidential, with associated data encoded to eliminate any traceability to a
particular individual.

A Conflict of Interest was disclosed as part of the ethics package to ensure transparency
with regard to the researcher’s current employment in the pharmaceutical industry. 26
The researcher’s employers had no access to the research in advance of publication, so
no competitive advantage was available.

All raw and analyzed data is kept in an electronic format, encrypted via Symantec’s
Endpoint Encryption software, 27 and stored on a personal password-protected
computer. The one exception to this are hard-copy consent forms which are stored in
a designated, locked file cabinet located in the researcher’s home. All efforts were
made to ensure that research subjects’ rights and privacy were maintained, and all data
was secured.

Ethical approval was sought and granted on April 21, 2015.

26

Refer to section 3.1.2 for additional information on the insider perspective.
Refer to https://www.symantec.com/products/information-protection/encryption for additional
information. Please also note that software support is purchased through an annual subscription which
is being sustained by the researcher through the life of the research effort, which will continue until
achievement of the PhD award or cessation of the program, at which time all electronic and hard copy
data will be destroyed.
27

77

3.3 A brief history of the research question
The original research proposal, as included in the research application and registration
package in June 2014 (74), cited the following primary hypothesis:

“Industry has failed to fully embrace the principles and processes outlined in
ICH Q9. QRM is absent or has been misapplied in multiple areas of the quality
system for the majority of pharmaceutical and biologics manufacturers.”

Of course, merely confirming or refuting this hypothesis would be an incomplete
research inquiry, with little ability to effect change within the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries. As a result, a secondary hypothesis was proposed, as
follows:

“A primary contributing factor to the current state of QRM in industry is the
lack of intra- and inter-industry benchmarking with respect to the constitution
of an effective QRM program. Without a successful model to emulate, firms
struggle to implement a holistic program to enable their quality management
system in the spirit of ICH Q9 and Q10.”

At the time of writing the confirmation report in the fall of 2016, the researcher had
progressed in her thinking and elected to refine the initial hypotheses into a research
question, as follows:

“Has industry achieved a state of effective risk management, whereby QRM is
conducted in an efficient manner and continually adds value to operational and
quality processes in the manufacture of pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
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products? What does effective and efficient quality risk management look like,
and how can it be achieved?”

This research question more sufficiently phrased the researcher’s trajectory at that stage
of learning, with the original intent of risk maturity preserved, yet re-envisioned as a
function of effectiveness, efficiency, and value.

However, as time passed, the researcher again began to rethink the true objective of the
research. Over the course of the three-year research effort, this researcher has been
fully absorbed into the academic and industrial world of QRM. Thought leaders and
experts have spoken at length about QRM at conferences, sharing their opinions in open
venues and in peer-reviewed journals, espousing the need to apply QRM to a
multiplicity of topics. Regulators, similarly, have increased focus on QRM with a litany
of new regulation, guidance, and inspection techniques.

Despite this increased

attention, the researcher became increasingly dissatisfied with the way the conversation
was evolving—while there was more discussion around “doing QRM,” there was less
around managing risk to the patient. As discussed in the introductory literature review
(Chapter Two), very few sources address the fundamental question of how QRM should
be used to serve the patient. Indeed, there are no such sources that look holistically a
comprehensively across a QRM program, including the governance, process, and
people-related aspects that are essential to build and sustain a state in which risks to the
patient are effectively managed.

And thus the third and final revision of the research question crystallized:

“How can industry recode QRM to better manage risks to the patient?”
79

3.4 Research design, methodology, and methods
Based on the research question discussed in the prior section, the research design
followed a phased approach to encompass the logical progression of research topics.
The first phase focused on characterizing the current state of the industry with regard
to reaping the benefits of better patient protection. The second phase sought to
understand the ways in which QRM is being used to try to achieve that benefit. The
third phase focused on better defining a mature state of QRM to realize the benefit, as
well as providing tangible solutions to help industry measure and progress on the path
towards the ideal.

Table 3-1: Research design, methodology, and methods
Research
Phase

Objective

1

Characterize the
current state of
industry with regard
to patient benefit
realization

2

Characterize the
current state of
industry with regard
to QRM
implementation

3

Define how QRM
implementation
might better protect
the patient

Methodology

Methods
•

Quantitative

Literature review / data
analysis

•
Explanatory
sequential mixed
methods

Exploratory
sequential mixed
methods

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Literature review / data
analysis
Structured
benchmarking survey
Literature review
Philosophical dialogues
Literature review
Philosophical dialogues
Semi-structured
interviews
Transcript analysis
Pilots /case studies

Mixed methods research was chosen as the most suitable research methodology to
employ within the overarching research design. Specifically, an overarching embedded
mixed methods approach was employed. This methodology includes combinations of
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quantitative, explanatory sequential mixed methods and exploratory sequential mixed
methods research techniques in an iterative framework. (71) Quantitative research is
primarily focused on data analysis, and where therefore chosen for the Phase 1 research.
Explanatory sequential mixed methods begin with quantitative research, followed by
qualitative techniques to support interpretation (71); this methodology was chosen for
the second phases of the research to better gauge the current level of QRM adoption.
Exploratory sequential mixed methods progress in opposite of explanatory sequential
mixed methods; that is, qualitative methods are employed at first, followed by a
quantitative inquiry to facilitate interpretation. (71) Exploratory sequential mixed
methods were used in the final phase of the research.

As discussed above, Phase 1 sought to characterize the extent to which industry (and
the patient) have realized the benefit of improve product quality and patient protection
through quantitative research approach. Figure 3-A outlines the research method
employed during Phase 1.

Figure 3-A: Quantitative approach used in the Phase 1 research

Phase 2 of the research used an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach to
characterize the current state of QRM implementation in the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries. Figure 3-B illustrates the research methods employed
during Phase 2.
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Figure 3-B: Explanatory sequential mixed methods used in the Phase 2 research

Phase 3 of the research involved a synthesis of the learnings from the prior two research
phases as well as some additional methods in order to define an ideal state of QRM.
Because of the iterative nature of prior and new qualitative methods and the quantitative
pilot/case study employed in Phase 3, an exploratory sequential mixed methods
approach was used, as illustrated in Figure 3-C.

Literature review /
analysis
(qualitative)

Pilot / case study
(quantitative)
Philosophical
dialogues
(qualitative)

Interpretation

Semi-structured
interviews /
transcript analysis
(qualitative)

Figure 3-C: Exploratory sequential mixed methods approach used in the Phase 3 research

3.5 The research effort
Prior to initiating the research, the researcher had published two peer-reviewed articles
on QRM and presented two industry conference sessions. While these work products
were not specifically related to a formal research effort with a defined hypothesis, the
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covered topics added to the existing body of knowledge on QRM and the opportunities
to socialize ideas within industry led to the establishment of positive professional
relationships with QRM thought leaders. 28 These publications piqued the researcher’s
interest in pursuing a more rigorous form of inquiry, and a research abstract and
application to DIT’s graduate program was submitted.

3.5.1

Summary of the Phase 1 Research

The research commenced in June 2014, immediately following approval of the research
proposal and admission into the graduate program. The initial focus was to develop an
understanding of whether QRM had yielded some of the benefits listed in ICH Q9—in
particular, higher quality products and resultant patient protection. To determine
whether drug product quality had improved since the inception of ICH Q9, an analysis
of quality-related recalls and critical quality defects in the US and Ireland was
conducted to identify any applicable trends that may cast light on the research question.
The researcher simultaneously began work on the first stage of the Phase 2 research to
evaluate potential improvements in compliance and QRM implementation through a
review of warning letters (from FDA) and inspection observations (from HPRA), as
described in section 3.5.2.

In December 2014, the researcher was contacted by the Institute of Validation
Technology (IVT) and invited to serve as chairperson of the institute’s first Quality
Risk Management conference. The researcher coordinated known industry experts to
participate as speakers and suggested QRM-related topics that were suitable for the

28
These relationships have proven beneficial to the research, in line with the interaction and access
advantages of insider research described in section 3.1.2.
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target attendees. The conference was held in Orlando, Florida (US) in January 2015
with a small but meaningful enrollment of approximately eighty industry practitioners.
The researcher provided opening remarks, followed by a presentation of the initial
quality defect and compliance observation data analysis discussed above.

The

researcher also presented two additional topics, on risk-based impact assessment and
the creation of custom QRM tools. Also in January 2015, IVT arranged for peer review
of a paper on the quality defect and compliance observation analysis, which was
ultimately published in the Journal of Validation Technology (one of two journals
published by IVT).

Chapter Four summarizes the data and analysis for the Phase 1 research.

3.5.2

Summary of the Phase 2 Research

Following the completion of the Phase 1 research, the researcher began inquiry into the
current level of QRM implementation, with a research plan that included a literature
review and data analysis, an industry benchmarking survey, a qualitative literature
review, and philosophical dialogues. At this time, the researcher was invited to
participate in a PDA task force, responsible for the creation of a technical report on the
application of quality risk management to the design, delivery, validation, and use of
manufacturing systems, inclusive of facilities, utilities, manufacturing equipment, and
similar support systems. 29

29

Participation on this task force proved to be a multi-year effort. The deliverable from the task force,
PDA Technical Report No. 54-5, Quality Risk Management for the Design, Qualification, and Operation
of Manufacturing Systems, was published in May 2017.
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In July 2015, the researcher was selected for the PDA Volunteer Spotlight. This honor
is granted to one innovative, active participant in the group each month, who is
highlighted in a full-page interview in that month’s issue of the PDA Letter. The
researcher was chosen based on her work with the PDA task force described above.

In order to reach a larger target audience and to enhance access to industry experts for
the Phase 2 and 3 research the researcher developed a proposal for a research
collaboration with PDA. The PDA was selected by the researcher for this collaboration
effort based on a number of factors, including the PDA’s reach (as of this writing, PDA
has over 10,000 members worldwide; (75)), members’ expertise and innovation in the
area of QRM, and the historical relationship between the researcher and the
organization.

The DIT/PDA collaboration proposal outlined the research objectives, portions of the
research plan which were intended to be included in the collaboration, anticipated
timelines, and benefits that the collaboration would yield to industry and regulatory
science. The proposal clearly identified that the research and all deliverables would be
conducted by the researcher, primarily leveraging the PDA QRM Interest Group and
other volunteers as research subjects. The proposal was brought to vote with the PDA’s
Regulatory Affairs and Quality Advisory Board, and received unanimous approval in
August 2015. The research collaboration was socialized through a talk at the PDA/FDA
Joint Regulatory Conference in September 2015, and in an article in the PDA Letter the
following month.

Having secured access to a large potential research subject pool, Phase 2 commenced
with a preliminary draft of an industry benchmarking survey designed to elicit both
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opinions and current practices related to QRM from volunteer respondents. The survey
was developed in accordance with current standards of survey research, (76) to:

•

obtain respondent consent prior to completion of the survey,

•

ensure only the target population could respond (industry practitioners who
could represent their current experience in a particular company, rather than
consultants, for example),

•

minimize potential ambiguity in the questions,

•

mask any potential researcher bias that may have inadvertently colored the
question, and

•

have a clear and logical flow

The draft survey was review by peers from the PRST prior to being coded in the
SurveyMonkey online software application. 30

The QRM benchmarking survey opened on October 1, 2015. An email was distributed
by PDA to its membership list to solicit participation. The survey was originally
scheduled to close on December 31, 2015, however the response period was extended
through January 31, 2016 at the request of PDA Japan, who expressed particular interest
in understanding any potential regional differences with regard to QRM adoption. A
total of 230 responses were received, including (approximately) 144 complete
responses. Preliminary results (addressing trends and themes for industry as a whole)
were presented at the PDA Annual Meeting in March 2016; the presentation was
subsequently featured in The Gold Sheet, an electronic periodical highlighting current

30

SurveyMonkey employs the latest security technology and encrypts each respondent’s personal
information to assure privacy. The researcher’s SurveyMonkey account was password protected so that
no person other than researcher had access to the survey results prior or subsequent to analysis and
presentation.
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topics in pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical quality and regulatory affairs and was
recently published in the PDA Journal of Pharmaceutical Science and Technology.

While the benchmarking survey was ongoing, the literature review commenced.
Because the goal of Phase 2 was to characterize the current state of industry with regard
to QRM, literature was selected based on two criteria:

•

Topic under consideration addressed QRM principles, practices, or a portion
of the QRM lifecycle

•

Content directly related to the pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical industry
(either through publication by a regulatory agency, industry group such as
PDA, ISPE, or IVT), or in an industry-targeted journal or periodical)

Peer-reviewed publications were targeted where possible, however presentation
materials and opinion pieces were reviewed as well, provided these had the potential to
reach the target group (industry professionals) based on the conference at which they
were delivered or periodical in which they were published. Literature was selected
through a systematic review of all sources identified in Table 3-2. An overview and
critical analysis of the literature is summarized throughout this thesis.
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Table 3-2: Sources mined for literature review (excluding books)

Data Source
RSS Feeds
The Pink Sheet Daily
FiercePharma
FiercePharma Manufacturing
The Pink Sheet
PhRMA Updates
Quality Digest
Pharmaceutical Online
BioProcess Online
Life Science Leader
Med Device Online
GMP Trend Report
The Gold Sheet
Life Science Leader
Pharmaceutical Technology
Biopharm International
Pharmaceutical Executive
PDA Letter
Pharmaceutical Engineering
PDA Journal of
Pharmaceutical Science &
Technology
Journal of GxP Compliance
Journal of Validation
Technology

Issuing
Organization
FDA, EMA,
ICH
Informa
FierceMarkets
FierceMarkets
Informa
PhRMA
Jameson
Publishing
Jameson
Publishing
Jameson
Publishing
Jameson
Publishing
Jameson
Publishing
GMP Trends,
Inc.
Informa
Jameson
Publishing
Advanstar
Advanstar
Advanstar
PDA
ISPE

Data Type

Publication
frequency

RSS Feeds

Continuously

Subscription service
Subscription service
Subscription service
Subscription service
Subscription service

Daily
Daily
2x week
Weekly
Ad hoc

Subscription service

Ad hoc

Subscription service

Ad hoc

Subscription service

Ad hoc

Subscription service

Ad hoc

Subscription service

Ad hoc

Subscription service

2x Month

Subscription service

Monthly

Industry publication

Monthly

Industry publication
Industry publication
Industry publication
Industry publication
Industry publication

Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
10x year
Bi-monthly

PDA

Peer-reviewed journal

Bi-monthly

IVT

Peer-reviewed journal

Bi-monthly

IVT

Peer-reviewed journal

Bi-monthly

Peer-reviewed
whitepapers
Peer-reviewed
whitepapers

PDA Technical Reports

PDA

ISPE Baseline Guides

ISPE

Regulation and regulatory
guidance documents

FDA, EMA,
ICH

Authoritative

Ad hoc
Ad hoc
Ad hoc

In addition, the researcher commenced philosophical dialogues with industry
practitioners and QRM experts. These dialogues spanned a number of topics, including
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QRM best practices, obstacles preventing a more mature application of QRM, specific
challenges and frustrations experienced by industry, and feedback on the industry
benchmarking survey. The researcher leveraged all available forums to conduct these
industry consultations, drawing heavily upon industry conferences at which large
numbers of experts were present. The use of active listening proved invaluable in the
Phase 2 research, and continued through the final stage of the research.

Within Phase 2, the researcher served as guest editor for a special double issue of the
Journal of Validation Technology, published in December 2015. This issue, dedicated
to quality risk management, featured peer-reviewed articles written by industry thought
leaders and current and former regulators and marked the ten-year anniversary of the
publication of ICH Q9. The key theme of the issue was how industry can improve
current QRM practices to achieve better results. In addition to compiling the issue and
working with authors to position the work within the overarching theme, the researcher
contributed two articles to stimulate industry thinking on important but neglected
topics. These articles, as well as those of the other contributors, became part of the
literature review in Phase 2 and Phase 3.

Finally, the literature review was extended to other industries in which risk management
techniques have proven effective; namely, the medical device, aerospace, and nuclear
power industries. Chapter Six is fully dedicated to exploring this topic.

3.5.3

Summary of the Phase 3 research

Phase 3 of the research focused on defining an optimal state where QRM can be applied
to better manage risks to the patient. Specifically, this phase entailed the development
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of a deep understanding of the ways in which QRM should be applied to minimize
emphasis on the risk management activities themselves while maximizing the benefits
to the patient. Necessarily this involved the exploration into risk maturity and QRM
best practices as originally envisioned in the research proposal, and involved the
synthesis of Phase 1 and 2 learnings with a more sophisticated and precise research
plan.

The three qualitative research methods (literature review, philosophical dialogues, and
expert interviews/transcript analysis) were iterative in nature, as learnings from each
inspired further research from the others. The design of the semi-structured interviews
was based upon specific areas of inquiry deemed necessary by the researcher to fully
answer the research question, as follows:

1. In your opinion, how far has the industry comes towards achieving the
vision and benefits of QRM as outlined in ICH Q9 and Q10?
2. What are the main challenges you believe industry must overcome in order
to more fully achieve those benefits?
3. What aspects of the quality system do you think require more attention and
improvement?
4.

What best practices would you say are currently being used in QRM?

5. What aspects of the quality system do you think are currently well-addressed
through QRM programs?
6. In your opinion, what would be some of the characteristics of a mature QRM
program?
7. In your opinion, what are some of the characteristics of an immature QRM
program?
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8. What behaviors of industry personnel do you feel must be nurtured in order
to improve QRM implementation and effectiveness?
9. In your opinion, what is the one (or most) key thing that must exist at a
company in order for QRM to be effectively applied?
10. Is there anything else you’d like to say with regard to QRM effectiveness
and maturity?

Interview candidates included a total of eleven QRM experts from industry as well as
one regulator, from the HPRA. Industry experts were identified via self-identification
to the researcher following the industry benchmarking survey and through active
solicitation by the researcher based on the experts’ reputations and industry
contributions. In each case, the interviewee was required to meet inclusion criteria
consisting of the following:

•

Ten or more years working in the pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, or
medical device industries

•

Five or more years working directly (or indirectly but intensively) in the QRM
field

Conformance to these criteria was confirmed by a review of each interviewee’s
curriculum vitae.

The interviews took place either in person or via teleconference and, with the
interviewee’s consent were recorded and transcribed.

In some instances, due to

scheduling and geographical challenges, interviewees provided written responses
directly to the researcher. The transcripts (and written responses) were then analyzed
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using a key-word identification process 31 to identify emergent themes from the
interviewees.

The literature review and philosophical dialogues included in the Phase 3 research
followed the same structure, with the same inclusion criteria, as outlined in section
3.5.2. The learnings from the qualitative research methods were used to define QRM
maturity, described in Chapters Seven through Nine of this thesis.

This ideal state, and the learnings from all three phases of the research, were then
combined into a QRM maturity measurement tool. The tool was piloted with two
volunteer organizations, both of whom requested to remain anonymous for this thesis.
The measurement tool design, application, and feedback from the pilot case studies are
discussed in Chapter Ten.

31

In some cases, synonyms were identified as key words. This was deemed necessary due to the wide
variety of metaphor and “catch phrases” used in QRM expert circles, as each interviewee possessed his
or her own individual “brand.” Refer to Chapter Seven for additional discussion on QRM vernacular.
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Section Two: Characterizing the
Current State
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“Go to the people. Learn from them. Live with them. Start with
what they know.”
- Lao

Tzu

“Lay a firm foundation with the bricks that others throw at you.”

- David Brinkley
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4 Chapter Four: Have Patients Realized the Benefits of
QRM?

This chapter describes the research outputs and findings from Phase 1 of the research.
This phase employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach as described
in Chapter 3, beginning with quantitative methods of inquiry, then moving to a
qualitative approach prior to interpretation of the results. The objective of Phase 1 was
to fully characterize the current state of the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
industries with regard to the realization of the benefits of QRM implementation as
described in ICH Q9. 32

ICH Q9 discloses a number of potential benefits that may arise from the implementation
of QRM principles and practices, including:

•

Better assurance of product quality through proactive identification and
mitigation of potential risks

•

Improved compliance by enabling an understanding of the relationship between
regulatory requirements and the unique concerns of the product or process

•

More informed and consistent decisions relative to product quality (for
realized/reactive risks) and quality system process design

•

Potential reduction in the level or frequency of regulatory oversight through
improved communication and higher confidence in quality system effectiveness
(45)

This phase of the research focused on the patient experience—that is, whether product
quality and the resultant level of patient protection has improved since the inception of

32
This research summarized in this section has been previously published in the Journal of Validation
Technology (146) and presented at an industry conference (142).
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ICH Q9. Based on this espoused advantage and the availability of concrete quantitative
data through which to measure its realization, a quantitative study was designed.

4.1 Tangible benefits to the patient – research design and process
The Phase 1 research sought to provide a systematic review of US and Irish product
recalls spanning the 2006 through 2013 time period. This timeframe was selected based
on the potential to identify trends in product quality following the publication of ICH
Q9 in 2005, through the most current period in which a comparable data set (i.e. a
complete year of data) was available. As depicted in the literature map in Figure 4-A,
this research phase extends the initial literature review described in Chapter Two.

Figure 4-A: Literature map highlighting focus for Chapter Four

Data from the US was sourced from the weekly enforcement report database available
through the Food and Drug Administration website. (77) Drug recall data was reviewed
in an effort to characterize product quality, and by extension patient safety, over time.
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In the US, drug recalls are divided as individual events, each assigned a unique recall
tracking number and associated classification level based on risk to patient or consumer.
While most recalls are separated based on product presentation and dosage form, in
certain instances (e.g. where all products manufactured by one firm in a given time
period were subject to recall) a single tracking number was assigned to a portfolio of
products. The data reviewed and presented in this section retains the separation and
classification as assigned by FDA, including subsequent corrections for previouslyreported data (e.g. expansion of recalled lots).

Data from the EU proved more difficult to retrieve. As a result, the research focused
on Irish recall data ascertained through publicly-available annual reports written by the
HPRA as well as research assistance for this project provided directly by the HPRA.
(78) (79) As the world’s largest drug exporter and the hub of DIT, Ireland served as an
obvious choice for a European perspective. (80) To enable the identification of themes,
data was coded according to a number of categories as reflected in the findings and
analyzed to visualize potential trends and enable comparison between countries.

4.2 Is the patient better protected? - research findings
As noted above, one of the potential benefits of QRM is improved product quality and
resultant patient safety. One indicator of patterns in this area is the number of recalls
that may result from inadequate quality products reaching the marketplace.
Improvements in product quality, such as the ability to meet specifications prior to drug
product release, should therefore manifest as a reducing trend in the number of recall
events over time. Figure 4-B and Figure 4-C depict the number of quality-related recall
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events initiated from 2006 through 2013 in the US and Irish markets, respectively. (77)

Number of Quality-related Recalls
Events

(78)
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Figure 4-B: Total Number of Quality-Related Drug Recall Events in the US, 2006 through
2013
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Figure 4-C: Total Number of Quality-Related Medicinal Product Recalls in Ireland, 2006
through 2013

A review of these data reveals an increasing trend. Further analysis of US data reveals
that in peak recall years (2009 and 2011), seemingly isolated issues resulted in multiple
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recall events. For example, Penicillium spp. cross-contamination at a single firm
(Aidapak Services) led to 1,021 recall events in November 2011 while cGMP
deviations in June and July 2009 led to 1,107 recall events from another manufacturer
(Advantage Dose LLC). While variables such as improved detection of quality defects
or increases in volume of drug products on the US and Irish markets cannot be ruled
out as contributing factors for the trends seen, the data indicated that recall events were
increasingly common over the period in question.

This led the researcher to examine how the application of QRM may have influenced
these outcomes. Table 4-1 lists the top three categories of recall events for each year
included in the research. (77) (78)

Annex II of ICH Q9 highlights potential applications of QRM that, when employed
appropriately, could be used to avoid these types of recalls. For example, OOS release
specification events might have been prevented through the application of QRM “…to
establish appropriate specifications, identify critical process parameters and establish
manufacturing controls (e.g., using information from pharmaceutical development
studies regarding the clinical significance of quality attributes and the ability to control
them during processing)” and “to decrease variability of quality attributes [to] reduce
product and material defects [and to] reduce manufacturing defects.” (45)
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Table 4-1: Top Three US and Irish Recall Categories, 2006 through 2013
Contribution Rank
(percentage of total quality-related recall events in noted calendar year)
Year

Country
US

2013
Ireland
US
2012
Ireland

US
2011
Ireland
US
2010
Ireland
US
2009
Ireland
US
2008
Ireland
US
2007
Ireland
US
2006
Ireland

1
Lack of sterility
assurance / sterility
failure (49.8%)
Lack of sterility
assurance (19.8%)
Lack of sterility
assurance / sterility
failure (29.5%)

2
Out of specification
(OOS) release
specification (10.9%)
cGMP deviations
(18.5%)
OOS release
specification (11.6%)

cGMP deviations
(10.5%)

Contamination issue
(29.2%)

OOS stability
specification (20.8%)

Incorrect or
inadequate labeling
(15.3%)

Cold chain failure
(33.0%)
Cold chain failure
(25.8%)

Microbial
contamination (nonsterile products)
(13.7%)
Damaged product
(18.7%)
cGMP deviations
(18.4%)

Packaging or labeling
issue (41.0%)

Damaged product
(15.4%)

cGMP deviations
(84.9%)
Packaging or labeling
issue (42.2%)

OOS release
specification (6.5%)
Lack of sterility
assurance (20.0%)

cGMP deviations
(50.6%)

OOS release
specification (17.7%)

Packaging or labeling
issue (70.6%)
Incorrect or inadequate
labeling (57.2%)
Packaging or labeling
issue (27.6%)
Incorrect or inadequate
labeling (59.9%)

OOS release
specification (8.8%)
OOS release
specification (13.5%)
Cold chain failure
(25.0%)
OOS release
specification (9.5%)

Packaging or labeling
issue (35.9%)

Lack of sterility
assurance (20.5%)

Cross contamination
(47.9%)

33

3
cGMP deviations 33
(9.3%)
OOS stability
specification (17.3%)

cGMP deviations
(10.5%)
OOS release
specification (13.8%)
OOS stability
specification (12.1%)
Cold chain failure and
cGMP deviations (tie;
11.5% each)
OOS stability
specification (2.5%)
OOS release
specification (15.6%)
Incorrect or
inadequate labeling
(8.6%)
OOS stability
specification (5.9%)
OOS stability
specification (12.6%)
Lack of sterility
assurance (17.1%)
cGMP deviations
(8.2%)
OOS release
specification and
Particulate or other
contamination (tie;
10.3% each)

“cGMP deviations” is a classification for recall events given by FDA. Information regarding the impact of such
deviations, or the specific nature of the deviation, was not readily available from the Agency.
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Similarly, QRM could have minimized instances of cross contamination, lack of
sterility assurance / sterility failure, and microbial contamination of non-sterile
products if used “…to determine appropriate zones when designing buildings and
facilities, e.g… [to] minimize contamination, prevent mix-ups, and [to determine the
need for] dedicated or segregated facilities / equipment” (45)

Though it is not clear whether QRM was ineffective or simply not used in the context
of these recall events, the data demonstrated that potential patient exposure to defective
product has not improved since the inception of ICH Q9.
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5 Chapter Five: How Mature is Industry in its QRM
Application?

The Phase 1 research concluded that the patient has not yet benefited from QRM in the
form of higher quality and safer medicinal products. Phase 2 of the research, as
captured in this chapter, sought to characterize the correlation between QRM and this
lack of benefit realization through an evaluation of the ways in which industry is
currently applying QRM principles and practices to drug manufacturing. The Phase 2
research employs a variety of research methods, described in later sections, and
continues the literature review introduced in Chapter Two, as shown in Figure 5-A.

Figure 5-A: Literature map highlighting focus for Chapter Five
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This chapter explores the extent and effectiveness of QRM application in the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. The concept of maturity was first
introduced into the realm of QRM through PDA Technical Report Number 54,
Implementation of Quality Risk Management for Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology
Manufacturing Operations, published in 2012. This report introduced industry to a
simple maturity model, depicted in Figure 5-B. The PDA QRM maturity model
includes five stages, stemming from no quality risk management at the lowest level
through fully integrated quality risk management at the highest level. PDA positioned
the model as one of the progression of process maturity, thereby using the conduct of
QRM activities as the measure of program maturity.

In the researcher’s experience, the model reflects the general progression of a company
as QRM becomes increasingly embedded within the quality system. The initial stage
is a lack of QRM, in which there is no codified QRM program and risk-based
assessments are not employed. This stage advances to one of informal QRM, where
risk assessments or risk-based decisions are employed, however there is an overall lack
of consistency associated with its implementation. Once a formal QRM program has
taken hold, the third level of maturity is reached, where risk activities are generally
reactive in nature, addressing issues that have already occurred in order to understand
the impact of the event. As companies focus more on anticipation and avoidance of
risks through proactive risk identification, assessment, and control, QRM programs
evolve into a more established, prospective state. Finally, the most mature level is
reached, where QRM principles and practices are woven into the fabric of the quality
system and product lifecycle and are therefore transformed into the normal operation
of the business, as shown in Figure 5-B. (62)
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Figure 5-B: QRM maturity model presented in PDA Technical Report No. 54

The PDA Technical Report provides a second example of a risk maturity model,
adapted from a model originally proposed under the umbrella of supply chain risk
management. This alternative model explores some of the cultural factors that support
and act within a QRM program, as shown in Table 5-1. (62)

Table 5-1: Alternative risk management maturity model presented in PDA Technical
Report No. 54
Risk Maturity
Level

No formal
processes
Ad hoc use of
stand-alone
processes

Accidents will
happen

Fear of blame
culture

Skills &
Knowledge
Unconscious
incompetence

Suspended
belief

Reactive, fire
fighting

Conscious
incompetence

Understanding
& Application

Tick box
approach

Passive
acceptance

Compliance,
reliance on
registers

Conscious
competence

Embedding &
Integration

Risk
management
embedded in
business

Active
engagement

Risk-based
decision
making

Unconscious
competence

Robust Risk
Management

Regular review
& improvement

Champion

Innovation,
confident &
appropriate risk
management

Expert

Skepticism
Awareness

Risk Processes

Attitude
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Behavior

The second model offers general concepts for each maturity level within four different
dimensions—risk processes, attitude, behavior, and skills and knowledge.

No

additional information, such as the distinction between concepts or how to progress
from one level to the next, is offered. In the absence of a fully formed QRM maturity
model (the gap this research intends to fill), the two example risk maturity models from
PDA Technical Report No. 54 were used as the frame of reference to measure the
current state of industry with regard to QRM. Though QRM maturity is likely to be a
continuum rather than one marked by discrete tiers, for clarity of analysis the researcher
chose to employ five levels of maturity, as shown in Figure 5-C.

Figure 5-C: Basic QRM maturity model used for Phase 2 research

5.1 Has industry improved the level of compliance since the
publication of ICH Q9?
5.1.1

Research design and process

The Phase 2 research began with a systematic review of US and Irish compliance
enforcement data spanning the 2006 through 2013 time period. Similar to Phase 1, this
timeframe was selected based on the potential to identify trends in cGMP compliance
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following the publication of ICH Q9 in 2005, through the most current period in which
a comparable data set (i.e. a complete year of data) was available.

US data was collected from the warning letter database available through the FDA
website. (81) Warning letters issued by FDA for cGMP-related concerns were selected
based on the insight they may provide into the industry’s state of compliance over time.
FDA is charged with protecting public health and as such has several levels of
compliance enforcement options available to facilitate this mandate. (82) Compliance
observations noted during inspections are summarized on a Form 483. Unlike the
practice in the EU, these observations are not categorized according to criticality and
therefore may not delineate the gravity of noncompliance concerns as identified during
inspections; in addition, access to individual Form 483s are not readily available.
Warning letters represent the “principal means of achieving prompt voluntary
compliance” with applicable regulations and are typically issued for significant
violations of related statutes or, in many cases, inadequate responses or commitments
from violative firms following the issuance of a Form 483. (83) Warning letters are
posted to a public access database and have the potential to offer a rich source of
information regarding noncompliance with cGMPs. Various cross checks (i.e. database
searches by year, company name, warning letter category, product type, and keywords)
were performed to assure the validity and comprehensiveness of the data collected.

Inspectional observations in the EU are not readily available to the public; the
researcher therefore relied on assistance provided directly by the HPRA and therefore
focused solely on the scope of inspections from the Irish authorities. (78) (79) To
enable the identification of themes, data was coded according to a number of categories
and analyzed to identify patterns.
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5.1.2

Research findings

Another potential benefit of QRM implementation described in ICH Q9 is reduced
regulatory oversight, which may be achieved through demonstration of quality system
effectiveness in the form of a robust QRM program. (45) (52) This allows trust to be
built between regulators and manufacturing sites, as regulators have visibility to the
depth of product and process knowledge at a site, as well as their level of self-awareness
over their own quality vulnerabilities. It stands to reason that, where firms fully
embrace the principles and practices of QRM, incidences of breaches of cGMP, product
quality defects, and resultant risks to the patient should reduce and compliance status
should improve over time.

This should allow manufacturers to demonstrate the

enhanced effectiveness of their pharmaceutical quality systems through the use of
meaningful quality metrics, such as reductions in the number of deviations,
effectiveness of CAPAs and change requests, and a reduction in the number customer
complaints.

Figure 5-D illustrates the overall number of cGMP-related warning letters issued by
FDA from 2006 through 2013. (81) The increased numbers of compliance enforcement
actions since 2006 indicated that cGMP compliance, and therefore quality system
effectiveness, had not improved since the inception of ICH Q9.
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Figure 5-D: Total Number of US FDA cGMP-related Warning Letters, 2006 through 2013

The researcher acknowledges that further analysis of variables, such as the total number
of cGMP inspections conducted in each calendar year and the proportion of inspection
observations (Form 483s) that ultimately resulted in warning letters, would allow for a
refined interpretation of the data; however, such information is not readily available
from FDA.

A review of warning letters through the lens of QRM revealed an increasing trend of
citations against the QRM programs and practices themselves, as shown in Figure 5-E.
This would indicate that, in the opinion of the inspectors, many applications of QRM
had not inspired confidence that the manufacturing site has appropriately interpreted
contemporary guidance and regulations within the context of their individual
operations.
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Figure 5-E: US FDA cGMP-related Warning Letters with one or more QRM citations,
2006 through 2013

Again, while additional variables such as increased QRM education of inspectors or an
evolving strategic emphasis on QRM may be at play, insight into the nature and extent
of impact of such variables is not available. Nonetheless, these data confirmed a gap
between regulatory expectations and industry practice over the period reviewed. This
conclusion was reinforced with additional analysis into the various categories of QRM
citations. Figure 5-F illustrates whether each individual citation indicated either an
absence (i.e. failure to apply QRM where warranted based on an individual event or
circumstance) or misapplication (i.e. inappropriate use of QRM principles or faulty
conclusions drawn based on QRM application). For example:

•

Absent QRM: “…we note that your response includes a commitment to
retrain personnel, revise procedures, and use of premade agar plates to address
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[deficiencies in aseptic processing techniques]. Your response is inadequate
because your firm failed to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of these
poor aseptic process activities, and the inadequate environmental monitoring
program, to evaluate their impact on product quality.” (84)
•

Misapplied QRM: “We are concerned…with your risk assessment, which
suggests that the failure of these products to meet acceptance criteria for
defects during the 100% inspection has no bearing on the quality of the
released units. Please provide detailed information regarding how you
reached your conclusion.” (85)

18.2%

Absent
Misapplied

81.8%

Figure 5-F: Type of Quality Risk Management Deficiency in US FDA Warning Letters
Issued between 2006 and 2013

An absence of QRM was cited in the overwhelming majority of instances. This was
striking, considering that ICH Q9 had been published many years prior; it would be
reasonable to expect that sufficient time had elapsed to allow industry to overcome
some of the initial inertia inherent in any paradigm shift, even one of the magnitude of
transitioning from “rule-based” to “risk-based” quality and compliance.
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Analysis with respect to the QRM lifecycle stage that was cited in the warning letter
was similarly informative. Figure 5-G shows the proportion of citations for the various
sections of the lifecycle: risk assessment, risk control, risk review, risk communication,
or risk management as a whole.

1.8%3.6%
5.5%

Risk Management
Risk Assessment
Risk Control
Risk Communication

89.1%

Figure 5-G: Quality Risk Management Deficiency by Lifecycle Stage in US FDA Warning
Letters Issued between 2006 and 2013

The majority of citations implicated risk assessment, the first phase of the QRM
lifecycle. Because QRM is an iterative process that commences with a robust and
science-based risk assessment, citations in this area of the lifecycle were particularly
concerning since it is unlikely that the remaining phases would prove effective if built
upon a faulty or absent risk assessment. The data is also revealing as to the level of risk
maturity of implicated firms—observations related to the risk review portion of the
QRM lifecycle were notably absent. Perhaps this is because practitioners failed to
successfully complete the risk assessment and risk control portions of the lifecycle; if
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so, it is likely that risk review phase was not reached. Unfortunately, it appears that
risk review has been neglected for some time, as a 2006 PDA survey on QRM practices
noted that a large proportion (41%) of respondents did not periodically reassess risk
assessments, while the majority (55%) did not evaluate the QRM program for
effectiveness. (86)

These data support the hypothesis that certain firms within industry are still in the early
phases of QRM maturity (i.e. Level 1 “no quality risk management” or Level 2
“informal quality risk management”, based on the model depicted in Figure 5-C), with
challenges centered on the initial risk assessment phase of the QRM lifecycle.

Another indicator as to the expected level of QRM maturity is whether warning letter
citations focus on reactive or prospective QRM implementation. While it is broadly
acknowledged that risk management applied in response to a realized issue (i.e.
reactive) can be helpful to get to true root cause and plan and to define an appropriate
remediation strategy, most risk management practitioners will assert that the full value
of QRM is achieved through proactive anticipation and mitigation of potential risks to
ensure those issues do not materialize. (45) (62) When QRM-related warning letter
citations were classified by emphasis (i.e. prospective or reactive; Figure 5-H), it was
evident that industry shortcomings were primarily focused on reactive QRM during the
prior eight-year period.
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30.9%

Reactive
Prospective

69.1%

Figure 5-H: Quality Risk Management Deficiency Emphasis in US FDA Warning Letters
Issued between 2006 and 2013

Examples of this emphasis are evident in the following excerpts:

•

“Please provide a copy of your investigation [surrounding breach of data
integrity through the deletion of critical analytical data and backdating records],
along with your risk assessment regarding the extent and impact of the missing
data on the quality of all finished drug products released for distribution.” (87)

•

“…your firm failed to investigate numerous customer complaints for several
lots of [product] concerning cracked vials… your firm's response failed to
include a risk assessment for the product currently on the market.” (88)

•

“…your firm failed to conduct and document verification under actual
conditions of use of [multiple] laboratory test methods… [in your response]
please provide a risk assessment for possible impurities present in [lots of API
released to market].” (89)

In these instances FDA was calling for the application of QRM in situations where an
impact assessment might have been used traditionally, i.e. where the full breadth and
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gravity of a cGMP-related event or circumstance must be determined. This trend
implied that FDA expected industry to have mastered reactive/corrective QRM, or be
positioned at a Level 3 on the QRM maturity continuum. Therefore, a gap between the
risk maturity status of industry (Level 1 or 2) and FDA expectations (Level 3) was
apparent.

While a comparable data set was not available from Ireland, excerpts from HPRA
inspectional observations indicated a similar gap in QRM maturity. For example:

•

“With regard to the usage of the flexible isolator / barrier for the dispensing of
[material X] in [room Y], there was no formal risk assessment documented
assessing the impact of the introduction of the flexible isolator on pre-existing
activities in the room.” (emphasis proactive, risk assessment; (79))

•

“Following a risk assessment exercise that had been performed in 2011 on the
use of diaphragm pumps at the site following a diaphragm pump failure issue
that had occurred at a sister site, appropriate actions had not been taken to
ensure that the controls on which the risk had been deemed acceptable in
(Site) were effective…” (emphasis proactive, risk control; (79))

These findings indicate that (as of 2013) the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
industries were still struggling with QRM. Maturity levels in QRM application were
low, and the benefits suggested in ICH Q9 had not yet been realized.

5.2 How is QRM currently being applied throughout industry?
In addition to the use of compliance enforcement data as a means to characterize the
level of risk maturity, the researcher sought data and opinion directly from industry
through the design, deployment, and analysis of an industry benchmarking survey.
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5.2.1

Research design and process

The design of the industry benchmarking survey began by outlining the knowledge to
be gained, such that the survey questions would align with the goals of the research.
The researcher sought to explore three pillars that compose QRM—people, process,
and governance—that in turn support the patient, as depicted in Figure 5-I:

Figure 5-I: Pillars of a QRM program

Because programs such as QRM require the engagement and dedication of practitioners
to work within it, people was selected as the first pillar to explore. This line of inquiry
focused on understanding the motivations, behaviors, and attitudes towards risk
management of the personnel who support and execute the QRM program. Processes
were investigated in order to measure where and how QRM is applied, using Annex II
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of ICH Q9 34 and the contents of PDA Technical Report No. 54 as guides. Finally,
questions related to governance, such as the support from leadership, ownership, and
accountability, were included.

The survey was structured to elicit feedback from respondents regarding the percent of
time spent on a particular QRM activity, the percent of colleagues who might express
certain opinions, and how various QRM activities had been codified within the umbrella
quality system. In this way, the survey served as a quantitative research method,
enabling extensive analysis and trending of resultant data.

The first two questions of the survey addressed inclusion criteria for the research
subjects.

The survey began with a research brief, developed as part of the

documentation package for the Research Ethics Committee, including contact
information for the researcher. The brief was followed by a mandatory question
regarding consent—respondents who indicated that they did not consent to participation
in the research were directed to a “thank you” page and not permitted to continue with
the survey. Respondents who granted consent through this initial screen were allowed
to continue to the next mandatory question regarding their current employment status.
Respondents who self-identified as consultants were likewise directed to the “thank
you” page and not permitted to complete the remainder of the survey. This ensured that
respondents answered based on their current experience with their current employer
(either a Marketing Authorization Holder (MAH), Contract Manufacturing

34

As discussed in Chapter Two, Annex II of ICH Q9 lists potential applications of QRM throughout the
quality system. Different quality system elements, such as product development, validation, deviation
management, change control, and sampling are listed, along with the objectives of using QRM in each
context. The content of this Annex was captured in the benchmarking survey to measure where and to
what extent integration may have occurred at a given company.

116

Organization (CMO)/Contract Research Organization (CRO), or other type of
company), rather than based on a portfolio of companies they might support, and
therefore assured fidelity of responses based on the targeted research objectives.

Following these inclusion questions, general demographic information (including
product types, company size, company location, applicable product lifecycle phases,
respondent’s functional group, and respondent’s position within the company) were
asked to enable subsequent analysis. The survey continued with general questions
regarding the existence of a QRM procedure or policy, compliance with ICH Q9, and
inspection status and results. The remaining questions were considered optional (to
reduce the risk of respondent fatigue and cessation of participation) and focused more
specifically on the elements of people, process, and governance described above.

The survey, once drafted, was reviewed by the researcher to ensure questions were clear
and unambiguous, and that the question design would support the research objective.
The survey was then reviewed by third parties (other members of the PRST) to provide
additional feedback prior to coding in the SurveyMonkey software application. Once
coded by the researcher, the electronic survey was piloted by PDA personnel to confirm
the integrity of the flow associated with the inclusion criteria. All pilot responses were
deleted, and a link to the survey was provided via email to applicable PDA members
and published in the PDA Letter, which also announced the research collaboration
effort.

The survey was opened on October 1, 2015 and remained active through December 31,
2015. Shortly thereafter, the leader of the QRM workstream from PDA Japan requested
that the researcher reopen the survey to allow for additional responses from members
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in that PDA chapter. The researcher obliged, and the survey finally closed on January
31, 2016.

Responses to the survey were downloaded from SurveyMonkey, encrypted as described
in section 3.2, and analyzed. A general analysis of industry as a whole was conducted,
using all responses to the survey. In addition, three sub-analyses were performed in an
effort to identify any new perspectives that might be revealed: analysis by region (based
on the location of company headquarters, using the primary ICH regions of EU, US,
and Japan), analysis by company size (based on number of employees), and analysis by
respondent position within their company (i.e. executive management, senior
management, middle management, supervisory level, and individual contributor level).
Initial findings from the QRM benchmarking survey were shared at the PDA Annual
Meeting in March 2016, followed another talk at the PDA Japan Annual Meeting in
November 2016.

5.2.2

Research findings

Two hundred and thirty industry practitioners accepted the invitation to complete the
QRM benchmarking survey, with approximately 144 of these providing complete
responses. Though not statistically significant in a strict sense, 35 this response rate
enabled a vigorous analysis that could provide insight into the general level of QRM
maturity within the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.

35

The

According the 2012 US census, over 810,000 people work in biopharmaceuticals in the US alone.
(175) Even within this small cross-section of industry, a statistically significant sample size would
require 384 responses, given a 95% confidence level and a +/- 5 confidence interval.
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demographic information provided by respondents indicated a broad variety of industry
sectors were represented.

As shown in Figure 5-J, eighty percent of respondents were employed by MAHs, with
eleven percent working for CMOs. The remainder worked for companies that perform
both functions, or fall into other categories, such as contract testing laboratories.

Both
2%

Company Type

CMO
11%

Other
7%

MAH
80%

Figure 5-J: Demographics – Respondents’ company type

A variety of company sizes were also represented, with the greatest response rate
representing medium- and medium/large-sized companies, as shown in Figure 5-K.

Respondents represented companies headquartered throughout the world, the majority
of which were based in the ICH regions of EU, US, and Japan, as shown in Figure 5-L.
In addition, half of respondents were physically located in the US (50%), followed by
Japan (22%) and Europe (14%).
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Company Size
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19%

Very Large
13%

Small/medium
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23%
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21%
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15%

Figure 5-K: Demographics – Respondents’ company size 36

Company Location
India
5%

Other
8%

Japan
24%

US
39%

Europe
24%

Figure 5-L: Demographics – Headquarters location of respondents’ company

36

For the purposes of this survey, small companies were defined as those employing less than 500 people;
small/medium companies employed between 500 and 1,000 people; medium companies had between
1,001 and 5,000 people; medium/large companies between 5,001 and 10,000 people, large companies
between 10,001 and 50,000 people, and very large companies employing more than 50,000 people.
These intervals were selected to represent company size based on the potential correlation with the
number of (human) resources available to work within a QRM program.
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Questions surrounding the respondents’ roles at their firms revealed a nearly even split
between those working at a site versus those working at the corporate level (54% and
46%, respectively). These data may reveal some limitations associated the survey,
since, depending on the company, respondents working at the corporate level (across
multiple sites) may have only indirect knowledge regarding the actual practices and
attitudes towards QRM at the site level. Some inconsistencies in the data, based on
direct versus indirect knowledge, are therefore possible.

Respondents also cover a broad swath of positions within the company, with middle
management-level roles providing the largest proportion of responses (Figure 5-M).
Furthermore, nearly two-thirds of respondents work in the quality assurance or quality
systems fields, heavily weighting data trends towards the knowledge and perspective
of the quality unit, at the expense of operations (Figure 5-N).

Respondent Position
Individual
contributor
23%

Senior
management
17%

Line
management
15%

Middle
management
40%

Figure 5-M: Demographics – Respondents’ position

121

Executive
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Quality Assurance / Quality Systems
Other
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3%
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3% 2% 2%

Quality Control

5%
6%

Validation

64%

Research & Development
Manufacturing Science

6%

Process Development
Operational Excellence or similar
Supply Chain

Figure 5-N: Demographics – Respondents’ functional role within their companies

With regard to product type, dosage form, and product lifecycle phase, biologics and
sterile injectables received the highest representation, as did the commercial phase of
the product lifecycle, as shown in Figure 5-O through Figure 5-Q. Given the primary
source of volunteers for the survey (i.e. members of the PDA), these demographics are
not surprising. Indeed, the majority of the respondent pool works within what is
commonly considered to be the most complex product types (biologics), that reach the
most people (commercial phase of product lifecycle) as well as those that carry the most
risk to patient (sterile injectables). It is reasonable to expect that given the climate in
which these respondents operate, particular attention would be paid to identifying and
managing risk.
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Product Type
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Figure 5-O: Demographics – Product type(s) manufactured by respondents’ companies

Dosage Form
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Figure 5-P Demographics – Dosage form(s) manufactured by respondents’ companies

123

Lifecycle Phase
Commercial
Clinical
Preclinical
Developmental
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Figure 5-Q: Demographics – Lifecycle phase(s) for applicable products

A full 90% of respondents indicated that their company has a QRM policy or procedure
in place to document how QRM activities are performed. Five percent of respondents
indicated that their company does not have such a document in place—this is alarming,
particularly since the respondents work for firms within the ICH countries of US and
Japan, for which ICH Q9 has a decade-long tenure. An additional 5% of respondents
were not sure of whether their company has such a document. Nonetheless, there has
been significant progress in this area since 2006, when only 48% of companies had
implemented QRM with an additional 30% citing their efforts as “in progress.” (86)
Nearly all of the respondents who indicated negative or uncertain responses to this
question in the benchmarking survey did not continue with the remainder of the survey.

The majority of respondents indicated that their companies’ QRM programs had been
inspected by regulatory authorities, as indicated in Figure 5-R. In the experience of the
respondents, the US FDA and European National Competent Authorities (indicated as
“EU”) review QRM programs in more than half of their inspections. The responses
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suggest that Japanese PMDA and Australian TGA do not appear to review QRM as
often. Health Canada (included in the “Other” category) also seems to have taken an
interest in firms’ QRM programs, although to a lesser extent than its southerly neighbor.

QRM Inspection Status
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%

Unknown

50%

QRM not inspected

40%

QRM inspected

30%
20%
10%
0%

EU

FDA

PMDA

TGA

Other

Figure 5-R: Compliance – QRM program inspection status

When asked about the outcomes of these inspections, the majority of respondents (53%)
indicated that their QRM programs only partially meet regulatory expectations (Figure
5-S). This is quite curious, considering that 86% of respondents indicated that their
firms’ QRM programs were compliant with ICH Q9. These data provide additional
evidence of a gap between regulators’ expectations of industry and actual industry
practices; a gap identified by the researcher during the data analysis of quality defects
and compliance observations discussed in section 5.1. This discrepancy may be due to
incomplete knowledge on behalf of the respondents, or differences between the ICH
Q9 source documents and regulators’ understanding of how the guidance should be
implemented within the overarching quality system.
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QRM Inspection Outcomes
2%

Exceeds expectations

4% 3%
38%

Fully meets expectations
Partially meets
expectations

53%

Does not meet
expectations
Unknown

Figure 5-S: Compliance – QRM program inspection outcomes

People: The first pillar of QRM

Respondents then completed a series of questions regarding attitudes and opinions—
the people element of the survey. A statement was proposed, and respondents were
asked to estimate the percent of their colleagues who might agree with the statements.
Statements expressed both positive (i.e. in favor of QRM) and negative (i.e. opposed to
QRM) opinions, which were then coded and graphed during the analysis to illustrate a
potential risk maturity level. This analysis was conducted such that the more people
agree with a positive opinion and disagree with a negative opinion, the higher maturity
level.

The first question sought to explore the general level of QRM awareness at respondents’
firms through the question “[What percent of your colleagues…] have no knowledge
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of QRM principles or practices?” This represented a negative opinion, so the results
were graphed to show that the fewer people lacked knowledge, the more mature that
firm might be. As seen in Figure 5-T, the majority of industry ranks at a Level 4
maturity with regard to QRM awareness, with an average response of 3.4. Some
differences were seen when considering the data by sub-group. For example, individual
contributors felt that the QRM knowledge of their colleagues was closer to a Level 3
(average of 3.2), while more senior managers estimated this at closer to a Level 4
(average of 3.6). Similarly, awareness of QRM principles and practices appear to be
much stronger in companies based in EU (average of 3.9) than those in the US and
Japan (averages of 3.3 in both regions).

Awareness:
“[What percent of your colleagues…] have no
knowledge of QRM principles or practices?"
60

# responses

50
40
30
20
10
0

nearly all

50 - 75%

25 - 50%

<25%

almost none

Figure 5-T: People: Level of QRM awareness of respondents’ colleagues

Looking past mere awareness into the amount of support offered by industry personnel,
respondents were asked “[What percent of your colleagues…] resist participating in
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QRM-related activities?” As a negative behavior, the results were graphed to show that
the more people exhibit this tendency, the less mature the company with regard to
QRM. As seen in Figure 5-U, the majority of industry scored a Level 4, with an average
response of 3.8. Similarly, differences were seen in responses by sub-group, with small
and smaller/medium companies indicating a higher level of support for the QRM
program (averages of 4.0 and 4.3, respectively) than large and very large companies
(with averages of 3.6 and 3.7). In the ICH regions, Japan exhibited the lowest level of
support (average of 3.6), followed by the US (3.8 on average) and the EU (4.0 on
average).

Support:
“What percent of your colleagues resist participating in
QRM-related activities?”
60

# responses

50
40
30
20
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0

nearly all

50 - 75%

25 - 50%

<25%

almost none

Figure 5-U: People – Level of support for QRM

With respect to the people pillar of QRM, maturity began to wane with the level of
engagement within the program. When asked “[What percent of colleagues…] are
eager to learn and participate in QRM-related activities?” respondents indicated that
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industry sits at a Level 3, responding with an average of 3.2 (Figure 5-V). This
response was relatively consistent across sub-groups, with no significant differences in
maturity seen based on company size, respondent position, or region.

# responses

Engagement:
“What percent of your colleagues are eager to learn
and participate in QRM-related activities?”
45
40
35
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20
15
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5
0

almost none

< 25%

25 - 50%

50 - 75%

nearly all

Figure 5-V: People – Level of engagement within QRM program

A similar drop in maturity was seen when respondents were questioned about their
colleagues’ advocacy for QRM, with the majority of industry seated at a Level 2 and
an average response of 2.8 (Figure 5-W). In addition, companies based on the EU
appear to have stronger advocates for the program (an average of 3.2) than do Japan
and the US (averages of 2.9 and 2.8, respectively).
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Advocacy:
“[What percent of your colleagues…] actively advocate
for the use QRM?”
60

# resposnes
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0

almost none
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25 - 50%

50 - 75%
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Figure 5-W: People – Advocacy for QRM program

The people elements described above (awareness, support, engagement, and advocacy)
can be placed on the QRM maturity continuum, since each attitude and behavior is a
precursor to those that follow. For the purposes of gauging QRM maturity with regard
to the people working within it, the highest level (Level 5) was defined as a state where
QRM no longer requires deliberate advocacy, since the principles and practices have
become such a part of daily operations that QRM is seamless with other aspects of
manufacturing and the quality system. Through this lens, the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries score a Level 3 (average = 3.3)—that is, a state in which
people are aware of QRM tenants and practices at their firm, are supportive of the
program, and are engaged in applying the program to their own work (Figure 5-X).
Industry has not yet achieved the ranks of actively championing the program, which
may play in role in the level of maturity seen for the other two pillars of QRM: process
and governance.
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Figure 5-X: Industry’s current level of maturity with respect to the people interacting
with the QRM program

Process: The second pillar of QRM

The survey then transitioned into a series of questions aimed at characterizing
industry’s level of maturity from the perspective of the process. The first of such
questions sought to explore the extent to which industry has integrated QRM into other
aspects of the quality system. The majority of the quality system elements embedded
within this category were taken directly from Annex II of ICH Q9; therefore this
question provided insight into the extent of compliance and potential gaps between
industry’s current state and regulator expectations that were identified earlier in the
research. For a series of quality system applications, respondents were asked whether
QRM was applied consistently (as a procedural requirement), ad hoc (not a procedural
requirement but applied on occasion), or not at all. Currently, the majority of industry
applies QRM consistently in ten of the seventeen elements: deviations, CAPA, change
control, complaints and quality defects, product and process characterization, product
and process development, systems lifecycle management, environmental monitoring,
internal audit, and supplier management, as shown in Figure 5-Y.
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QRM Integration into Quality System
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Figure 5-Y: Process – Level of integration of QRM principles and practices into the quality system
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These results are disappointing, given the direction offered in ICH Q9 and the potential benefits
available were QRM applied to the other twelve quality system elements. That said, differences
seen on a regional basis indicate that some companies have embraced these uses, with Europeanbased companies showing a much stronger level of integration than US or Japan (Table 5-2). In
addition, as might be expected based on the availability of resources, larger companies tended to
have a higher level of integration than smaller companies.

Table 5-2: Matrix of quality system elements where QRM is consistently applied by ≥50% of
respondents, by region

Quality System Element
Deviations
CAPA
Change control
Complaints/quality defects
Product/process characterization
Product/process development
Systems lifecycle
Supplier management
Environmental monitoring
Technology transfer
Process validation lifecycle
Internal audit
Cleaning
Storage and distribution
Packaging and labeling
CMO management
Training

ICH Region
Europe
US
Japan
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

The process pillar of QRM is associated not only with where in the quality system QRM is applied,
but also how it is applied. To that end, the next set of questions focused on characterizing the
extent to which QRM is structured in its application. The structure of QRM should not be confused
with the level of formality applied to the QRM process; formality refers to the rigor associated
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with QRM application (typically risk assessment), whereas structure refers to how well the QRM
process is defined. Even less-formal applications of QRM should be well-defined, to enable
consistency of application and ensure conclusions are commensurate with the assessment
performed; as such, more mature QRM programs should tend to be well structured in their
application. The responses to these questions were curious, as one might expect that QRM is
applied in either a well-defined or loosely-defined way. However, as shown in Figure 5-Z and
Figure 5-AA, the majority of industry uses well-defined QRM methodology <25% of the time,
and also uses loosely-defined QRM methods <25% of the time, with responses averaging a 3.4 in
maturity for unstructured application and 2.9 for well-structured application. While smaller
companies tend to apply QRM more often in a loosely-defined way than do larger companies, the
difference was nominal and did not extend to other sub-groups such as region or position.

Well defined:
"How would you estimate the percent of time your
company spends applying QRM in a well-structured or
well defined way?"
30
# responses

25
20
15
10
5
0

almost none
of the time

<25%

25-50%

50-75%

nearly all the
time

Figure 5-Z: Process - Percent of time QRM is applied in a well-defined way
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Loosely defined:
"How would you estimate the percent of time your
company spends applying QRM in an unstructured or
loosely-defined way?"
30
# responses

25
20
15
10
5
0

nearly all the
time

50-75%

25-50%

<25%

almost none
of the time

Figure 5-AA: Process – Percent of time QRM is applied in a loosely-defined way

The next set of questions endeavored to determine when QRM was most often applied: either
reactively, in response to a risk that has been realized or event that has occurred, or proactively, to
identify and manage risks before they are realized. While it is important to strike a balance
between the two, risk principles and practices yield the greatest advantages when applied in a
proactive setting, to identify preventive actions that enable the anticipation and avoidance of risks
to product quality and patient safety. Despite the broad acknowledgement of this fact from
regulators, experts, and practitioners alike, it appears that the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries have not yet harnessed the proactive application of QRM. Figure
5-BB and Figure 5-CC indicate that the majority of industry is in transition, performing risk
management before and after events in equal measure.
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Proactive:
"How would you estimate the percent of time your company
spends applying QRM proactively / prospectively?"
45
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Figure 5-BB: Process – Percent of time QRM is applied proactively

# responses

Reactive:
"How would you estimate the percent of time your company
spends applying QRM reactively / retrospectively?"
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nearly all the
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Figure 5-CC: Process – Percent of time QRM is applied reactively
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<25%

almost none of
the time

The final inquiry relative to the process pillar of QRM strove to characterize the perspective with
which QRM is applied; specifically, whether QRM is applied in a targeted manner (e.g. looking a
single risk such as cross-contamination across a number of products or systems) or a holistic
manner (e.g. exploring all potential risks associated with a given process or products). While there
are advantages and limitations associated with each approach, it is likely that a balance of the two
would best enable a vertically integrated risk portfolio. Figure 5-DD and Figure 5-EE demonstrate
that the majority of industry is focused on assessing and managing previously identified risks (such
as the cross-contamination example used above), rather than employing a more all-inclusive
approach to risk identification and control. The exception appears to be companies in the EU,
where respondents indicated that holistic risk management occurs more frequently than targeted
applications. While a targeted approach is beneficial to evaluate a specific harm when it emerges,
an unbalanced emphasis on conducting discrete QRM efforts aimed at known risks can lead to a
myopic perspective regarding the true number of risks present for a given product or process,
thereby limiting the effectiveness of risk identification.
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Targeted:
"For the QRM activities undertaken at your company,
how would you estimate the percent of time your
company spends assessing specific risks (e.g. cross
contamination, data integrity, etc.) across mutiple
systems / processes?"
50
# responses

40
30
20
10
0

nearly all the
time

50-75%

25-50%

<25%

almost none of
the time

Figure 5-DD: Process – Percent of time QRM is applied using a targeted approach

Holistic:
"For the QRM activities undertaken at your company,
how would you estimate the percent of time your
company spends assessing multiple types of risks within
entire systems / processes / product lines (e.g. cell
culture, tableting, fill/finish, Pr
60
# responses

50
40
30
20
10
0

almost none of
the time

<25%

25-50%

50-75%

nearly all the
time

Figure 5-EE: Process – Percent of time QRM is applied using a holistic approach
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From the perspective of the QRM process, responses to elements such as the level of integration,
underlying structure, timing of application, and perspective of application indicate that industry is
currently seated at a Level 3 (Figure 5-FF).

Figure 5-FF: Industry’s current level of maturity with respect to the QRM process

Governance: The third pillar of QRM

Questions exploring the governance pillar of QRM were structured in a similar manner to those
addressing people—that is, an opinion was posited and respondents were asked to estimate the
percent of their colleagues who might agree. For the purposes of the survey, governance addressed
ownership and accountability for QRM, as well as the way in which QRM supports decisionmarking. Since these concepts are often driven by the overall QRM policy and the behaviors of
senior leadership at a firm, governance may be considered “the tone at the top” from which
personnel take their cue.
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The first question addressing the level of maturity for governance asked “[What percent of
colleagues might say that] the application of QRM is the responsibility of the Quality
organization?” As shown in Figure 5-GG, the majority of industry achieved only a Level 2 on the
maturity scale, with an average response of 2.5. However, some distinct variations in responses
were seen within sub-groups. In Japan, for example, responses averaged 2.4, while companies in
the US were closer to a Level 3 (average = 2.9). Small companies also tended to score lower
relative to ownership, indicating an average of 1.9, whereas large companies averaged 3.0.

Ownership:
“What percent of colleagues might say that the
application of QRM is the responsibility of the Quality
organization?”

# responses

50
40
30
20
10
0

nearly all

50 - 75%

25 - 50%

<25%

almost none

Figure 5-GG: Governance – Ownership of QRM

When asked about accountability for QRM via the question “[What percent of your colleagues
might say that] QRM should be performed across all levels in the organization (shop floor to senior
management)?” the majority of industry ranked a maturity Level 2, although the number of
responses on the higher end of the maturity scale elevated the average response to a 3.0 (Figure

140

5-HH). As a sub-group, companies based in Europe were slightly more mature (average = 3.3)
than those in Japan or the US (averages 3.1 and 2.9, respectively).

Accountability:
“What percent of your colleagues might say that QRM
should be performed across all levels in the
organization (shop floor to senior management)?”
50
# responses

40
30
20
10
0

almost none

< 25%

25 - 50%

50 - 75%

nearly all

Figure 5-HH: Governance – Accountability for QRM activities

Figure 5-II shows that industry is squarely at a maturity Level 3 with regard to an understanding
of one of the primary functions of QRM—to enable risk-based decision making. When asked
“[What percent of your colleagues might say that] QRM should be applied before a decision is
made, to help inform the decision-making process?” respondents provided an average reply of 3.1.
This was relatively consistent across sub-groups, although regional differences were seen, with
European companies providing an average response of 3.6, Japanese companies a 3.3, and US
companies a 2.8—the least mature of the three primary ICH regions with regards to understanding
this principle of QRM.
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# responses

Purpose / Utility:
“What percent of your colleagues might say that QRM
should be applied before a decision is made, to help
inform the decision-making process?”
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

almost none

< 25%

25 - 50%

50 - 75%

nearly all

Figure 5-II: Governance – Purpose of QRM

The last survey question addressing governance asked “[What percent of your colleagues might
say that] QRM can be used to justify current practices / a decision that has already been made?”
This question was classified as the level of complacency within an organization, since using QRM
to justify current practices, rather than to define the optimal path forward, reduces the firm’s ability
to identify opportunities for improvement. As shown in Figure 5-JJ, the majority of industry scores
a Level 4 in this area, however the number of responses falling below this maturity model resulted
in an average response of 3.0. There were slight but meaningful differences across regions, with
European companies once again being more mature than industry as a whole, with an average
response of 3.2. The US measured an average of 3.0, with Japan falling behind at 2.8. Executivelevel management also indicated a less mature response, averaging 2.5, which is concerning
considering the influence individuals at that level exert over the direction of a firm. The responses
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for this question is rather disturbing, as it implies that companies are biased towards the outcome
of QRM and may be “reverse-engineering” risk assessments to support pre-determined
conclusions.

Complacency:
“What percent of your colleagues might say that
QRM can be used to justify current practices / a
decision that has already been made?”
50

# responses

40
30
20
10
0

nearly all

50 - 75%

25 - 50%

<25%

almost none

Figure 5-JJ: Governance – Use of QRM to justify complacency

The elements of ownership, accountability, purpose, and complacency that compose the
governance pillar of QRM entail similar concepts that can be combined into five maturity levels
on the continuum. The first of these is an immature state with no governance in place—a state
where leadership has not established an appropriate tone for the application of QRM. From there,
a firm might reach a state with a loose governance structure, albeit one that lacks meaningful
management support. The third governance maturity level is one that is fully functioning, but
where success can be attributed to pockets (or siloes) within the firm. Level 4 firms would have
progressed to state with broader engagement of functional groups; one where personnel apply
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QRM to their own areas and are held accountable for knowledge and reduction of risks. Finally,
the highest maturity level would entail a fully integrated governance structure where risks are
being managed and are visible through all layers of management. Based on the responses received
through the benchmarking survey, industry is currently at a Level 3; a state in which QRM has not
fully penetrated the fabric of the firm and is siloed in its application (Figure 5-KK).

Figure 5-KK: Industry’s current level of maturity for QRM governance

Questions of value

The survey progressed to ascertain the value that respondents felt QRM brought to their daily
operations. The first of such questions asked “[What percent of your colleagues might agree that]
QRM is a box-ticking exercise with no real value?” Respondents made a clear statement that this
is not the case, indicating that this was a rare sentiment throughout industry (Figure 5-LL).
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Similarly, when asked whether QRM enabled product quality improvement, quality systems
improvement, and business objective realization, the majority of respondents felt risk management
was either valuable or very valuable (75%, 77%, and 61%, respectively, as shown in Figure 5-MM
through Figure 5-OO).

Value:
“What percent of your colleagues might agree that
QRM is a box-ticking exercise with no real value?”
50
# responses

40
30
20
10
0

nearly all

50 - 75%

25 - 50%

<25%

almost none

Figure 5-LL: Value – Perception that QRM adds value to the organization

How valuable do you find QRM for helping
to improve product quality?
Not used for this purpose

3% 3% 2%
38%

Not valuable

17%

Minimally valuable
Moderately valuable

37%

Very valuable
Unknown
Figure 5-MM: Value – Value of QRM for improving product quality
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How valuable do you find QRM for helping
to improve quality systems?
3% 4%

Not used for this
purpose
Not valuable

3%
13%

36%

Minimally valuable
Moderately valuable

41%

Very valuable
Unknown

Figure 5-NN: Value – Value of QRM for improving quality systems effectiveness

How valuable do you find QRM for helping
to improve the business and/or achieve
business objectives?
7% 7%

17%

7%

Not used for this purpose

18%

Not valuable
Minimally valuable
Moderately valuable

44%

Very valuable
Unknown

Figure 5-OO: Value – Value of QRM for enabling business objectives to be met
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Based on the QRM benchmarking survey results, the current state of maturity in industry is a Level
3 for the people and process pillars of QRM, and a slightly lower 2.5 for the governance pillar.
While no meaningful distinctions were found based on company size or respondent perception
based on position, there is a clear difference in maturity based on region. Companies based in the
EU (between Level 3 and Level 4) appear to be more mature than the US (Level 3), which in turn
appears to be more mature than Japan (between Level 2 and Level 3). Correlating factors for this
phenomenon include the extent to which QRM has become embedded within regional regulation,
and the degree to which regional regulatory authorities inspect QRM programs.

Irrespective of region, ten years after the publication of ICH Q9, one might expect industry to be
further along the path towards maturity; however, the majority of respondents felt their QRM
programs were on par with other companies in industry (Figure 5-PP). Potential obstacles
impeding a more mature state are explored in section 5.3.

How would you characterize the maturity
of your QRM program compared with
other companies in the industry?
12%

More mature than other
companies

15%

On par with other
companies

28%

Less mature than other
companies

45%

Unknown

Figure 5-PP: Benchmarking – Estimate of QRM program maturity when compared with other
companies
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The last question in the benchmarking survey sought to validate the research plan. Respondents
were asked whether their companies had interest in benchmarking their QRM programs with other
companies, to better understand best practices and pitfalls. Over half of respondents (56%)
indicated that such a need exists, with another 29% being unsure. The remainder of the research
effort, including the development of a QRM maturity measurement tool, aims to fill this gap for
industry.

5.3 What obstacles might be preventing a more mature state?
5.3.1

Research design and process

Following the quantitative analyses performed to evaluate whether the patient has fully realized
the benefits of QRM and to benchmark risk maturity throughout industry, the qualitative portion
of Phase 2 began. This phase used literature review and philosophical dialogues to understand
potential obstacles that have impeded industry’s path towards a more mature state. Philosophical
dialogues were conducted at a series of industry conferences comprised of delegates from multiple
areas of expertise; these conversations included representatives from industry, regulatory
authorities, and academia. This section of the report addresses the primary themes regarding
barriers to progress in QRM that were revealed during the philosophical dialogues, some of the
researcher’s own experience as an “insider,” and references to the literature where applicable.
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5.3.2

Research findings

Misconceptions regarding quality vs. compliance, or “taking a conservative approach”

The first theme that emerged from the philosophical dialogues was confusion between compliance
with ICH Q9 and effectiveness of QRM implementation. These, of course, are two very different
concepts; compliance is often defined as “following regulation” or applying the GMPs, while
effectiveness in QRM stems from applying the regulations in a way that has tangible benefits such
as product quality improvement, quality systems improvement, and realization of business
objectives. In order to better gauge the perspectives of industry practitioners relative to this
distinction, the researcher asked conference delegates to sketch their understanding of the
relationship between quality and compliance using a Venn diagram format. Venn diagrams are
graphs of interlocking circles that are often used to demonstrate the relationship between
categories, including the relative size or contribution of each category (as depicted by the size of
a given circle) and the level of similarities and differences between categories (as depicted by the
extent to which the circles overlap). Over the course of the three years of research, the researcher
had the opportunity to see dozens of Venn diagrams illustrating the perceived relationship between
quality and compliance in industry; a pattern emerged early on, and has been reinforced many
times at multiple industry conferences. The vast majority of delegates drew a diagram similar to
that shown in Figure 5-QQ.
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Figure 5-QQ: Typical Venn diagram sketched by industry practitioners to illustrate the relationship
between quality and compliance

This implies that most of industry believes that there are aspects of quality that are unrelated to
compliance, and more worryingly, that there are aspects of compliance that are unrelated to
quality. With this being the paradigm under which some members of industry operate, it is not
surprising that quality culture has become a topic of concern with regulators, since this opinion
could embitter personnel to compliance and QRM-related activities if the value is not understood.
While an excellent article was written by members of the PRST to dispel this misconception (90),
the frequency with which a void between quality and compliance is cited indicates the mindset has
not yet taken hold.

This poses a serious challenge to the enhancement of QRM maturity in industry, since the
difference between quality and compliance (or compliance and effectiveness) is fundamental to
understanding the role that QRM plays in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.
ICH Q9 notes that “appropriate use of quality risk management can facilitate but does not obviate
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industry’s obligation to comply with regulatory requirements” (45)—a tenant that (in the
researcher’s opinion) should be understood to mean that QRM is a mechanism through which
compliance-related activities can be linked to product quality. In addition, QRM offers industry
an opportunity to define what quality looks like for their patients, products, and businesses, beyond
the basic requirements associated with regulatory compliance. As a result, the Venn diagram
showing the relationship between quality and compliance through the lens of QRM looks more
like that shown in Figure 5-RR.

Figure 5-RR: Venn diagram of quality and compliance through the lens of QRM

In this model, compliance has been wholly encompassed by quality, such that all compliancerelated activities likewise add to the quality of the product, and the circle representing quality has
been enlarged based on the knowledge gained through QRM. This is the purpose of QRM; in
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ensuring compliance supports quality and quality is based on risk management principles and
practices, the patient is adequately supported.

A consequence of the misunderstanding of the role of risk management in protecting the patient
has manifested with some members of industry claiming to use a “conservative approach” in lieu
of QRM. Philosophical dialogues with certain delegates (all of whom worked outside the QRM
field) revealed a misunderstanding that QRM need not be used in certain circumstances if a
“conservative approach” is employed. One delegate summed up the intent of this term with regard
to validation, indicating that he did not apply QRM to determine what and how much to validate,
because he validates “everything.” QRM practitioners cringe at this statement, since it indicates a
void of knowledge about the purpose of risk management. For example, validating “everything”
circumvents any drive to distinguish between critical and non-critical elements, as identified in
ICH Q8(R2) and Q11, and therefore dilutes the amount of attention and resources spent assuring
that elements critical to the patient are under control—an approach that is certainly not
conservative with regard to the patient. It appears that some members of industry perceive QRM
as a mechanism to do less, shrinking the amount of resources needed to perform an activity, rather
than reallocating available resources to focus more on things that are critical and less on things
that are not. This misconception might be a driver behind the Level 3 maturity seen with regard
to the purpose of QRM, explored within the governance pillar of QRM.

Insufficient regulatory guidance combined with overly-prescriptive regulatory requirements

Many delegates cited the lack of concrete, actionable guidance offered in ICH Q9 and regional
regulations adopted from this guideline as a challenge associated with QRM implementation. ICH
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Q9 outlines a framework for QRM, and offers examples of how QRM can be applied, but does not
provide tactical information regarding how QRM can used to fulfill these purposes. This challenge
has been compounded by the eagerness of regulatory authorities to encourage industry to adopt
QRM practices, publishing a flurry of requirements to use QRM to accomplish certain deliverables
without sufficient guidance on how this should be accomplished within a QRM framework (see
excerpts from ICH Q11 discussed in section 2.2.3).

For example, a small group of delegates at the September 2015 PDA/FDA Joint Regulatory
Conference met after the day’s activities to discuss how their respective companies planned to
implement the (then) recently released EU guideline “on the formalised risk assessment for
ascertaining the appropriate good manufacturing practice for excipients for medicinal products for
human use.”

This document requires the use of a formal risk tool (HACCP is suggested) to

determine the rigor of GMP to be applied by suppliers of excipients and enforced by the drug
manufacturer. (91) The document lists eighteen factors to be considered in the risk assessment, as
follows:

1. “Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy
2. Potential for viral contamination
3. Potential for microbiological or endotoxin/pyrogen contamination
4. Potential, in general, for any impurity originating from the raw materials, e.g. aflatoxins
or pesticides, or generated as part of the process and carried over, e.g. residual solvents
and catalysts
5. Sterility assurance for excipients claimed to be sterile
6. Potential for any impurities carried over from other processes, in absence of dedicated
equipment and/or facilities
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7. Environmental control and storage/transportation conditions including cold chain
management, if appropriate
8. Supply chain complexity
9. Stability of excipient
10. Packaging integrity evidence
11. The pharmaceutical form and use of the medicinal product containing the excipient
12. The function of the excipient in the formulation, e.g. lubricant in a tablet product or
preservative material in a liquid formulation, etc.
13. The proportion of the excipient in the medicinal product composition
14. Daily patient intake of the excipient
15. Any known quality defects/fraudulent adulterations, both globally and at a local company
level related to the excipient
16. Whether the excipient is a composite
17. Known or potential impact on the critical quality attributes of the medicinal product
18. Other factors as identified or known to be relevant to assuring patient safety” (91)

The group of delegates lamented the challenges posed by this guideline: the poor fit between many
items on the list of required considerations and formal risk tools (including HACCP as the
document had suggested), the number of individual risk assessments to be performed (one each
per excipient per supplier), and the short timeframe for required implementation (roughly one year
from the date of publication). Several delegates agreed that a tool such as risk ranking and filtering
(RRF), also described in ICH Q9, would be a better fit than HACCP or FMEA; other delegates
pointed out that RRF is typically considered a less formal tool and would not meet the requirement
that a “formalized” risk assessment be performed. One delegate expressed his wish that the
guideline had simply included the expected format, so he could spend his time executing the
approach rather than trying to define it. The informal meeting concluded with no harmonized
agreement on the best path forward.
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This anecdote is just one example of the struggles reported by QRM practitioners when trying to
meet the detailed requirements of regional regulatory bodies within a more fluid, loosely defined
QRM framework as offered by ICH Q9. The gap between an overly prescriptive “what” and an
insufficiently prescriptive “how” has been identified as one of the obstacles preventing a more
mature state to be reached.

Excessive numbers of risk assessments

As suggested above, several delegates cited the sheer numbers of risk assessments that have been
created as a challenge in achieving a more mature state of QRM. Some delegates noted that
regulators appear to expect a discrete risk assessment for every decision or GMP direction in which
their companies proceed. Using the above example regarding excipients, a firm with five products,
each having four excipients that can be purchased from a mere two qualified suppliers would need
to create and periodically review forty risk assessments—just for the relatively narrow risk
question regarding the level of GMP required of their excipient suppliers. Indeed, this trend can
be seen in other areas as well; regulators expect risk assessments related to elemental impurities
as described in ICH Q3D, Guideline for Elemental Impurities (92), risk assessments related to viral
or other contamination such as those implied (among other sources) in ICH Q5A(R1), Viral Safety
Evaluation of Biotechnology Products Derived from Cell Lines of Human or Animal Origin (93)
and FDA Guidance Sterile Drug Products Produced by Aseptic Processing – Good Manufacturing
Practice (94); risk assessments related to cross-contamination such as that suggested by EMA’s
Guideline for setting health based exposure limits for use in risk identification in the manufacture
of different medicinal products in shared facilities (95); and so on.
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These individual, narrowly-construed risk assessments can quickly compound to the point of
unmanageability. In December 2009, Wallace Torres at Roche told The Gold Sheet that in
response to the 2007 public health crisis associated with chemical contamination of their popular
HIV drug Viracept, “we performed more than 100,000 full FMEA analyses worldwide in the first
year [following the initiation of the company’s QRM program].” (96) Though Torres positioned
this as a triumph of QRM implementation, a delegate working for Roche-Genentech noted that
excessive numbers of risk assessments can bog down the QRM program and minimize value that
can be extracted from the assessments, as time is spent administering to the program is time not
spent gaining knowledge. Another delegate expressed regret that her company had not created a
QRM deployment strategy when their program started, to help minimize effort while maximizing
knowledge gained.

Following the researcher’s presentation of the benchmarking survey results at the PDA Annual
Meeting in March 2016, one delegate expressed particular interest in the characterization of
industry regarding the targeted vs. holistic approach (discussed with the process pillar of QRM in
section 5.2), noting that “the shotgun approach has created a monster.” This is evident not only in
regulatory guidance, as noted above, but also in the industry literature. Figure 5-SS illustrates
various topics for which QRM approaches are offered in the literature (based upon the mining of
sources described in Chapter Two). This “word cloud” varies the text size based on the relative
frequency of the topic; there is a wealth of articles on QRM for sterile processing and sterility
control, for example, and fewer on QRM for supply chain management. Curiously, there are few
if any articles on risk control, risk review, governance, culture, the establishment of a QRM
program, or strategic deployment of such a program available in the literature—gaps this research
sought to bridge.
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Figure 5-SS: Word cloud of QRM focus areas in the literature

Lack of resources to focus on risk management

Many delegates cited a lack of resources, including time and personnel, to focus on risk
management as a potential obstacle in the way of further progress.

One delegate aptly

characterized this concern as a lack of managers’ willingness to deploy resources towards QRM,
rather than a lack of availability of these resources. Formal risk management techniques such as
Failure Modes and Effects (FMEA) are reported to consume between 40 and 80 hours of work for
a team of 6 – 12 people, not including the resources needed to track and implement risk control /
mitigation actions. Another delegate indicated the difficulties with allocating resources towards a
proactive effort in a fire-fighting culture, where personnel are largely (perhaps habitually) focused
on solving existing problems rather than identifying and resolving potential risks. Delegates
generally agreed that without concrete ways to measure the effectiveness of QRM activities, such
as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) or financial return-on-investment (ROI), it is difficult to
make a case to pursue QRM at the expense of more urgent issues. This challenge is one that will
be addressed in Phase 3 of the research.
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Fear

It is quite interesting that a primal emotion be listed as an obstacle preventing the successful
implementation of QRM; however, this concept did indeed reveal itself in the philosophical
dialogues. Many delegates reported a general reluctance within their organizations to embrace the
transparency needed to perform QRM tasks, manifesting in several ways:

•

Reluctance to analyze products, processes, and systems in a way intended to identify
weakness, stemming from the fear that an urgent looming problem would be
identified. One delegate likened this to a perception that “what we don’t know can’t
hurt us,” pointing out that in most cases, QRM results in more work through the
identification of mitigation activities.

•

Uneasiness with the idea that, were weaknesses identified and documented, regulators
would use the information to assign inspection observations. One delegate compared
risk assessments with internal audit reports, which must be completed as part of a
larger program but are generally not reviewed by inspectors so as to not discourage a
firm from thoroughly identifying actual and potential problems for fear of
observations. This delegate believed that risk assessments should be treated
similarly, indicating that her firm went so far as to include certain types of risk
management documents that should not be presented to inspectors in policy-level
documents.

•

Discomfort with anticipated differences of opinion between the risk team who created
a risk assessment and a third-party reader (whether internal or external to the
company). Because QRM is often a subjective endeavor, it ought to be difficult to
proclaim its outputs correct or incorrect without data to prove otherwise; however,
several delegates indicated that their internal stakeholders often disagree with the
analysis performed and conclusions drawn, with one delegate noting that an
inspection observation had been received when an inspector believed that certain
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“rules” should have been applied to the scoring of individual risks where the risk
team had felt otherwise.

Dr. Janet Woodcock, head of the Center of Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) at FDA, has
also expressed concerns regarding a culture of fear, noting:

“Let me just step back another step and say – and this would also disturb some people –
that I really think the culture of regulation that we had over the years, [produced] a kind of
a fear relationship. And I am still told that industry is in a state of fear, many of them, of
FDA. That kind of a fear relationship is not going to grow a quality culture, because there
is a fear of adverse consequences… That is antithetical to the idea of a quality culture,
where people own quality and say, ‘we can stand up to the FDA because we make a quality
product and we know it and we monitor it and we are proud of it. That is our quality
culture.’” (97)

The reluctance to embrace QRM based on these fears is indicative of a lack of risk maturity and a
struggling company culture; these themes willed be explored further in Chapters Seven and Nine.

The learnings from Phase 1 and 2 of the research enabled the researcher to reach several key
conclusions, as follows:

•

The patient is no better protected following the implementation of ICH Q9 that before,

•

Industry has a lower level of risk maturity than might be expected based on the time
elapsed since the publication of ICH Q9,
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•

There are fundamental challenges that are preventing industry from moving towards
excellence in QRM, and, most importantly,

•

These challenges have solutions.

Prior to endeavoring to define solutions to these problems herself, the researcher realized that a
thorough inquiry into other industries with proven track records of successful risk management
should be undertaken. Chapter Six, considered to be of the Phase 2 research for the purposes of
refining ideas for Phase 3, explores these practices.
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6 Chapter Six: Learning from Risk Management Practices in
Other Industries

The research outputs from Phases 1 and 2 revealed the inadequacies inherent with the ways in
which the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries are currently performing QRM. The
industry struggles with some basic elements, including robust QRM governance, a proactive
culture comprised of engaged leadership and personnel, and the use of QRM in an anticipatory
way. Furthermore, there is little evidence that the patient is better protected than before the advent
of QRM. Yet there are many industries that have successfully implemented risk management
principles and practices to improve their product quality and business practices. This chapter
begins with a discussion of ISO 31000, an internal standard on risk management that can be applied
to multiple business models, regardless of industry. The chapter continues with the identification
and discussion of risk management systems in industries with proven histories of realizing the
benefits of the practice. Though examples abound, the researcher selected three such industries
for further inquiry: medical devices, aerospace, and nuclear power.

Literature review was selected as the research method for this portion of the research, continuing
the literature review first introduced in Chapter Two (as illustrated in Figure 6-A).
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Figure 6-A: Literature map highlighting the focus for Chapter Six

Candidate literature was identified primarily through searches of ISO regulations and US
government websites for those agencies responsible for the oversight of the applicable industries,
including the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA; www.nasa.gov) and the
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC; www.nrc.gov). Throughout the literature review, the
researcher identified key learnings that either:

•

Solved a problem related to risk management implementation, as identified in the earlier
research

•

Filled a gap in risk management application or culture identified in the earlier research, or
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•

Represented a best practice in risk management that would benefit the pharmaceutical
and biopharmaceutical industries and its patients, if implemented

Of these, a subset was selected for discussion in this chapter based on the extent to which it
informed the Phase 3 research.

6.1 General risk management – ISO 31000
Prior to 2009, there were a multitude of separate, general-use risk management standards in use
across the globe. Individual country authorities had developed and issued their own discrete (yet
remarkably similar) documents to help guide companies, irrespective of industry, towards the
introduction of risk management principles and processes into their business dealings. (98) Long
in practice in several fields, risk management garnered increased attention following the global
crisis of 2008, in which ineffective (or inappropriate) risk management practices led to an
estimated loss of global wealth of US$34.4 trillion—equivalent to the annual gross domestic
product of the United States. (99) (100) Soon thereafter, in 2009, ISO 31000, Risk management –
principles and guidelines was published, leading to the retirement of many of the country-specific
standards, including the Australia and New Zealand standard AS/NZ 4360, Risk Management, and
the Canadian standard CAN/CSA Q850-97, Risk Management: Guideline for Decision Makers.37
While ISO 31000 was in the planning stages far before the economic crisis of 2008, the timing of
its release was applauded by regulators the world over. For those familiar with ICH Q9, as

37

The
retirement
and
replacement
of
these
standards
is
asserted
in
https://shop.standards.govt.nz/catalog/4360%3A2004%28AS%7CNZS%29/view (for the Australia and New Zealand
standard AS/NZ 4360) and
http://shop.csa.ca/en/canada/risk-management-archive-en/cancsa-q850-97-for
r2009/invt/27003271997 (for the Canadian standard). Both websites were accessed on September 25, 2017.
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discussed in section 2.2.2 of this thesis, much of ISO 31000 will resonate. There are some
meaningful differences, however—ones that provide key learnings for the Phase 3 research.

ISO 31000 outlines benefits beyond those proposed by ICH Q9, articulating principles that address
some of the concerns and challenges identified in Phase 1 and 2 of the research. These principles
include:

1. “Risk management creates and protects value.
2. Risk management is an integral part of all organizational processes.
3. Risk management is part of decision making.
4. Risk management explicitly addresses uncertainty.
5. Risk management is systematic, structured and timely.
6. Risk management is based on the best available information.
7. Risk management is tailored.
8. Risk management takes human and cultural factors into account.
9. Risk management is transparent and inclusive.
10. Risk management is dynamic, iterative and responsive to change.
11. Risk management fosters continual improvement of the organization.” (15)

While the Phase 3 research, focused on crafting an ideal state for QRM, relied heavily upon each
of these principles, this chapter will reflect upon the fourth principle regarding uncertainty—a
neglected concept in the world of pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical QRM.

6.1.1

Learning #1: Acknowledge uncertainty

ICH Q9 briefly addresses the concept of uncertainty and its role in QRM as follows:
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“In doing an effective risk assessment, the robustness of the data set is important because
it determines the quality of the output. Revealing assumptions and reasonable sources of
uncertainty will enhance confidence in this output and/or help identify its limitations.
Uncertainty is due to combination of incomplete knowledge about a process and its
expected or unexpected variability. Typical sources of uncertainty include gaps in
knowledge gaps in pharmaceutical science and process understanding, sources of harm
(e.g., failure modes of a process, sources of variability), and probability of detection of
problems.” (45)

The differences in emphasis on uncertainty—as fundamental to risk management in ISO 31000,
yet a small note positioned under risk assessment in ICH Q9—may have contributed to the
differences in risk maturity within the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries and other
industries as explored in this chapter. This difference in emphasis is inherent in the very definition
of “risk”.

As presented in section 1.2 and as reiterated in ICH Q9, the term “risk” is defined as an equation
whereby:

Likelihood (of the occurrence of harm) x Severity (of that harm) = Risk

This definition of risk is presented in ICH Q9 and ISO 14971 for medical devices, both of which
are focused on patient safety through the realization of medical products (drugs and devices,
respectively). Suitably, the origin of this definition is the ISO Guide 51, Safety aspects –
Guidelines for their inclusion in standards, a document which itself describes risk management
165

as a means to achieve product safety. (45) (101) (16) ISO 31000, however, offers an alternate
definition of risk— “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.” (15)

This definition allows the very concept of risk to be reimagined in the context of drug
manufacturing. Rather than an equation that implies precise measurements of risk can be made,
the definition of risk in ISO 31000 38, applied to the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
industries, can be framed as the effect of uncertainty on the patient. Using the ISO 31000
definition, the goal of QRM therefore can be positioned as one of minimizing uncertainty
associated with the product and the associated manufacturing process in order to better protect
the patient. This would encourage industry to seek out knowledge in the form of deeper and
more meaningful scientific analysis, rather than attempting to predict the likelihood of a given
hazard or harm based on incomplete evidence or a cursory interpretation of available data. Only
a small number of published QRM methods, including the CQA identification approach
described in PDA Technical Report No. 60 and the risk-based impact assessment tool offered by
Waldron, explicitly include measures of uncertainty (or conversely, in statistical terms,
confidence) within the risk assessment process. (102) (103) The pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries would benefit from placing more of an emphasis on disclosing,
reducing, and thinking critically about sources and levels of uncertainty associated with the
scientific knowledge that underpins QRM.

38

The definition of risk from ISO 31000 is in turn derived from ISO Guide 73, Risk management – vocabulary, which
endeavored to bring a common vernacular to all forms of risk management, including those related to safety as defined
in ISO Guide 51. (14) Based on the breadth of terminology currently in use across industries of all types, and the
preservation of different terms and definitions in a variety of risk management standards, it appears as through a
harmonized risk management language has yet to take hold.
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6.1.2

Learning #2: Define the context

The risk management lifecycle depicted in ISO 31000 (shown in Figure 6-B) echoes that of ICH
Q9 (described in section 2.2.2), and includes the fundamental phases of risk assessment, risk
treatment/control 39, review of the risks given new knowledge, and communication of the risks.

Figure 6-B: Risk Management Lifecycle from ISO 31000:2009

39

“Risk treatment” in ISO 31000 replaces the “risk control” step in ICH Q9. While the concepts are fundamentally
the same—taking action based on the learnings from the risk assessment— “risk treatment” could include additional
actions to embrace and pursue risks (opportunities) while “risk control” is focused on reducing and controlling the
risk. This difference stems from the perspective of each document, with ICH Q9 focusing on negative risks to product
quality and patient safety and ISO 31000 addressing risks of all types, both positive and negative. Because some
quality risks may be reduced through the introduction of new, positive risks (such as those associated with the
introduction of new technology that carries with it a high level of uncertainty), this researcher prefers the term “risk
treatment” over “risk control.” However, to preserve the terminology used in this thesis to this point and for fidelity
with ICH Q9, the term “risk control” will continue to be used.
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Despite the similarities between these risk management lifecycle, the initiating step of ISO 31000
stands out—a step called “establishing the context.” The ISO standard devotes a large portion of
the document to the explanation and reinforcement of this critical step, one in which the internal
and external business climate are carefully evaluated to ensure subsequent risk management
activities are aligned with the environment in which they are performed. In the pharmaceutical
and biopharmaceutical industries, “establishing the context” might entail a critical analysis of
internal conditions such as:

•

The availability of scientific knowledge to adequately assess the risks

•

The expertise and competencies necessary to perform risk management activities,

•

The resources available to assess and reduce the risk, where necessary

•

The type of medicinal product under evaluation (e.g. life-saving, life-sustaining, qualityof-life),

•

The vulnerability of the product to shortage, and

•

The company’s risk tolerance

In addition, conditions external to the company should also be identified and evaluated, such as:

•

Applicable laws and regulations in the markets for which the product is intended

•

The vulnerability of the patient community in the event of a drug shortage

•

Perceptions of risk in the regulatory and patient community

•

Regulatory authorities’ risk tolerance(s)

•

The patients’ risk tolerance(s)

Indeed, the internal and external perspectives that may result from such a careful analysis of the
context could significantly affect the QRM process and outcomes. It is for this reason that ISO
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31000 notes, “…attention to these and other relevant factors should help ensure that the risk
management approach adopted is appropriate to the circumstances, to the organization and to the
risks affecting the achievement of its objectives.” (15) A robust review of the internal and external
climate in which QRM activities are being conducted will ensure that such exercises better protect
the patient.

6.2 Risk management in the medical device industry
The medical device industry has long felt the influence of risk management principles, having been
subject to risk-based classification and regulation since the term “medical device” was formally
defined. 40

Risk management as part of medical device development and manufacture was

introduced in the EU in 1993 with the issuance of the Medical Device Directive, 93/42/EEC, which
included a clear statement in the first General Requirement that “…devices must be designed and
manufactured in such a way that…any risks which may be associated with their intended use
constitute acceptable risks when weighed against the benefits to the patient and are compatible
with a high level of protection of health and safety.” (104) This concept took hold in the US with
the issuance of FDA’s Design Control Guidance in 1997, and a harmonized method for performing
risk management for medical devices was published in 2000 with the first version of ISO 14971,
Medical devices –risk management for medical devices. (101) (105) ISO 14971 has some
remarkably similarities to ICH Q9, but it is the differences between the two that lead to insight.

40
The US FDA “Medical Device Amendments” of May 28, 1976 introduced the classification of devices as Class I
(low risk), Class II (moderate risk), and Class III (high risk) based on the potential to harm the patient and the level of
control required to assure safety and effectiveness of the device. Prior to this date, there was no harmonized definition
for a medical device in the US and therefore no risk-based classification scheme. (197) Device classification remains
risk based in major markets and is currently performed according to 21CFR860 in the US and 93/42/EEC in the EU.
(198) (199)
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6.2.1

Learning #3: Focus on the product

Unlike ICH Q9, which is focused on the management of extrinsic risks, medical device risk
management is primarily concerned with the management of intrinsic risks. For example, ISO
14971 notes in its introduction, “The requirements contained in this International Standard provide
manufacturers with a framework within which experience, insight and judgment are applied
systematically to manage the risks associated with the use of medical devices” [emphasis added].
(101) ICH Q9, on the other hand, limits its scope to “aspects of pharmaceutical quality” and
acknowledges that “the risk to [the drug’s] quality is just one component of the overall risk.” (45)
The other risks referred to in this quote include intrinsic risks associated with the use of
pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals, such as those described in Chapter One.

Devices and drug products differ fundamentally with regard to intrinsic risks—while drugs often
have inherent side effects and contraindications that manifest as a result of biochemical processes
in vivo and are associated with the target molecule or biological pathway itself, intrinsic risks
associated with medical devices can often be designed out of the product through the use of
engineering principles. 41 The differences between product designed through chemistry and
biology and those designed through engineering may contribute to the differences in emphasis
seen between ISO 14971, with a distinctly product perspective to risk management, and ICH Q9,
with a product quality and quality systems perspective.

41
It is worth noting that emerging therapeutic modalities in the biopharmaceutical industry, such as gene therapies,
cellular therapies, and personalized medicines, are seeing the scientific fields of biology and chemistry merge with
engineering with regard to product development. In this researcher’s opinion, for medicinal therapies that allow for
engineering principles to be applied (e.g. gene editing), a medical device risk management perspective and regulatory
framework might be better suited than the existing drug perspective due to the opportunity to eliminate many intrinsic
risks, thereby directly increasing patient protection.
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During medical device development, firms often create three separate risk assessments to address
the requirements of ISO 14971 and similar device regulation: a design risk assessment, addressing
risks associated with the design of the device, an application risk assessment, addressing risks
associated with the healthcare practitioners’ handling of the device, and a process risk assessment,
addressing risk associated with the manufacture of the device. (101) (106) When subject to the
process steps defined in the risk management lifecycle, these three risk assessments cover a
majority of the risk-related concerns for medical devices. These risk assessments are stored in a
“risk management file” specific to the medical device or family of devices. (101) In this way, ISO
14971 has fostered the creation of a sort of “living risk assessment library” that can be used as a
reference tool for knowledge management as well as streamlined summary of the major risks
associated with a given device.

With only 54.6% of benchmarking survey respondents reporting the consistent application of
QRM to product and process characterization (as discussed in section 5.2.2), it seems unlikely that
the concept and value of a living risk library, akin to the risk management file approach used in
medical devices, has fully penetrated the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. The
design and creation of such a library is discussed further in Chapter Eight.

6.2.2

Learning #4: Risk control deserves the most attention

Though no documents have been located by the researcher, to date, that expressly point to one
phase of the risk management lifecycle as more important than the others, the regulatory and
quality foundation upon which drug manufacturing occurs make this answer an obvious one:
controlling risks to patient should be the primary focus of any QRM endeavor. Detailed, science-
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based risk assessments, robust risk review, and frequent and transparent risk communication serve
little purpose if the patient is not ultimately better protected in the end. Risk control is the step at
which the patient experience benefits. It is the step during which control measures are established
to address identified risks, leader to better quality product and, therefore, a safer patient.

While ICH Q9 dedicates only a few cursory paragraphs to the topic, ISO 14971 devotes several
pages to explaining the objectives of risk control, techniques to enable more effective control over
risks to the patient, and the rationale behind these requirements. (101) The emphasis placed on
risk control is evident with a review of the risk management lifecycle for medical devices (Figure
6-C), which denotes six sub-steps to what constitutes a single sub-step (“risk reduction”) in ICH
Q9. ISO 14971 seeks to ensure that the reader understands the importance, and the relative amount
of attention, that should be paid to reducing risk to the patient.

In ISO 14971, the risk reduction process begins with a thorough examination of available options
for risk control, and comparing these options to determine the best fit to reduce a particular risk or
portfolio of risks. Risk reduction measures, or mitigations, must be both technological and
economically feasible 42 and be designed to reduce the risk as low as possible. The standard

42

The topic of “economic feasibility” has been of much debate since the publication of the 2012 revision to ISO
14971, which did not alter the content of the standard itself but instead updated Annexes Z-A through Z-C which
reconcile the requirements of the standard with those of the EU Medical Device Directive (MDD). The MDD does
not, in letter or spirit, include an allowance to disregard a risk control option due to its cost; therefore the Annexes
were updated to note that economic factors may not be a factor in selecting risk reduction options for those devices
intended to registered in the EU. (100) However, in the current era where drug pricing has become a heated political
and practical issue, manufacturers are reluctant to apply risk reduction measures that may render the cost of treatment
out of reach for patients. It is this researcher’s opinion that the topic of economic feasibility is an important one that
requires additional discussion, outside of the realm of this thesis. As such, the researcher has chosen to preserve the
requirement that a risk reduction strategy must be economically feasible in order to be effective and reach the patients.
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Figure 6-C: Risk Management Lifecycle from ISO 14971:2009
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requires one to consider the effect a given risk reduction option may have on the risk as well, listing
a priority of “(a) inherent safety by design, (b) protective measures in the medical device itself or
in the manufacturing process, [and] (c) information for safety.” (101) This order lists control
options from most to least effective, with elimination of risk through system or product design
being most effective at patient protection, followed by risk mitigation by reducing the likelihood
of harm, and finally informing patients and users of the risks and appropriate control measures to
be applied through risk communication.

Once the options for risk control have been identified, analyzed, and compared, the best fit option
(or combination of options) is selected for implementation. ISO 14971 requires that, once the risk
control measures are in place, they be verified—twice. The first verification confirms that the
control measure has, in fact, been implemented, while the second verifies effectiveness by
determining that the risk has actually been lowered. (101) In most instances, because the risks are
intrinsic to the product, effectiveness can be confirmed through design validation of the device
itself; it may prove more difficult to measure risk reduction for other types of risks and related
controls, particularly for proactively identified risks that have not been historically realized. (107)

Once all risk control measures have been fully verified, ISO 14971 requires the residual risk to be
determined. (101) This process includes an evaluation of whether new risks have been introduced
as a result of the risk control measures, and a determination of the new risk levels in light of the
additional controls. The acceptability of the residual risk is determined through a comparison of
the risk level against pre-defined criteria—a similar process as was employed when determining
which risks required reduction. ISO 14971 goes further however, acknowledging that where the
residual risk remains unacceptable, a risk/benefit analysis should be performed. This risk/benefit
174

analysis seeks to compare the medical benefits of the device against the (individual) residual risk
to determine whether, on balance, the patient is adequately protected. This individual risk/benefit
analysis often serves as an input into risk communication, assisting the manufacturer with the
design of product labeling to disclose such risks to the consumer. (101) (108)

Per ISO 14971, once the individual risk/benefit analyses are complete, a second, overall
risk/benefit analysis is performed to determine whether the cumulative effects of all residual risks
associated with the device are outweighed by its benefits to the patient. (101) This step, absent in
ICH Q9, requires the risk practitioner to evaluate and understand the totality of risk to which the
patient is subjected through use of the product. Only where the device offers a greater benefit to
the patient than it does risk is the overall residual risk deemed acceptable. This process facilitates
a strategic view of the complete risk portfolio, requiring the practitioner to redirect their attention
from detailed line items captured in a spreadsheet back to the ultimate goal—protecting the patient.

ISO 14971 acknowledges the paramount importance of risk control in the risk management
lifecycle, and refocuses attention from what might often be an intellectual endeavor to the patient.
The pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries would benefit from the adoption of these
practices in their QRM work.

6.2.3

Learning #5: Planning is key

ISO 14971 describes the use of a Risk Management Plan for device risk management. Unlike the
Risk Management Plan designed to manage intrinsic drug risks, as discussed in Chapter One, this
document is intended to outline the plan for risk management activities in support of device
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development and manufacturing. As noted by ISO 14971, “a risk management plan is required
because (a) an organized approach is essential for good risk management, (b) the plan provides the
roadmap for risk management, [and] (c) the plan encourages objectivity and helps prevent essential
elements from being forgotten.” (101)

The requirements for a Risk Management Plan read similar to what one might envision as a QRM
procedure for the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. Role and responsibilities are
defined and delineated, the scope of the plan with regard to the product lifecycle is outlined, a
governance structure and associated processes are established, risk and residual risk acceptance
criteria are defined, and requirements and data sources for the use of production and postproduction information (similar to the risk review phase of the ICH Q9 lifecycle) are described.
(101) In addition to these standard requirements, ISO 14971 notes that the Risk Management Plan
may be used to define milestones, plan risk management activities, and outline risk tools that will
be employed for the various activities. In this way, the Risk Management Plan has an inherently
flexible structure with the goal of better enabling the organization to plan for what risk
management activities must be done to align with certain product-realization goals.

ICH Q9 contains no notion of a Risk Management Plan. There is an assumption that a QRM
procedure or policy-level document would exist, of course, as is a general quality system
requirement in those regions that have adopted the guidance. (45) However, the idea that a firm
should outline strategic goals for the QRM program and develop a plan to reach them is notably
absent. This is a plausible reason why the industry has struggled with the administration of the
QRM program and the creation of myriad risk assessments with no holistic vision, as discussed in
Chapter Five—in the absence of planning, the ICH Q9 lifecycle begins with a “QRM Initiation”
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step, the focus of which is a rather myopic process to gather the information needed to begin a risk
assessment and continue throughout the QRM lifecycle. ISO 14971 has no need for this initiation
step, as all risk management activities would be pre-defined in the Risk Management Plan and
need merely be executed in accordance with those requirements. By streamlining the initiation
process and outlining overarching objectives for the QRM program, the use of a Risk Management
Plan would enable the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries to spend less time “doing
QRM” and more time managing risk to the patient.

6.3 Risk management in the aerospace industry
The aerospace industry has a history of highly publicized successes, where the application of risk
management principles and practices have enabled monumental discoveries unprecedented in
human history, as well as shocking disasters that have led nations to mourning. The need for risk
management in aerospace is clear: the risks associated with an environment that is completely
beyond control, the (literally) astronomical costs associated with developing the technology to
achieve spaceflight, and the shortage of opportunities to use that technology mandate that risks be
understood and manage to achieve right-first-time missions—because in aerospace, the first time
may be the only time.

6.3.1

Learning #6: Acknowledge the two objectives of risk management

The US National Aeronautics and Space Agency is generous with their learnings and operational
practices, offering many of their internal guidebooks and operational manuals to the public from
their website, www.nasa.gov. The risk management process in use at the agency is summarized
in the NASA Risk Management Handbook, issued by the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance.
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The handbook details risk management tools and decision-making frameworks, and provides
instructions on establishing performance-based risk tolerance, modeling and graphical
representation of risks, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques 43, and risk control
planning.

Perhaps the most influential learning from NASA’s risk management program,

however, is the way in which the agency has divided risk management into two sub-processes:
risk-informed decision making (RIDM) and continuous risk management (CRM). (109)

At NASA, CRM mirrors the risk management process as described thus far in this thesis. Risks
are identified, assessed, controlled, and reviewed in an iterative framework to ensure risks to the
success of a space mission and the safety and security of the astronauts and payloads are
continually evaluated, with risk controls designed in as engineering solutions. The risks and
scenarios in which they may manifest are communicated throughout the agency, from the technical
experts through the top-levels elected officials who are responsible for the overall performance of
the agency. (109) In this way, the CRM process at NASA is similar to the QRM lifecycle described
in ICH Q9.

NASA, however, has acknowledged a separate risk management process that does not follow the
risk management lifecycle in full—this process, risk-informed decision making, is a necessary
component of robust risk management with its own process and objectives. Figure 6-D illustrates

43

Probabilistic Risk Assessment is the name given to a series of risk management tools, including master logic
diagrams, event sequence diagrams, fault tree analyses, and Monte Carlo simulations, used in concert to yield a result.
PRA appears to be the preferred risk assessment approach for NASA and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), both of which have multiple handbooks available the public sphere regarding the method and its merits. (259)
(259) (186) The researcher chose not to include a detailed analysis of PRA in this thesis because the approach hinges
upon mathematical models that continue to elude the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, which, as
discussed in section 6.1.1, are still struggling with uncertainty in some of the fundamental science inherent in drug
products and their manufacture. Chapter Eleven includes inquiry into PRA as a topic for future work in the QRM
field.
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the process steps involved with risk-informed decision making.

RIDM begins with the

identification of alternatives—that is, the potential decisions that could be made. A risk analysis
is then performed on each of the alternatives to enable a comparison of risks associated with each
decision path.

Finally, considering the results of risk analyses (assessments) and other

considerations, such as the benefits offered by each potential decision path, the decision is taken.
(109) The risk assessments performed to support the decision-making process are not subject to
other aspects of the risk management lifecycle, such as risk control or risk review. Rather, the risk
assessment was performed for the express purpose of enabling a specific decision to be made at a
specific point in time, using the best available information at the time. Once the decision is made,
the risk assessment has served its purpose.

Figure 6-D: NASA’s Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) Process (108)
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These sorts of ad hoc risk assessments have utility in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
industries as well. Decisions regarding product release in the face of a cGMP deviation, whether
to proceed with a proposed change to the manufacturing process, the frequency and scope of
internal or supplier audits, and other operational, quality, and compliance related decisions are
made every day by drug manufacturers. Do each of these decisions require a risk assessment to
inform them? As NASA’s Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook explains:

“[Decisions for which RIDM is appropriate] tend to have one or more of the following
characteristics:

•

High Stakes — High stakes are involved in the decision, such as significant costs,
significant potential safety impacts, or the importance of meeting the objectives.

•

Complexity — The actual ramifications of alternatives are difficult to understand
without detailed analysis.

•

Uncertainty — Uncertainty in key inputs creates substantial uncertainty in the
outcome of the decision alternatives and points to risks that may need to be managed.

•

Multiple Attributes — Greater numbers of attributes cause a greater need for formal
analysis.

•

Diversity of Stakeholders — Extra attention is warranted to clarify objectives and
formulate performance measures when the set of stakeholders reflects a diversity of
values, preferences, and perspectives.” (110)

The use of ad hoc risk assessments for risk-based decision making in the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries would allow for more context-specific risk questions to be
established while alleviating some of the administrative burden reported by QRM practitioners in
the earlier research.
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6.3.2

Learning #7: “Complacency is the enemy of quality” 44

While NASA’s many successes highlight the critical role risk management fills, the failures
experienced by the agency offer similar lessons. The story of two of the most stunning disasters
in the history of space exploration—the explosion of the Challenger mission within moments of
launch and the breakup of the Columbia spacecraft upon reentry to Earth—reveal an important
element regarding the culture in which risk management is applied.

On January 28, 1986, the Challenger mission began. News outlets across the world broadcasted
the launch to the public, many of whom sat with bated breath in front of their television sets to
watch their newly-minted heroes begin their exploration into the solar system. A mere 72 seconds
after lifting off, a plume of smoke could be seen. Moments later, Challenger burst apart, the result
of an explosion caused by faulty seals in the shuttle construct. Most of the world was shocked.
Many at NASA were not. (111) (112) (113)

Engineers at NASA had predicted the event. They had inspected O-rings, the seals that connect
the rocket boosters to the spacecraft, on numerous occasions following prior missions, and were
aware of the erosion that occurred, destabilizing the connection and threatening the integrity of the
hull. They had accounted for this phenomenon in their PRAs, noting in particular that cold weather
could render the O-rings so brittle that they would fail almost immediately, leaving no chance for
the spacecraft to remain intact. They had discussed the results of their risk assessments with NASA
decision-makers, and, noting the freezing temperatures predicted for the Challenger launch day,

44

Quote attributed to Rick Friedman, Deputy Director of Science and Regulatory Policy, Office of Manufacturing
Quality, FDA
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recommended the mission be delayed. Yet the mission proceeded, and lives were lost. It was a
failure of risk management on the world stage. (111) (112) (113)

Seventeen years later, an eerily similar event occurred. This time, it was the shuttle Columbia,
and it was the end of the mission. The public awaited the reentry of the spacecraft into Earth’s
atmosphere, ready to celebrate the returning astronauts with parades and news interviews. Not
quite two minutes after reentry, the shuttle burst apart, the result of damage to the left wing caused
by impact with a piece of foam that had dislodged during launch. Again, the public was shocked,
and again, NASA was not. NASA engineers became aware of the impact the day after launch,
during the routine video footage review and analysis intended to prevent failures of this type.
Mission Control informed the crew of Columbia, asserting that the event was of no consequence
and there should be no concern regarding the safety or integrity of the spacecraft. After all, they
had seen this before on successful missions. (114) (115)

Despite their initial conclusion, NASA proceed to evaluate the impact event, though under the
caution that it was an “information gathering” endeavor—not one that was critical to the safety of
the mission. They gathered their best and brightest, who began to apply proven risk management
techniques and mathematical modelling to confirm their original assumption—that the impact to
the left wing would not jeopardize the shuttle upon reentry. The engineers, however, did not have
enough information from the original launch footage to perform a thorough analysis. They needed,
and requested, more information. Their request was discussed by NASA management, but no
action was taken—the risk associated with the impact of the foam on the left wing was deemed
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acceptable. 45 No interventions were made. Upon reentry, the shuttle and the lives of those within
it were destroyed. (114) (115) The “acceptable risk” proved to be anything but—risk management
had again failed at NASA.

As one might expect, post-mortem analyses following both the Challenger and Columbia disasters
were as plentiful as they were critical. Most sources agree that risk management had failed in
these instances, as well as the reason it had failed; the risk management activities were conducted
within a culture that, at that time, was complacent and did not learn from its mistakes. Without a
stronger culture, risk management was destined to fail.

The primary cultural element that contributed to these failures is one that is also ubiquitous in the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries: the “normalization of deviance.” (116)
Normalization of deviance is a phenomenon in which an organization becomes numb to failures
that occur on a regular basis. Because there are often no catastrophic consequences that occur
from these failures, the organization accepts them as a normal part of operations and becomes
complacent with their occurrence. (117) Such a culture is widespread in the drug industry, as
quality leaders cite process deviations as “normal” with a willingness to accept a certain (nonzero) number. This cultural norm, where failure is accepted by the organization, is anathema with
regard to the goals to risk management—continual improvement and a proactive, risk avoidant
mindset.

45

The additional data needed was satellite footage of the shuttle during its mission, which would have allowed the
risk management team to better understand the angle of impact—knowledge critical to understanding the risks that
were posed. The US Department of Defense had historically provided such footage upon request, but given the
“acceptable” classification of the risk associated with the Columbia event, a request was not made. (108)
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6.4 Risk management in the nuclear industry
The final industry chosen as a best practice benchmark for risk management is the nuclear industry.
Nuclear power is perhaps best known for its adaptation of a military technique known as defense
in depth to risk management, particularly in the area of risk control. Defense in depth holds that
multiple layers of risk control should be employed in concert, so that control over the risks
associated with a system should never depend upon a single control, lest it fail and the risk be
realized. The US NRC states, “the key [to defense in depth] is creating multiple independent and
redundant layers of defense to compensate for potential human and mechanical failures so that no
single layer, no matter how robust, is exclusively relied upon. Defense in depth includes the use
of access controls, physical barriers, redundant and diverse key safety functions, and emergency
response measures.” (118)

The use of multiple control layers is not a foreign concept, although the nuclear industry employs
it with excellence. A metaphor for risk management known as the “Swiss cheese model” was
initially conceived by James Reason in 1990, and has become ubiquitous across multiple academic
and industry risk management circles. (119) (120) This model holds that accidents happen (or risk
are realized) when “holes” in “barriers” (i.e. risk controls), such as vulnerability points or failures,
occur in tandem, allowing a hazard to reach the patient and cause harm. This model is typically
depicted in graphic form as shown in Figure 6-E, hence the “Swiss cheese” moniker.
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Figure 6-E: Reason’s “Swiss Cheese model” of accidents (120)

Using the Swiss cheese model, the objective of risk control is to construct barriers for which the
holes will never overlap—that is, that are not so tightly coupled that a single point of failure would
lead to the failure of all of the barriers.

In the nuclear industry, these barriers form the core of the defense in depth system. There are
typically five barrier layers in a nuclear reactor system to manage the risks of reactor meltdown
and any resultant radioactive fallout:

1. “Prevention of abnormal operation and failures
2. Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures
3. Control of accidents within the design basis
4. Control of severe plant conditions [to prevent accident progression and to mitigate the
consequences of accidents]
5. Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant release of radioactive material.”
(121)
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In the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, many of these barriers are inherent in
quality system requirements and may be rephrased as:

1. Eliminate or prevent quality risks through the use of QRM
2. Detect quality risks through QRM and process/product monitoring
3. Manage deviations when quality risks occur
4. Manage the consequences of the deviation through disposition of affected product
5. Manage consequences to the patient through recall and patient support

In a robust quality system, including the application of effective QRM principles and practices,
the defense in depth concept can be applied to ensure the patient is protected. 46

6.4.1

Learning #8: Communicate with purpose

“[In the eyes of the public], risk = hazard + outrage.” (122) This quote, drawing a playful
juxtaposition with the notorious risk = likelihood x severity equation that permeates risk
management, sets the stage for the US NRC’s handbook on external risk communication. The
topic, of course, is a serious one—how to frame risks and their criticality to a third party who lacks
the intimate scientific knowledge that the communicator possesses. In the realm of nuclear
reactors, any accident or hazard is likely to be met with fear and indignation from the public. The
consequences of a nuclear meltdown affect not only the people living and working in the vicinity

46

The reader may question why the researcher has not chosen to identify defense in depth as one of the key learnings
in this chapter; therefore it is important to proactively address this concern. The researcher acknowledges that
additional research into the application of defense in depth principles would be beneficial for industry. However, the
research effort is focused on the application of quality risk management in a proactive way (numbered items 1 and 2)
in the list), and the researcher is loath to extend the scope of the research to include reactive risk and crisis management
(numbered items 3 through 5 in the list). While the topic of defense in depth and its utility in the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries piques the researcher’s interest, she must relegate further discussion on the topic to
Chapter Eleven.
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of the accident, but also their children and their children’s children. The severity scale for nuclear
disasters can be measured in generations, and risk management must be held proportionately
sacrosanct.

While risk management forms the core of nuclear industry operations, risk communication is most
often performed by its regulators, including the NRC in the United States. As discussed in Chapter
Two, risk communication occurs between the communicator and internal and external
stakeholders.

The NRC understands the emotional aspects of communication and the

consequences of miscommunication (or a lack of communication), and has therefore ensured that
communication with the public regarding risks associated with the nuclear industry are thoroughly
planned and controlled, and that all NRC employees are equipped to speak on behalf of the agency
when called upon. (122) These principles and the process for effective risk communication to the
public is summarized in NUREG/BR-0308, “Effective Risk Communication: The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’s Guidelines for External Risk Communication,” a handbook for all staff
to use. In addition, the NRC has a created a sister document, NUREG/BR-0318, “Effective Risk
Communication: Guidelines for Internal Communication.” (123) This document acknowledges
the importance of knowledge sharing and communication regarding identified and analyzed risks
within the NRC, as well as resultant decisions and policy changes. The processes defined by the
NRC for internal and external risk communication are shown in consolidated format in Figure 6-F.
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Form a team
(external
communication
only)

Establish
objectives

Plan

Prepare

Communicate
and Involve

Document Decisions
(internal
communication only)

Evaluate
and
Improve

Figure 6-F: US NRC process for risk communication (consolidated) (122)

The NRC has assigned the first step in successful risk communication, whether internal or external,
as “establish objectives.” For the NRC, there may be several objectives associated with internal
risk communication, such as:

•

Gathering information to assist with a risk assessment
188

•

Seeking peer feedback or input

•

Providing input that may contribute to a decision

•

Providing background information

•

Conveying a decision

•

Building consensus or resolving issues

•

Supporting communication with external stakeholders, and/or

•

Developing a risk-informed, performance based assessment in a new area (123)

With regard to external risk communication, the objectives may be:

•

Providing information

•

Gathering information

•

Building trust and credibility

•

Seeking involvement, and/or

•

Influencing behavior or perceptions about risk (122)

Within the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, these lists might be combined, as
they represent common objectives irrespective of whether the stakeholder is internal or external.
For example, a drug manufacturer may communicate externally to regulators regarding decisions
that have been made based on QRM, while an individual QRM practitioner may wish to build trust
and credibility regarding identified risks internally with his or her leadership, staff, or peers.

With the objectives for risk communication established, the process reaches the planning stage.
This begins with the identification of stakeholders and a careful evaluation of their potential
concerns, preconceptions, and existing knowledge regarding the risks or risk topics being
communicated. The stakeholders will be the recipients of the risk communication, and must be
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thoroughly understood in order for the communication to be effective. Any imbalances in
knowledge and underlying bias should be explicitly addressed in the communication plan, and risk
communication methods should be selected to ensure that the risk information being
communicated is clear to the intended audience. (122) (123)

Preparation follows the planning stage, and entails the creation of communication materials (such
as slides, speaker notes, email messages, or letters), the anticipation of potential questions or points
of contention, and the collation of information and data to support key messages. Finally, the
communication occurs; this may be passive communication, as may be the case when the objective
is to inform the recipient of facts or decisions, or it may be an active dialogue requiring the use of
active listening skills. Once the communication has occurred, the communicator should reflect on
the experience and identify opportunities for improvement in the future. (122) (123)

While the above discourse on effective risk communication can be viewed as “good
communication practices” in a general sense, the fact that these principles are applied in a
disciplined way to the communication of risk information within the nuclear industry is not
inconsequential. There is an entire field of study and related body of literature dedicated to how
risk is perceived by individuals 47, and the recipient’s state of mind and frame of reference can
greatly influence their interpretation of both the information and message communicated. (124) In
order for the risk information to be transmitted from sender to receiver in the way in which it was
intended, risk communication must not be marginalized or taken for granted. This is particularly

47

The most notable of these is the work of Kahneman and Tversky on human heuristics and cognitive biases.
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true of QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, where the risk information
directly affects the life and health of patients.

Equipped with best practices and key lessons from industries with a history of effective risk
management implementation, the research reached its third and final phase.

This phase,

documented in Section Three (Chapters Seven through Ten), focused on synthesizing the learnings
from Phase 1 and 2 of the research with additional research to define the ideal state of QRM: a
state in which QRM truly enables the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries to manage
risk to the patient.
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Section Three: Recoding QRM to Better
Manage Risk to the Patient
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“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.”

- Albert Einstein

“There is nothing about risk management that does not make common
sense.”

- Amanda Bishop McFarland
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7 Chapter Seven: What QRM Maturity Looks Like - People

This chapter marks the first of three aimed at characterizing the ideal state of QRM—a state in
which a firm’s QRM program has been optimized to provide the maximum benefit to both the
company and the patient.

7.1 Research design and process for Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine
The Phase 3 research discussed in Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine represents a synthesis of prior
learnings and phase-specific qualitative research methods, as introduced in Chapter Three. A
combination of philosophical dialogues, literature review, and semi-structured interviews were
used.

Philosophical dialogues took place primarily at industry conferences, such as those

sponsored by PDA and IVT, which were attended by large groups of delegates with varying levels
of expertise and practical experience in QRM. The researcher sought out specific individuals to
discuss QRM topics based on their current roles, and leveraged delegates attending conference
sessions on or relating to QRM topics. Themes were identified and later trended, and selected
quotes were documented by the researcher during these exchanges. In many cases, the themes that
emerged from the philosophical dialogues echoed the researcher’s own experience and learnings
from the Phase 1 and 2 research; these are cited accordingly in the chapters that follow.

The literature review consisted of articles from industry periodicals, peer-reviewed journals, and
reports, as discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis and as shown in Figure 7-A. In addition, the
researcher incorporated several books on quality and risk management topics, as well as
whitepapers and reports published by renowned consulting firms (such as Deloitte and Price
194

Waterhouse Coopers) and risk management-related organizations (such as the Risk Management
Society, or RIMS, and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission,
or COSO). The literature review therefore extended beyond QRM in the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries to other industries, such as finance and insurance, and other risk
management fields, such as Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). These sources added depth to
the Phase 3 research and enabled the characterizing of best practices from a variety of trades,
further expanding upon the industries selected for the Phase 2 research in Chapter Six.

Figure 7-A: Literature map highlighting focus for Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine
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As noted in Chapter Three, the semi-structured interviews of QRM experts were conducted either
in person, via telephone, or via written correspondence in instances where the experts’ schedules
were not conducive to a dialogue. Each expert was asked to review a research brief, prepared in
accordance with the DIT’s rules for ethical research conduct and approved by the Ethics
Committee, and sign a declaration that they agreed to serve as research subject. In person and
phone interviews were recorded and later transcribed. Each transcript (or written interview
response) was coded for key words and analyzed to inform the applicable topic in Chapters Seven,
Eight, and Nine. These semi-structured interviews found many themes, as well as some disparate
opinions that offered a richness to the research.

This chapter intends to characterize maturity with regard to the people pillar of QRM and is divided
into three sections. The first section discusses the benefits of, and methods for, building awareness
of QRM principles and practices throughout industry, as embodied within those personnel working
at a given pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical manufacturing site. The second section discusses
the need for building expertise within industry for QRM as a discipline in its own right, and offers
an educational approach to achieve this. The third and final section of this chapter explores risk
culture, including those characteristics indicative of mature and immature risk cultures, and
summarizes some best practices to enhance risk culture.

7.2 Building organizational awareness of QRM
A common theme identified in the benchmarking survey, expert interviews, and literature review
is the need for all employees to possess a basic level of awareness of QRM, irrespective of their
individual job responsibilities. Because QRM is an enabler of the quality system, and all
employees are responsible for ensuring the quality of the products they manufacture or support, an
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understanding of QRM principles and practices throughout each organization is necessary.
However, O’Donnell summarizes that currently, “[most] people [in the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries] don’t make the links between what they do and QRM.” (125)

Ramnarine notes that at companies mature in QRM, individuals at all levels and functions are able
to identify and communicate risks associated with their daily work. (126) Vesper reiterates this,
noting that firms mature in QRM implementation will have developed their staff such that
“…people think about risks as part of their job. They understand risks associated with their job,
and they realize that before they start a task, they should run through it in their mind, [and ask]
what can go wrong here? What will I do if it goes downhill? Where am I vulnerable in this
particular activity? So it’s where risk is a natural part of daily work. It’s risk-based thinking.”
(127) Developing an organization that easily identifies risk and seamlessly integrates QRM
principles into task preparation and execution provides a competitive advantage to drug
manufacturers and a direct benefit to patients. The risk-aware mindset allows for potential issues
to be more readily identified and remediated in real time, before consequences on product quality
manifest.

In order to develop the appropriate level of organizational awareness of QRM, companies with
mature QRM programs often employ role-based training. (128) (129) (130) This model enables a
tailored approach to QRM knowledge transfer based on an individual’s level of interaction with
QRM. While certain roles may require minimal technical knowledge of QRM, those who interact
more frequently and deeply with QRM will require a commensurate level of training to ensure
they can fulfill their responsibilities within the program. Table 7-1 provides a training model for
the roles described in Chapter Nine.
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Table 7-1: Role-based training model to enable risk maturity

Role
All employees

Objective of training
Provide an overview of
QRM principles and
practices

Subject Matter
Experts

Enable participation in
QRM activities

System or Process
Owners

Ensure ownership and
accountability for QRM

QRM Experts
(Facilitators)
Decision makers

Build expertise in QRM

Leadership

Enable risk-based
decision making
Secure a commitment to
QRM

Points to emphasize
• QRM does not replace the obligation
to follow cGMP
• Risk management is part of daily life
• It is everyone’s responsibility to
manage risks to the patient
• QRM is not surrogate for sound
science
• QRM requires the use of data and
scientific knowledge to be effective
• Roles and responsibilities for QRM
• Appropriate and inappropriate use of
QRM
• Refer to section 7.3
•
•
•
•

QRM is an input into decision
making; it is not the decision
The role of governance and culture in
successful QRM (refer to Chapter
Nine and section 7.4, respectively)
The importance of leadership
commitment in the success of QRM
The value of QRM to the patient and
the business

The role-based training described above should not be delivered only once; it is important to
periodically refresh individuals on QRM principles and practices to ensure the knowledge remains
current and easily accessible to the employee. Companies mature in QRM tend to perform annual
re-trainings, either as standalone efforts or as part of other routine training such as cGMP
refreshers. (128)

Developing organizational awareness of QRM principles and practices achieves several objectives
that serve to enhance risk maturity.

It gives employees the tools to identify, reduce, and

communicate quality risks that might be present in their daily work. It enables a continuous
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improvement mindset by giving employees the vocabulary and opportunity to speak up about
quality risks and opportunities for improvement. (131) It helps overcome cultural inertia that may
be present in historically reactive operational cultures. Finally, organization-wide familiarity with
QRM ensures that all employees remain aware of their role in managing risk to the patient.

7.3 Building expertise in QRM
Many experts and authors espouse the need to build quality risk management expertise within the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. These industries are founded in various sorts of
expertise: expertise in patients’ medical needs, the clinical benefits of medicines, the science
underpinning drug research and development, the manufacturing science required to produce these
drugs, the quality system elements to ensure patient protection, and the regulatory science
underpinning the manufacturer-regulator relationship.

Despite this, there is a lack of deep

understanding of the principles and practices of QRM: the very principles and practices that are
being integrated throughout each of these areas. (125) (132) As stakeholders have evolved their
appreciation of the benefits offered by QRM, each of these areas of expertise, once considered
sufficient to deliver value to the patient, are now rendered vulnerable. Critical knowledge
necessary to fulfill their role is lacking. The need for a deeper understanding of the ways in which
QRM should be used to enable product realization and ongoing safety and efficacy is clear.

Some of the experts interviewed as part of the research made a distinction between training and
education. (132) (132) Training, they noted, teaches people basic concepts required to fulfill their
job responsibilities and execute tasks as intended. Education, on the other hand, provides a deeper
perspective on the intent, principles, and practices associated with a given area to enable people to
go further than what might be provided by training alone. It transfers knowledge and gives
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students the skill set to synthesize this knowledge and create additional knowledge as they
progress. Education, rather than training, is what is needed within industry for QRM. The
researcher proposes that such an education program might apply three categories to each student,
based on their level of progression through the program and demonstrated mastery of QRM
principles and practices, as illustrated in Table 7-2.

Table 7-2: Education levels to develop QRM experts

Level

Candidate

Level of
Level of
educator
structure
involvement
High
High

Apprentice

Moderate

High

Expert

Low

Low

Focus of
education

Educational
premise

Skills gained

Course work,
case study
review
Use of skills
under a
seasoned QRM
expert

“learn by
seeing”

Broad understanding
of principles, tools,
and application
Application of
student skills in reallife settings,
flexibility to “think
outside the box”
Refinement of
expertise, knowledge
transfer

“learn by
doing”

Independent use “learn by
of skills,
teaching”
mentorship of
apprentices
At the Candidate level, the coursework progresses from a basic review of QRM regulation, terms,
and tools through more complex concepts such as the development of risk control strategies, QRM
facilitation skills, risk communication, and risk review, finally ending with advanced concepts
such as human heuristics and bias and adaptation of QRM approaches to real-life scenarios. Table
7-3 summarizes recommended coursework during the Candidate level of QRM education, based
largely on the research described in this thesis.

At the Apprentice level, the student is expected to apply knowledge gained during the Candidate
coursework to real-life scenarios in a work setting, under the tutelage of a seasoned QRM expert.
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Such apprenticeship may involve activities such as co-facilitation of risk assessments, participation
in Community of Practice-type knowledge sharing forums, and exposure to senior leadership as
risk-based decisions are discussed and taken. The apprenticeship program benefits from a high
level of structure, with defined opportunities and mentor partners, to ensure the apprentice has an
opportunity to exercise skills and be exposed to scenarios outside of their comfort levels. The
apprenticeship program provides a way for students to learn on the job and experience success and
failure in QRM endeavors without exposing the business and the patient to undue risk.
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Table 7-3: Coursework for QRM Candidates
Course
QRM Basics

•
•
•

Included topics
ICH Q9
QRM standards: ISO 14971 and ISO 31000
QRM terms

QRM Applications

•
•

ICH Q8(R2) and ICH Q11
ICH Q10

QRM Tools

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP)
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
Bowtie Analysis: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Risk-based Impact Assessment (RBIA)
Developing the risk question
Risk tool selection
Building a risk team
Preparing for a risk assessment

Risk Control

•
•
•

Risk control methods
Identifying GMP controls
Risk control option analysis

Risk Review

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Risk review timing and objectives
Data sources
Making sense of the data
Identifying stakeholders
Communication methods
What should be communicated
Situational leadership
Managing conflict
Leading meetings
Heuristics and biases

QRM Initiation

Risk Communication

Facilitation skills

Section references in this thesis
• 2.2.2
• 6.2
• 6.1
• 2.2.3
• 2.2.4
• 8.3
• 8.2.2

•

8.2

•
•
•

6.2.2
6.4
8.48.4

•

8.5

•
•

6.4.1
8.6

None 48

48

With the exception of heuristics and biases, facilitation skills are not specific to QRM and are therefore not discussed in this thesis. Heuristics and biases did not
warrant significant discussion based on the research question, however are critical knowledge for the QRM Candidate. See, for example, (63), (64), (157), (222).
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Students at the Expert level 49 focus on using their mastery of QRM for the benefit of the patients
they and their organizations serve. In addition, they nurture the next generation of QRM Experts
as coaches and mentors. The process of mentoring brings with it an additional level of learning,
as students with new knowledge, ideas, and mindsets challenge the mentor.

Companies with mature QRM programs invest heavily in building this level of QRM expertise.
(130) This investment offers a significant return, of course, in the form of core knowledge that
can be applied throughout the quality system and over the entire product lifecycle. The people
working with and through QRM are assets to be invested in and championed; developing core
expertise in QRM principles and practices enables companies to better manage risk to the patient.

7.4 Risk culture
Several experts who participated in the Phase 3 research cited a company’s culture with respect to
QRM as the aspect most predictive of success, and also of failure, in managing risk to the patient.
Cultural influences have made or broken risk management in other industries as well, as in the
culture of complacency and the normalization of deviance seen at NASA (discussed in Chapter 6)
and the failure to implement appropriate design controls in the 1970s model Pinto at Ford that is
common attributed to the unethical prioritization of profits over people. 50 (133)

49

Indeed, even experts should be considered students of QRM, as the consistent evolution of the practice necessarily
entails an ongoing commitment to learning.
50
The Ford Pinto debacle is commonly studied by business ethicists and risk management practitioners alike. The
1970s model Pinto had a serious design flaw; the fuel tank was positioned in a way that made it vulnerable to explosion
upon impact, and also made it difficult or impossible for the vehicle occupants to subsequently escape the fiery crash.
Pinto designers admitted to keeping this information from the CEO at the time, since safety was not a priority at the
company. Cost and time, however, were. Once the Pinto went to market and drivers began to suffer as a result of the
design issue, the company still chose to continue selling the vehicle. Ostensibly the justification was that a mass recall
and part replacement was more expensive than the expected legal settlements in wrongful death tort suits. (141) The
company culture at Ford serves as a cautionary tale for any QRM practitioner.
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The Phase 2 research identified fear as an obstacle that is currently preventing progression towards
more mature QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. Other experts cited a
lack of interest in exploring uncertainty as a hallmark of an immature risk culture, while others
cited reactive, “fire-fighting” cultures that reward problem solving instead of problem prevention.
(134) (132) (127) The lack of a common risk vocabulary, and the willingness to use it, is another
indicator of weak risk maturity, as is the feeling that QRM adds value only so far as the regulations
require it. (129) (135) In immature risk cultures, personnel are loath to participate in QRM
activities, often actively avoiding them. (128)

These immature risk cultures may be relics of older regulatory paradigms, predating ICH Q8, Q9,
Q10, and Q11. The semi-structured expert interviews and philosophical dialogues held in the
Phase 3 research indicated that there may be lingering fear of risk, drawn off the impression that
regulators, in particular, would historically not tolerate quality risk of any sort. (127) (128)
Mohachkar et al reflect that “the industry [has] too long been regulated into a culture in which a
static process [is] the only safe process.” (136)

Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Two,

pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical regulation has been historically rule-based, rather than riskbased. Compliance was king, and there was an assumption that perfect compliance would result
in perfect quality. Some companies, low in risk maturity, may still cling to this older paradigm as
the way it has always been done.

The unfortunate fact is that in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, culture change
often follows regulatory sanctions, such as an import alert, warning letter, consent decree, or
revocation of a GMP certificate—all situations that represent grave quality problems and
associated risks to the patient. The challenge becomes how to identify ways to change culture
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proactively. Juan Andres, head of quality at Novartis, positions it as an issue for leadership: “We
need to be able to articulate and to be able to catalyze that mindset and that cultural change in our
organizations with the business leaders prior to punished, or punishing the patients…”
(137)[emphasis added] The challenges in achieving momentum with a new organizational mindset
were summarized by Richard Bowles, head of quality at Schering-Plough, who discussed the
evolving levels of commitment as cultural change takes hold. (137) Table 7-4 summarizes these
levels of commitment.

Table 7-4: Levels of commitment in cultural change

Level of commitment
Denial
Resistance
Exploration
Commitment

Mindset
“I will do it if I have to.”
“I will obey the rules.”
“I will support the effort.”
“I stand for this.”

There are ways to accelerate the organization through these levels of commitment, steepening the
learning curve associated with understanding and adopting new ways of thinking—as QRM surely
entails. A first step is to develop organizational awareness of QRM, as discussed earlier in this
chapter. Some large pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical coupled the initial role-based training
efforts with company-wide “QRM Days”, engaging personnel with QRM-themed games, “lunch
and learn” talks about QRM topics from all levels of the organization, and QRM poster sessions.
One site achieved quick success in permeating the organization with a QRM mindset through their
“12 Days of Riskmas” event, using holiday themes to introduce and reinforce QRM topics
throughout their site. (128) Events such as these can diffuse some of the fear associated with risk
identification and management, and can allow personnel to engage with leadership and decision
makers who reinforce their commitment to a risk-savvy culture.
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Other firms have “branded” QRM through the design of risk management slogans and logos. The
branding is then used on multiple forms of communication—email signatures, presentation slides,
reports, and posters around the facility—to remind personnel of QRM. (138) (130) Uydess and
Meyers describe such branding as a key element of a successful cultural transformation, noting
“To help drive and sustain [cultural] changes, a compelling… message must be developed—in
effect, internally branding the effort. The message must be clear, relevant, understood by all, and
designed to provide a point around which every employee can rally, motivating them to contribute
to the effort.” (139) This effort should also work to reverse any preconceptions that risk
management is “the brakes of the operation more so than valued partners.” (140)

In addition, crafting a reward and recognition program for personnel who exhibit anticipatory and
avoidant behaviors will encourage others to follow and demonstrate the organization’s
commitment to the new risk culture. (132) (127)

This is particularly important within

organizations that have historically rewarded reactive behaviors, as these organizations have
reinforced the perception that problem-solvers are valued, while risk managers go unnoticed.
Vesper shared an anecdote to demonstrate the point:

“I was working with a biopharma company and they prided themselves as fire-fighters. If
something went wrong, they would work twenty hours a day and over weekends to fix it,
and once they did they would get their picture taken with the site director and it would be
put on their interval website or newsletter. They were rewarding fire-fighters. And what
was so hard about this firm, is that QRM is proactive. And they weren’t rewarding
proactive behaviors, or avoiding a problem instead of solving it.” (127)
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Reward and recognition programs to reinforce proactive behaviors can vary from formal to
informal in line with typical company policies, however it should be similar in measure to the
programs used for reactive behaviors—those with a QRM mindset should get equal or greater
symbols of appreciation as those who capitalize off the failure of QRM.

For those firms ready to transition to the modern quality archetype of risk-based quality and
compliance have a clear idea of what maturity looks like. Pat Barrett, Auditor-General for
Australia, listed ten attributes of mature risk cultures (positioned as KPIs for risk management):

1. Integrated risk management approach: an organization in which risk management is
forward-looking and integral to all business processes
2. Committed and led: an organization with a strong leadership commitment to risk
management at the highest levels
3. Positive and proactive focus: an organization that seeks to identify and manage risks
before they manifest, rather than after
4. Process-driven: an organization with a framework capable of executing risk management
processes
5. Planned for continuous improvement: an organization with a clearly defined risk
planning process and ongoing monitoring and review
6. Audited and documented: an organization that confirms its application of risk
management principles and processes
7. Active communication: an organization with a defined risk communication plan, that
communicates risks actively to internal and external stakeholders
8. Resourced: an organization that has committed adequate resources, both financial, time,
and personnel, to the management of risks
9. Trained and Educated: an organization that is committed to training and education of
staff in risk management principles and is willing to fund such education
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10. Value-based decisions: an organization that makes business decisions based on risk
assessment outcomes (141)

Mature risk cultures are composed of people with an innate curiosity and drive to better understand
and manage risks. (134) (126) These are open, transparent cultures that have not assigned an
inherently negative value judgement to risks; risks and their management are seen not as
mandatory compliance element but as opportunities to improve the business and better protect the
patient. (134) (132) (142) (130) (125) In mature risk cultures, there is eagerness to employ QRM
principles and practices since the benefits of doing so are clear to all. People actively champion
QRM; that is, until the highest level of maturity is reached where QRM is so fully integrated into
everyday work that the use of risk management concepts no longer requires conscious effort. Of
course, a strong risk culture is one that is proactive, anticipatory, and risk avoidant; it is a culture
that puts patient protection first.

This chapter outlined an ideal state of QRM with regard to the people working within it, including
role-based training and awareness, the process and benefits of nurturing QRM experts, and the role
of risk culture. Chapter Eight will characterize maturity for the QRM process to be used by these
QRM practitioners, aimed at shifting the focus from “doing QRM” to “managing risk to the
patient.”
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8 Chapter Eight: What QRM Maturity Looks Like - Process

This chapter seeks to characterize risk maturity with regard to the process—the activities that
comprise the QRM lifecycle. This chapter begins with the introduction of a concept intended to
serve as the guiding light for subsequent quality risk management efforts, the living risk
assessment library. This library focuses the organization on holistically managing aspects of that
directly relate to the patient, minimizing the emphasis on performing QRM activities for less
important aspects. It is, in a sense, the principle of risk management applied to risk management
itself. The sections that follow characterize what maturity looks like over the QRM lifecycle, and
proceed in rank order of QRM initiation, risk assessment, risk control, risk review, and risk
communication. Finally, an alternative QRM lifecycle is proposed, based upon the more effective
QRM process proposed in earlier sections.

8.1 Constructing a holistic risk assessment library
ICH Q9 does not distinguish between two complementary but distinct concepts: quality risk
management and risk-based decision making. This difference is more effectively communicated
in ICH Q10, which distinguishes between the product lifecycle and the quality system working
within that lifecycle. The QRM lifecycle proposed by ICH Q9 implies that risk management
activities necessarily entail each of the process steps to a greater or lesser extent; there is no
acknowledgement that QRM principles may be applied, in the absence of the complete QRM
lifecycle, throughout the quality system. Industries such as aerospace (discussed in Chapter Six)
and companies with mature QRM programs distinguish between these two applications of QRM
and have structured their programs appropriately. (109) (129) (134) (128)
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An operational definition for risk-based decision making for the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries might be “the use of the principles of quality management risk
outside of the lifecycle framework to assist with quality-related decision making.” For example,
one might apply QRM to help determine a commensurate depth of investigation for a process
deviation or complaint, or to evaluate the appropriate frequency for preventive maintenance,
calibration, or self-inspection. These applications of QRM do not necessarily require the totality
of the lifecycle to be followed; rather, a risk assessment or risk-based approach may be conducted
to facilitate a decision without continuing into the risk reduction, risk acceptance, and risk review
portions of the lifecycle. It is therefore necessary for firms to distinguish between living risk
assessments, which follow the full breath of the QRM lifecycle, and ad hoc risk assessments, which
may only address a portion or portions of the lifecycle, depending on the risk question. This
alleviates some of the administration burden of a QRM program by focusing energy and resources
(particularly within risk review) on the applicable portions of the lifecycle.

Living risk assessments should represent the core of the QRM program. These are performed on
a product, process, or system, with the objectives of understanding the associated risks, controlling
them to an acceptable level, and reviewing the risks in light of changing conditions to evaluate the
continued relevance of the identified risks and the continued effectiveness of risk controls. On the
other hand, ad hoc risk assessments are likely to be performed as part of an integrated quality
system, to make decisions within specific contexts. These risk assessments need not be subject to
risk review, but are often the input into the review of living risk assessments. Many companies
struggle as they attempt to review risk assessments intended for risk-based decision making rather
the QRM lifecycle, since related decisions have been taken and resultant next steps enacted. A
mature QRM program addresses and embraces both of these types of risk assessments.
210

It follows, of course, that the products manufactured by a firm should be subject to the full rigors
of the QRM lifecycle, and therefore have living risk assessments associated with them. These
represent the most direct link to the patient and should be continually evaluated in a QRM
framework throughout their lifecycle. (143)

The question then becomes, what living risk

assessments are necessary to ensure that risks to the patient are fully understood and controlled?

As discussed in the Viracept story in Chapter One, many firms have approached this by creating
thousands of risk assessments, each covering a small segment of the total knowledge required to
truly manage risks to the patient. Schmitt notes that in his experience working with numerous
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies, “… one is left with hundreds (sometimes
thousands) of risk assessments all over the place, not linked to a plan or a process, just floating.”
(135) At companies with less mature QRM programs, risk assessments, and therefore the QRM
lifecycle, are initiated as the need arises, and are seldom planned in advance to fit within an
overarching strategy to achieve full risk understanding. (135) (144) This approach soon proves its
folly, as the forest is lost for the trees and a complete picture of the risks to which the patient might
be exposed are not fully understood. Further, the administrative burden posed by the need to
perform risk review activities on thousands of individual risk assessments soon becomes
unmanageable, causing an increased focus on “doing QRM” at the expense of managing risk to
the patient.

A mature QRM program would have a clear picture of the minimum scope required to achieve
holistic risk knowledge and would have established a QRM plan to achieve this. For example, a
firm may elect to use the approach commonly employed by medical devices, with one risk
assessment (and QRM lifecycle initiation) each for the product, process, and use. However,
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discomfort with this sparse approach is often voiced by various departments: what about the risks
associated with the manufacturing facility? The utilities within the facility? The equipment used
to run the manufacturing process? The computer systems used to run those equipment? And once
again the firm moves to the other side of the pendulum, with an excess of risk assessments of small
scope ruling the day. (128) (138) A more streamlined and comprehensive approach is to evaluate
the parts that comprise the whole and proactively design a holistic living risk assessment library.
Such a living risk assessment library might leverage platform processes and technologies and
similarities in design and construction to cover the totality of product considerations, as shown in
Table 8-1.

Using the living risk assessment library model, risk identification would occur within the context
of a pre-planned risk assessment, rather than before. Therefore, individual efforts to perform risk
assessments for pre-defined risks, such as cross-contamination, integrity of the supply chain/value
stream, or the level of cGMP required of excipient manufacturers, would no longer be necessary;
these would already be addressed in the applicable living risk assessment. In this way the living
risk assessment library model enables a more streamlined yet comprehensive approach such that
all applicable risks are identified within the context of a holistic risk assessment.

In order to maximize the effectiveness of the living assessment risk library concept, the
organization must be aware that these must be kept living; that is, a new living risk assessment
should only be created if a gap is discovered within the library construct. Rather, the risk
assessments that already compose the library should be revisited, revised, expanded, or contracted
based changes that may occur to the topic that was assessed, in accordance with the principles of
risk review.
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Table 8-1: Example of an optimized living risk assessment library
Focus of risk
assessment

Includes components of…

Delivers knowledge related to…
•
•

Manufacturing
process

•
•
•

Manufacturing equipment
Automation
Equipment cleaning and
sterilization

•
•
•
•
•
•

Facility

•
•
•

Starting/raw
materials and
components

Analytical
methods

HVAC systems
Critical utilities (e.g. water,
steam, and process gases)
Facility flows (e.g.
personnel, product, waste)

•
•

Material quality and safety
Extractable and leachable
profiles

•

Method capability and
repeatability
Laboratory instruments
Analyst interface
Data capture and trending
systems (e.g. Laboratory
Information Management
Systems)

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Product
shipping

•
•
•
•
•

Shipping lanes
Stability requirements
Temperature requirements
Handling requirements
Import/export
considerations
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•
•
•
•
•

Design and content of master batch
production records
Process and operational control
strategies
Process monitoring strategies
Product sampling and testing plans
Cleaning process design and
validation
Computer systems design and
validation
Maintenance and calibration plans
Inspection plans and acceptance
levels
Contamination and crosscontamination control strategies
Cleanroom capabilities and
classification
Environmental monitoring plans
Critical utilities monitoring plans
Product impurity profiles
Supplier qualification
Supplier management
Component lifecycle management
Data integrity
Analytical method design and
qualification
Computer systems design and
validation
Counterfeiting, tampering, and
diversion prevention and response
plans
Shipping configuration design and
qualification
Cold chain requirements
Supplier qualification
Supplier management
Good distribution practices

8.2 QRM initiation
In many companies, the QRM process is initiated informally, without any minimum requirements
that would prove critical to the success of the effort; in some cases there is no communication that
QRM has been invoked until after a risk assessment is complete. 51 (128) These practices could
lead to false-starts and other problems, such as weak, unclear or conflicting objectives, inadequate
expertise on the risk team, selection of a sub-optimal risk tool, or redundant or vague scope of the
QRM effort. Companies with mature QRM programs tend to pre-plan QRM efforts, as discussed
in the context of the QRM Plan in Chapter Nine, and apply a structured approach to the initiation
process to provide an appropriate level of oversight and direction for the activities to follow. A
mature QRM initiation process would require the initiator to define the risk question or objective
select an appropriate risk tool, and identify the expertise and data needed and individuals
possessing that expertise and knowledge, and ensure that the QRM effort is aligned with the overall
QRM strategy. Depending on the level of risk maturity of the organization, a defined QRM
initiation process may also include requirements to ensure the proper ownership, select a qualified
facilitator, prepare for the risk assessment, and understand the resources available to control any
resultant risks. The QRM initiation process should be considered a planning step critical to the
success of the effort, and should entail a commensurate level of structure and energy. Appendix I
offers a template that can be used by pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies to enhance
their maturity in QRM initiation.

51
In companies with very mature QRM programs, QRM would be seamless within the organization and therefore
initiation of QRM would not require a formal process or associated communication effort. However, as discussed in
Chapter Five, most pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies have not yet reached this level of maturity and
should follow a structured approach to QRM initiation until such time as control and oversight over this phase of the
lifecycle is no longer necessary.
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8.2.1

The risk question

Though ICH Q9 mentions it only in passing, perhaps the most important deliverable from QRM
initiation is the definition and documentation of the risk question. The risk question is that which
the risk assessment seeks to answer. It encompasses the problem statement in a question format,
serving as a compass for the activities to come. Broad risk assessments, such as those used to
construct the living risk assessment library discussed earlier in this chapter, tend to use short and
simple risk questions, such as “what are the risks associated with this process?” Narrowly-scoped,
specific risk assessments tend to employ more complex risk questions, such as “what are the risks
of exceeding the storage temperature during transport of this product by air freight from Ireland to
Hong Kong in February?” (61)

Some companies forgo a risk question and instead document the objective of the risk assessment.
The researcher cautions against this practice for several reasons: an objective may encourage
incorrect use of QRM by implying a foregone conclusion, such as a decision that has already been
made or a justification of an inappropriate practice (as in “The objective of this risk assessment is
to justify a reduced level of training for aseptic processing operators.”) and may also introduce
bias into the QRM exercise through the assumption that the objective is appropriate. The use of a
risk question has several advantages over an objective in QRM, including:

•

Minimizing bias by positioning the QRM exercise as one of learning, rather than
assertion, which in turn means there are no “right” or “wrong” answers

•

Allows the data to speak for itself in the context of a risk assessment, rather than to
support a pre-defined goal

•

Allows for uncertainty to be present and acknowledged
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This is not to say that the use of risk questions always represents a greater level of risk maturity.
Weak risk questions may exhibit characteristics similar to an objective, as in “what is the risk of
not doing <activity>?” Conversely, strong risk questions will be agnostic to the outcome.

Table 8-2 illustrates how varying levels of risk maturity might manifest during this step of QRM
initiation.

Table 8-2: Examples of QRM objectives and risk questions relative to the level of risk maturity

QRM Topic
Least mature
For
“The objective of this
environmental risk assessment is to
monitoring
justify a reduction in
sampling locations and
frequency for the
environmental
monitoring program.”
For deviations “The objective of this
risk assessment is to
justify the release of
product implicated in
deviation X.”
For change
management

8.2.2

“This risk assessment
was performed to
satisfy the QRM
requirement in the
Change Management
procedure.”

More mature
“What are the risks of
removing sampling
locations and reducing
the frequency of
sampling in the
environmental
monitoring program?”
“The objective of this
risk assessment is to
determine whether
product implicated in
deviation X should be
released.”
“This risk assessment
was performed to
determine the risks
associated with the
proposed change and
reduce them to an
acceptable level.”

Most mature
“What sampling
locations and frequency
should be employed in
the environmental
monitoring program,
based on the risk?”
“Given that deviation X
occurred, what are the
risks to product quality
and patient safety?”

“Should the proposed
change proceed based
on the risks? If so, what
effect does this change
pose on the risk profile
of the associated
process?”

QRM tool selection

Two-thirds of the experts interviewed for the Phase 3 research noted that a mature QRM program
would have an extensive risk “toolkit” that can be used to support the QRM lifecycle. (129) (134)
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(135) (132) (126) (127) (142) Risk tools support the conduct of risk assessments, including
elements of risk identification and risk analysis, at a minimum. A variety of risk tools are listed
in ICH Q9, including:

•

Flowcharts

•

Check sheets

•

Process maps

•

Ishikawa diagrams (also known as fishbone or cause and effect diagrams)

•

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

•

Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

•

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

•

Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP)

•

Hazard Operability Analysis (HAZOP)

•

Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

•

Risk Ranking and Filtering (RRF)

•

Supporting statistical tools, such as control charts, histograms, and process capability
analyses (45)

Despite this, many companies less mature in QRM application tend to use a single tool. By far the
most common tool in use the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries is FMEA, a fact
lamented by QRM experts. (129) (134) (135) (132) (126) (127) (142) While FMEA has its place
in any QRM toolkit, the rigidity of the tool construct poses challenges when used for risk questions
that are ill-fit for the tool design. For example, the identification of failure modes, causes, and
effects inherent in FMEA is useful when trying to optimize a process to minimize risk, however is
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of little value when trying to understand the impact of an event on product quality and patient
safety for which the underlying cause may be of minimal relevance.

A robust toolkit enables QRM practitioners to select the best-fit approach for the risk question at
hand and empowers organizations to fully avail themselves of different levels of formality inherent
in each tool. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, ICH Q9 advises that “the level of effort, formality,
and documentation of the quality risk management process should be commensurate with the level
of risk.” (45) FMEA is generally recognized as a formal risk tool; the over-use (and therefore
misuse) of FMEA means that less mature QRM programs do not apply this principle of
proportionate formality and effort.

Vesper and O’Donnell listed “using formal QRM on

everything” as a major trend and misapplication of QRM seen across industry. (145) Darrel
Morrow, Senior Director of Quality Systems at Acceleron Pharma, reiterates that “it cannot be
stressed enough that good systems use simple tools and avoid complexity. In this industry, it is
easy for scientists to become hung up on ensuring accuracy; that means that people often add
details and specifics to risks that do not actually help create a meaningful risk assessment.” (142)

Several sources note that formality is not a binary concept in QRM; rather, it is a “spectrum”
ranging from informal to very formal, with each risk tool having its place along the spectrum. (62)
(126) It is this researcher’s opinion that the formality spectrum described by these sources has
minimal utility in a practical sense, since the distinction between risk tools is less a matter for
formality than it is of conceptual design and intended application. Companies seeking to enhance
their level of risk maturity would benefit most from acknowledging the difference between formal
and less formal risk tools, and then developing risk toolkits to include a small selection of both
types. A recommended minimum toolkit is offered in Table 8-3.
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Table 8-3: Recommended minimum risk tools to increase risk maturity

Tool
FMEA

HACCP

Risk-based Impact
Assessment (RBIA)
Risk Estimation
Matrix (REM;
sometimes called a
simple hazard
analysis)
Risk Ranking and
Filtering
Decision trees and
Ishikawa diagrams

Check sheets
Ishikawa diagrams

Formality Optimized for…
Formal
Product, process, and
system optimization and
continuous improvement
Formal
Facility and utility
optimization and
continuous improvement
Formal
Impact assessments

Enables delivery of…
Process control strategies

Less
Formal

Frequent use in a variety
of circumstances

•

Less
Formal
Less
Formal

Customization

Less
Formal
Less
Formal

Risk identification

Customization

Risk identification

Monitoring plans

Risk-based decision making
Resource and project
prioritization
• Identification of areas that
may require analysis
through more formal tools
Integration of QRM principles
into the quality system
• Integration of QRM
principles into the quality
system
• Risk-based decision making
List of applicable risks from a
pre-identified set
List of causal factors

Once an appropriate toolkit has been defined, the most challenging aspect of QRM initiation
begins-- selecting the most appropriate risk tool. Murray and Reich explain the challenge as
follows:

“Successful QRM tool selection begins with an awareness of the interrelationship between
risk understanding and the choice of QRM tools. Knowledge pertaining to potential risks
both influences, and is influenced by, the selection of QRM tools… This interrelationship
may seem paradoxical; QRM tools are typically used to facilitate and organization risk
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identification, yet it is premature to select a QRM tool without knowing the nature of the
risks to be assessed.” (146)

This paradox can be overcome through a deep understanding of the capabilities and limitations of
individual risk tool, combined with an evaluation of the risk question at hand. Murray and Reich
compare and contrast the characteristics of some common risk tools in a matrix format, as shown
in Figure 8-A. While this comparison is valuable, it does not acknowledge the level of formality
required of the assessment, nor is the risk question taken into account. This researcher, using
learnings from Murray and Reich, philosophical dialogues, expert interviews, and work experience
has addressed these shortcomings through the development of a decision tree to facilitate risk tool
selection in mature QRM programs, as shown in Figure 8-B.
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Figure 8-A: Murray and Reich’s comparison of common risk tools (146)
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Scope and Objective/
Risk Question

Is there a
procedural
requirement to use
a specific risk
tool?

 Yes

Use tool
defined in the
applicable
procedure

 No
 No

Is this a
living risk
assessment?

 Yes

Risk
Assessment
Formality =
Formal

Is the
development of a
sampling plan a
primary
objective?

 No

Is the objective of this
risk assessment to
determine patient impact
following an event?

 Yes

 Yes

Risk
Assessment
Formality =
Formal

 No

Is the objective of this
risk assessment to
determine root (or
potential) cause?

 Complex

 Yes

Use Five Whys or
other less formal
root cause analysis
tool

Is the issue simple and
loosely coupled or
complex and tightly
coupled?

 No

Is this risk assessment
related to a process or
system that is critical to
product quality or patient
safety?

Use Hazard
Analysis and
Critical Control
Points (HACCP)

Use Risk-based Impact
Assessment (RBIA)

 Simple

 Yes

Use Failure
Modes and
Effects
Analysis
(FMEA)

Risk
Assessment
Formality =
Formal

Use Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) or
other formal root
cause analysis tool

Use Failure
Modes and
Effects Analysis
(FMEA) tool

 No

Use Risk Estimation Matrix (REM), Risk
Ranking and Filtering (RRF), decision tree,
Ishikawa diagram, or other risk-based
approach

Risk
Assessment
Formality =
Less Formal

Figure 8-B: Decision tree to aid in risk tool selection
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8.2.3

QRM team selection

With over a decade of experience in the pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, and medical device
industries, this researcher has become a strong proponent of the use of multidisciplinary teams to
solve problems. Ideas and intelligence are cumulative, and having the best and brightest work
together on a topic almost always leads to a better outcome. ICH Q9 acknowledges the importance
of using a team approach to QRM, stating “Quality risk management activities are usually…
undertaken by interdisciplinary teams. When teams are formed, they should include experts from
the appropriate areas… in addition to individuals who are knowledgeable about the quality risk
management process.” (45) A critical component of the QRM initiation process includes the
identification of the QRM team and chartering its membership.

Companies less mature in QRM tend to struggle with the idea of expert teams. McFarland
describes her least mature clients as “those that do not require cross-functional team involvement
in risk exercises.” (134) In addition, many firms confuse functional group affiliation with
expertise; for example, working within the quality control microbiology laboratory at a
pharmaceutical firm does not necessarily render one an expert microbiologist. (128) Companies
mature in QRM do not seek to ensure departments are represented in a risk assessment; rather,
they aim to have all necessary scientific expertise at the table when QRM is initiated.

The term “subject matter experts”, or SMEs, is typically used to identify these individuals. A
subject matter expert might be defined as one who has both access to scientific data and the
knowledge to interpret that data through the lens of risk. This expertise tends to be in a scientific
or engineering discipline of course, and should entail an appropriate level of education, experience,
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and ongoing learning to ensure the expert’s reference point is not solely academic nor industrial,
and is kept in tune with scientific advancements over time. These experts, comprising the bulk of
the QRM team, need only possess a superficial knowledge of QRM tools in order to fulfill their
role on the team. Under the guidance and tutelage of a qualified risk facilitator, their expertise can
be translated into a QRM framework to create deliverables.

At QRM initiation, the necessary data and expertise should be identified before membership on
the QRM team is selected. This ensures that individuals are not asked to participate based on
functional group affiliation or availability, but instead based on their knowledge and the relevance
of that knowledge to the topic under evaluation. Appendix I provides a template for QRM
initiation that guides the user through this essential process.

8.3 Maturity with regard to risk assessment
There is a wealth of literature available on risk assessments—books and articles describing risk
tools, methods, considerations, and “best practices” abound. The gap in this literature, as discussed
in Chapters One and Two, is a discussion about how to use risk assessment to better manage risk
to the patient. The researcher has therefore chosen to approach this section, focused on maturity
of risk assessment, not on those tips already socialized throughout the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries, but rather on how to best execute living risk assessments to ensure
patient protection. The living risk assessment execution strategy described in this section was
initially proposed and authored by the researcher as part of her work with the PDA QRM Task
Force, and has since been published in the resultant technical report Quality Risk Management for
the Design, Qualification, and Operation of Manufacturing Systems. (147)
throughout this section, the approach will be referred to as SmartRA.
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For reference

8.3.1

Hierarchies and QbD and failure chains, oh my!

Stephen Covey offered some wisdom that should be held sacrosanct when performing QRM:
“begin with the end in mind.” (148) The “end” for pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
companies is, of course, is the end user—the patient.

All activities undertaken by drug

manufacturing firms ultimately link to the patient, as shown in Figure 8-C. The patient crowns the
pharmaceutical manufacturing hierarchy, and is supported by the medicinal product. The product,
in turn, is realized through the manufacturing process, which is possible through the use of
manufacturing systems, equipment, and technology.

These are comprised of individual

components—the constituent parts of the production and support systems. In order to protect the
patient by assuring the safety and efficacy of the drug product, each of the layers in this hierarchy
must be fully understood and carefully controlled.

Patient
Product
Manufacturing
Process
Production and
Support Systems
Components
Figure 8-C: Hierarchy of pharmaceutical manufacturing
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Visualized a different way in Figure 8-D, the product is enabled by the process, with is enabled by
systems, which are enabled by components. When the underlying hierarchy is well characterized,
even a simple valve or gasket can be linked to patient protection.

Figure 8-D: Enabling chain of pharmaceutical manufacturing

As discussed in Chapter Two, ICH Q8(R2) describes the Quality by Design process and introduces
specific vocabulary to describes the linkages between patient, product, and process. The aspects
of a medicinal product that are critical to ensuring product efficacy and patient safety are called
Critical Quality Attributes, or CQAs. (49) Examples of CQAs include potency, concentration or
dose, sterility, and the presence of impurities in the product. CQAs are identified through product
development data and preclinical and clinical evidence, illustrating how variation in a given quality
attribute affects patient outcomes and product quality. Companies mature in QRM often employ
a risk-based approach to CQA determination, using a risk tool that measures the strength of impact
of the quality attribute on the patient and the uncertainty associated with that impact. Only those
quality attributes that have strong scientific data supporting a lack of patient impact can be ruled
out as CQAs. In the event there is insufficient evidence to support a claim that a given quality
attribute will not affect the patient, the attributes will be considered a CQA to ensure it is
adequately controlled. (103) CQAs therefore make a link between the product and the patient, as
shown in Figure 8-E.
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Figure 8-E: Quality by Design linkages within the pharmaceutical manufacturing hierarchy

Once the CQAs for the medicinal product have been identified, the manufacturing process can be
similarly evaluated. The process parameters that are critical to ensure CQAs are met are deemed
Critical Process Parameters, or CPPs. These are identified during process development, using
experimental data (such as Design of Experiment or DoE) and risk-based impact assessments.
Only those process parameters that exhibit a strong correlation with, or causal link with, CQAs are
deemed critical.

As a result, CPPs link the process with the medicinal product in the

pharmaceutical manufacturing hierarchy.

The CPPs are, in turn, controlled by manufacturing systems, including facilities, utilities, and
production equipment. The elements of these systems that are critical to ensuring the CPPs are
adequately controlled and monitored are deemed Critical Aspects, or CAs. Finally, the CAs
require various components functioning in specific, reliable ways in order to be adequately
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controlled; these components are referred to as Critical Aspect Design Elements, or CADEs. 52 The
term “critical elements” is used throughout the remainder of this section to refer to CQAs, CPPs,
CAs, and CADEs as a group.

When viewed through the lens of QRM, the enabling chain of pharmaceutical manufacturing
(shown in Figure 8-D) becomes a failure chain. Because of the relationship between each critical
element, the failure of an upstream element necessarily can cause downstream elements to fail, as
illustrated in Figure 8-F. For example, if an impeller fails (CADE), the mixer will fail (CA). This
will lead to the mix speed or time being less than the process requires (CPP), which in turn could
affect the homogeneity of the applicable solution being mixed (CQA).

Figure 8-F: Critical element failure chain in pharmaceutical manufacturing

The totality of the linkages between various levels of the pharmaceutical manufacturing hierarchy
and the associated controls for the critical element failure chain are captured in what ICH Q8(R2)

52
ICH Q8(R2) does not extend to a discussion of manufacturing systems or the associated CAs or CADEs. The term
“critical aspect” in this context originates from ASTM E2500, Standard Guide for Specification, Design, and
Verification of Pharmaceutical and Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing Systems and Equipment. (50) The term
“critical aspect design element” was coined by the researcher for the purpose of continuing the pharmaceutical
manufacturing lifecycle to its most basic element, the component level. This term has been defined and published
within the PDA Technical Report No. 54-5, which the researcher authored in part. (146)
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calls a control strategy— “a planned set of controls, derived from current product and process
understanding that ensure process performance and product quality.” (49)

Through

implementation of the control strategy, a given stakeholder can focus on the level of the hierarchy
that suits their job function (such as engineers for manufacturing systems, manufacturing personnel
for manufacturing processes, and quality control personnel for product attributes), all the while
ensuring that the patient needs are met. The structure of the product-process-systems interface as
described in ICH Q8(R2), therefore, enables the first principle of ICH Q9 (i.e. “…The evaluation
of the risk to quality should be based on scientific knowledge and ultimately link to the protection
of the patient;”) to be applied in a clear and accessible way. (45) In a mature QRM program, the
fundamental concept of the critical element failure chain and the applicable control strategy is
derived from (or captured in 53) each living risk assessment; this ensures that elements critical to
product quality and patient safety are given a level of attention proportionate to their importance.

8.3.2

Developing a living risk assessment to ensure patient protection

The development of failure chains could, alone, serve as a robust living risk assessment to identify
critical elements, calculate the risk, and develop controls. However, in order to illustrate the
application of the living risk assessment model through a traditional risk tool, the risk tool decision

53

The researcher acknowledges that the approach described in this section varies slightly depending on the product
lifecycle phase in which it is applied. For example, “legacy” products and processes in the commercial manufacturing
stage of the product lifecycle may not have been created using a Quality by Design approach, and may have been
characterized for criticality post hoc. In these instances, the approach to risk assessment maturity will leverage predefined critical elements. Products and processes in the development phase, however, can use the same approach to
identify critical elements. This section and the examples that follow describe the application of this model for new
products, but is equally applicable to legacy ones.
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tree located in Appendix I was used and FMEA was selected as the best-fit risk tool. A brief
primer on FMEA is warranted, before more sophisticated concepts are introduced. 54

The risk identification step of an FMEA involves the identification of three components of risk:
failure mode, failure cause, and failure effect. A failure mode can be defined as the manner in
which an item could fail to meet its requirements. The consequence of a failure mode is termed a
failure effect, while the reason for the failure mode is called a failure cause. In FMEA, there is no
direct relationship between failure cause and failure effect; the failure mode intervenes between
the two, as illustrated in Figure 8-G.

Could result in

Failure
Effect(s)

Due to

Failure
Cause(s)

Failure Mode

Figure 8-G: Relationship between failure mode, failure cause, and failure effect in FMEA

Once risk identification is complete and all failure modes and related causes and effects are
defined, risks are ranked for frequency (or likelihood, where insufficient data exists), severity, and

54
The researcher acknowledges that there are as many ways to perform and structure FMEA as there are sources that
discuss it. For example, IEC 60812 does not explore causal factors in its version of FMEA while Dyadem explores
the frequency at which the cause, rather than effect or harm, occurs. (261) (262) For a number of reasons not pertinent
to risk maturity, the researcher prefers the approach defined by Dyadem and has chosen that form of FMEA for
discussion in this section.
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detectability, given existing controls (if any). Failure modes are ranked for their detectability,
failure causes for their frequency, and failure effects for their severity, as illustrated in Figure 8-H.

Failure
CAUSE
How frequent would the
failure cause be given the
controls in place?

FREQUENCY
Rating Decision

Failure
MODE
Would you be able to detect
the failure mode given the
controls in place?

DETECTABILITY
Rating Decision

Failure
EFFECT
If the failure effect occurs,
how severe would this
be?

SEVERITY
Rating Decision

Figure 8-H: Risk ranking in FMEA

The individual frequency, detectability, and severity ratings are then multiplied together to
determine the RPN, which is used to prioritize risk control or as basis for risk acceptance decisions,
as discussed further in section 8.4.

When performing a living risk assessment for a process, the failure modes will define the manner
in which the process will fail; for example, a process parameter of mixing speed may stray outside
its proven acceptable operating range, resulting in two failure modes: mix speed less than X and
mix speed greater than Y. Each of these failure modes will be traced to determine failure effects,
such as lack of homogeneity, and failure causes, such as mixer failure. This approach is called a
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process FMEA, since the central perspective (failure mode) is related to the manufacturing
process. In the event the failure of given process parameter could impact a CQA, it is, by
definition, a CPP. Conversely, where a process parameter failure has no impact on a CQA, that
process parameter is not critical. Using the same logic, the system-level cause of a CPP failure is
a CA, while system-level cases that affect non-critical process parameters are not CAs. Figure 8-I
illustrates how a process FMEA captures this segment of the failure chain.

Figure 8-I: SmartRA process risk assessment using FMEA

When used in this manner, the process FMEA will explore the severity of a CQA failure, the
detectability of a CPP failure, and the frequency of a CA failure. The controls in place, or
established through risk reduction, become part of the process control strategy, aimed to ensure
that the failure chain never manifests through a combination of preventive measures for CA failure
and control and montoring of CPP performance, risk control strategies to be discussed further in
section 8.4.

The astute reader will have noticed that the process FMEA neglects one of the components of the
failure chain—CADE failure. This critical elements is explored through a system design FMEA.
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The concept is the same as for the process FMEA, except that failure modes are set at the system,
or CA, level. This enables the exploration of the severity of CPP failure, the detectability of a CA
failure, and the frequency of CADE failure, using the risk ranking relationships described in Figure
8-H and as illustrated in Figure 8-J. Only those components that, in the event they fail, will result
in CA failure are considered CADEs; components that do not affect CAs are considered noncritical.,

Figure 8-J: SmartRA system design risk assessment using FMEA

Examples of completed process and system design FMEAs for saline solution preparation using
these concepts are provided in Table 8-4 and Table 8-5. The CQA of interest for this solution is
concentration, which has a specification of 4.0 – 6.5 mg/mL. The risk ranking and risk evaluation
criteria are shown in Table 8-6 through Table 8-9. 55

55

The researcher acknowledges the limitations of ordinal risk ranking scales, as well as the use of excessively
subjective ranking criteria—these limitations are explored in depth in the researcher’s published article “Risk Analysis
and Ordinal Risk Ranking Scales: A Closer Look” and are briefly discussed in section 8.4.4 of this thesis. (69) Because
this section is dedicated to a discussion of the living risk assessment approach, rather than the specifics of rating scales
and risk calculations, the researcher has chosen to use qualitative ranking scales and risk evaluation criteria.

233

Table 8-4: Example process FMEA using the SmartRA approach
Risk #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Failure Mode
Mix time < 30
minutes

Start and end time for
mixing documented in batch
record

Mix time > 40
minutes

Start and end time for
mixing documented in batch
record

D

2

2

Mix speed < 40
rpm

None

5

Mix speed > 100
rpm

None

5

Water added >
1.2L
Water added <
0.8L

Water is weighed on floor
scale with display
Water is weighed on floor
scale with display

NaCl added < 4.8g

NaCl is weighed on bench
scale with printout

3

NaCl added > 5.2g

NaCl is weighed on bench
scale with printout

3

17
18

Detectability Controls

2
2

Failure Cause
Timer failure
Mixer failure
Automation recipe
is incorrect
Timer failure
Mixer failure
Automation recipe
is incorrect
Mixer failure
Automation recipe
is incorrect
Mixer failure
Automation recipe
is incorrect
Operator error
Floor scale failure
Operator error
Floor scale failure
Operator error
Bench scale
failure
Operator error
Bench scale
failure
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Preventive
Controls
None
None

F
2
3

None

5

None
None

2
3

None

5

None

3

None

5

None

3

None

5

None
None
None
None
None

3
2
3
2
3

None

2

None

3

None

2

Failure Effect
Concentration <
4.0mg/mL
Delay in
downstream
production

S

5

20
30
100

2

8
12
20
45

Concentration <
4.0mg/mL

5

Equipment
damage

3

Concentration <
4.0mg/mL
Concentration >
6.5mg/mL

RPN

125
45

5
5

Concentration <
4.0mg/mL

5

Concentration >
6.5mg/mL

5

75
30
20
20
20
45
30
45
30

Table 8-5: Example system design FMEA using the SmartRA approach
Risk #

Failure Mode

Detectability
Controls

D

None

2

1

Power outage
Timer failure

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Failure Cause

Mixer failure

None

2

Preventive
Controls
None

F
2

Insufficient/inappropriate electrical
None
connection

5

Power outage

2

None

Impeller damaged
Impeller incorrectly oriented (not
centered properly)

None
None

4
3

None
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Automation recipe
incorrect

None

5

5

Improper coding
None

Power outage
Floor scale failure

None

5

None

Sensor failure
Weigh pan not level

None

Power outage
Bench scale
failure

None

5

None

None

Sensor failure
Weigh pan not level
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None

2
3
2
2
3
2

Failure Effect

Mix time < 30
min

S

RPN
20

5
50

Mix time < 30
min
Mix speed < 40
rpm
Mix time < 30
min
Mix speed < 40
rpm

5

5
5
5

Water added >
1.2L

5

Water added <
0.8L

5

NaCl added <
4.8g

5

NaCl added >
5.2g

5

20
20
40
40
30
30
125
125
40
40
60
60
40
40
50
50
75
75
50
50

Table 8-6: Example severity ranking criteria for SmartRA

Rating
(value)

Description

Criteria
Process FMEA
Minor disruption
No loss of product
No impact on product quality or patient safety
Minor disruption
Deviation with no loss of product
No impact on product quality or patient safety
Minor disruption
Portion of batch/lot must be scrapped
Minor impact on product quality. No impact
on patient safety.

1

Insignificant /
Minor Impact

2

Moderately
Significant /
Medium Impact

3

Significant /
High Impact

4

Extremely
Significant /
Very High
Impact

Major disruption
Loss of 100% of batch/lot.
Moderate impact on product quality. No
impact on patient safety.

5

Catastrophic /
Critical Impact

Failure of a critical quality attribute (CQA).
Hazardous situation that may endanger patient
or result in loss of data integrity.
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System Design FMEA
No impact on the performance of the product/system.
The usability of the product/system is not affected.
The performance of the product/system is reduced.
The usability of the product/system is slightly
affected.
The performance of the product/system is greatly
reduced.
The usability of the product/system is greatly
affected.
The performance of the product/system is reduced to
the point of diminished efficacy/ability to meet
intended use or product/system life expectancy.
The usability of the product/system is significantly
impaired.
Failure of a critical process parameter (CPP).
Immediate or sudden loss of product/system function
resulting in serious injury or death.
The product/system cannot be used without
successful completion of mitigation activities.
Loss of data integrity

Table 8-7: Example frequency ranking criteria for SmartRA

Rating (value)
1
2
3
4
5

Description
Remote
Low
Moderate
High
Extreme

Qualitative
Failure unlikely
Relatively few failures
Occasional failures
Repeated failures
Failure almost inevitable or unknown

Table 8-8: Example detectability ranking criteria for SmartRA

Rating (value)
1
2
3
4
5

Description
Very high
High
Moderate
Low
Remote

Criteria
Will be detected in (nearly) every instance before it causes harm.
High likelihood of detection before it causes harm.
Moderate likelihood of detection before it causes harm.
Remote likelihood of detection before it causes harm.
Cannot / will not be detected until after the product has been used, or detectability is unknown.

Table 8-9: Example risk evaluation criteria for SmartRA

RPN
≤ 20

Risk Level
Low

21 - 40

Medium

≥ 41, and/or frequency
or detectability = 5

High

Risk Acceptability / Required Action
Risk is acceptable. No further action required.
The risk must be evaluated and dispositioned as acceptable or not acceptable with appropriate
rationale. Risks deemed not acceptable must be subject to risk reduction or mitigation.
Risk is not acceptable. Mitigation required. If continued use of the system or process will
occur, interim controls must be identified to protect the patient while risk reduction is pursued.
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8.3.3

Extracting knowledge from the living risk assessment

The SmartRA approach to risk assessment ensures a clear line of sight to the patient, regardless of
the level of detail and associated distance from the patient that may result from performing risk
assessments on processes and systems. The model also maximizes the amount of knowledge that
can be gained, without the need to perform individual risk assessments, ensuring a holistic control
strategy can be developed based on the learnings from the effort. This sub-section illustrates the
knowledge that may be gained through review and interpretation of the SmartRA approach.

Identification of CPPs, CAs, and CADEs using SmartRA

As discussed above in the context of failure chains, the relationship between process parameters,
manufacturing and support systems, system components and quality attributes can reveal the
criticality of each and pinpoint those failures that render the patient vulnerable. ICH Q8(R2)
defines CPPs as “a process parameter whose variability has an impact on a critical quality
attribute;” therefore, any process parameter that, when operating outside of ranges established with
a consideration to acceptable variability, could result in a CQA failure is, by definition, a CPP.
(49) The relationship between process parameters and CQAs are explored through the example
process FMEA developed using the SmartRA approach (Table 8-4). The process parameters that
are identified as CPPs in the example include:

•

Mix time (> 30 minutes)

•

Mix speed (> 40 rpm)

•

Water addition (0.8 – 1.2 L)

•

Sodium chloride addition (4.8 – 5.2 g)
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These parameters are those that, when operating outside of the specified range, could impact the
CQA (concentration 4.0 – 6.5 mg/mL)—providing a direct link to the patient. On the other hand,
the process parameters of “mix time > 40 minutes)” and “mix speed >100rpm” are not considered
CPPs, as they do not impact CQAs.

Using the CPPs, one can then identify CAs, as follows:

•

Timer

•

Mixer

•

Automation recipe

•

Floor scale

•

Bench scale

These CAs are those systems that, should they operate outside of acceptable limits, would result
in CPP failure, and are “…necessary for the manufacturing process and systems to ensure
consistent product quality and patient safety.” (50)

Using the SmartRA approach, the CPPs and CAs carry from the process FMEA to the system
design FMEA shown in Table 8-5, which allows for the identification of CADEs, including:

•

Power supply

•

Electrical connections

•

Integrity of the impeller

•

Positioning of the impeller

•

Coding of the automation recipe

•

Floor scale sensor
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•

Bench scale sensor

•

Weigh pan positioning (both floor and bench scales)

Because only critical aspects (rather than non-critical systems and functions) are explored in the
system design FMEA, all component-level failure causes are deemed critical aspect design
elements.

Using the SmartRA approach, the critical elements of the manufacturing process and associated
systems can be identified. It is important to note that the risk ranking is not considered in the
identification of these critical elements—only the causal relationships, as captured by the failure
chain or failure mode/failure cause/failure effect relationships, are relevant to meet this objective.

Informing the control strategy with SmartRA

ICH Q8(R2) defines the control strategy as the set of controls necessary to ensure product quality
and patient safety; reframed in the context of QRM, these controls are synonymous with risk
controls—those controls that prevent or detect failure before the patient is impacted. (49) (45)
Therefore, the control strategy can be developed directly from the learnings of the SmartRA
approach, mapping to the identified CPPs, CAs, and CADEs.

One can use the SmartRA approach in a process FMEA to define CPP monitoring based on the
detection score, as is the case in FMEA because failure modes are linked to detectability. The
prevention of CA failure, through a review of the frequency score of the failure causes, can also
be gleaned. In cases where the detectability and frequency scores are low, the prevention and
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detection controls listed are adequate to include in the control strategy. However, in cases where
the detectability of a CPP or frequency of a CA failure are high, the existing controls are inadequate
and risk reduction, in the form of additional or more reliable monitoring and prevention is
necessary. Once the mitigation activities have been defined, these additional controls will be
added to the control strategy for the associated CPPs and CAs, thereby enhancing the management
of risk to the patient.

For example, using the process FMEA from Table 8-4, all identified CPPs and CAs should be
actively controlled. The control strategy should include the following in the monitoring plan for
CPPs:

•

Documentation and verification of start and end mixing times

•

Documentation verification of water and sodium chloride additions

In addition, a monitoring plan for the mix speed should be established, because of the lack of
existing detection controls and the associated high detectability ranking. To optimize the process
further, more reliable detection controls (such as automated recording of mix time, mix speed, and
material additions combined with alarms or equipment-stops in the event the limits are exceeded)
may be established to further reduce the risk.

Assurance that the CPPs remain within acceptable limits are provided through the CAs of the
related manufacturing systems, and the associated preventive controls. In the example process
FMEA, this includes the use of timers, mixers, automation, and weighing devices to ensure the
CPPs are met, as well as controls to ensure those systems remain in control. Based on the
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preventive controls listed (none, in the example) and the related frequency rankings, controls
preventing mixer failure, assuring the accuracy of the automation recipe, and preventing scale
failure should be explored. The means to accomplish this are discussed in the context of validation,
maintenance, and calibration strategy development later in this sub-section.

A similar analysis of the system design FMEA example in Table 8-5 reveals additional information
to be included in the control strategy. CA failures, which were evaluated for frequency in the
process FMEA, are now evaluated for detectability, enabling the monitoring plan to be extended
to the system level. Additional preventive controls can be established using the frequency of
CADE failure, and the existing risk controls. Additional benefits materialize as the QRM process
continues— the adequacy of the control strategy is assessed when the residual risk is calculated
and evaluated, and the ongoing effectiveness of the control strategy is explored during risk review
(both concepts that are explored later in this chapter). In this way, the control strategy—inclusive
of preventive and detective controls, associated limits, and ongoing effectiveness—can be derived
directly from the SmartRA approach within the larger QRM framework.

Developing a validation strategy using SmartRA

FDA’s 2011 Process Validation guidance defines process validation as “the collection and
evaluation of data, from the process design stage through commercial production, which
establishes scientific evidence that a process is capable of consistently delivering quality product.”
(149)

The process validation provides assurance of process capability, repeatability, and

performance, which requires proof of the same for the manufacturing systems and instrumentation
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that run the process through an equipment qualification. 56 The equipment qualification consists
of four sub-types: design qualification (or DQ) which ensures the system design meets the
specifications, installation qualification (or IQ) which ensures that the system has been installed
properly, operational qualification (or OQ) which ensures that the system operates as intended,
and performance qualification (or PQ) which ensures the system can operate reproducibly within
the specific parameters necessary for product manufacturing. (150) It follows that the validation
strategy should focus on those critical elements identified through the SmartRA—the CPPs, CAs,
and related preventive and detection controls that ensure these critical elements are functioning
properly.

Using the process FMEA example shown in Table 8-4, the following pieces of equipment should
be qualified:

•

Timer

•

Mixer

•

Automated recipe

•

Floor scale

•

Bench scale

56
The 2011 Process Validation guidance from the FDA includes equipment qualification as a step in the overarching
process validation—a step known as Phase 2a. (148) In the EU, validation and qualification remain separate concepts,
as described in Annex 15. (263) With regard to the assurance of product quality and patient safety, this distinction is
without a difference. The researcher has chosen to employ the terms “process validation” and “equipment
qualification” (rather than “Phase 2a”) in this thesis, as these terms are more commonly used throughout the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries than those used in the US FDA guidance.

243

These equipment, of course, are the same systems that were previously identified as CAs. Using
additional information from the system design FMEA example in Table 8-5, a more complete
qualification strategy can be developed, as shown in Table 8-10.

Table 8-10: Example qualification strategy derived from SmartRA approach

System
Timer
Mixer
Automation recipe

Floor and bench scales

Element to test
Electrical connections
Impeller damage
Impeller positioning
Coding
Security measures to prevent authorized
changes to code
Sensor
Weigh pan positioning
Print function for bench scale

Qualification type
IQ/OQ
IQ/OQ
IQ/PQ
IQ/PQ
IQ/PQ
IQ
IQ
IQ/OQ/PQ

Validation of the process would focus on ensuring that the manufacturing systems adequately
support the process, and that the process yields product of the appropriate quality. In this way,
qualification and validation reduce uncertainty associated with the process and manufacturing
system performance by providing data that precisely reflects upon the risks identified through the
SmartRA approach. Following qualification and validation, the risk ranking may need to be
adjusted to better reflect the additional knowledge gained. Requalification and revalidation,
performed at defined intervals or based on planned changes and reviews, provides further
assurance over the course of the product lifecycle and can be coupled with risk review to maximize
the use of data trends and analysis.

Developing a maintenance and calibration strategy using SmartRA
Finally, the knowledge gained from the SmartRA approach can be used to develop (and
subsequently adjust) maintenance and calibration activities for CAs and CADEs. This is easily
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demonstrated using the system design FMEA example from Table 8-5. The identified CADEs
each have an associated frequency of failure, since the CADEs serve as failure causes within a
system design FMEA. Maintenance (ideally preventive, rather than corrective, in nature) should
be performed on all CAs and CADEs. During maintenance, the system should first be inspected
for overt damage and wear and tear, allowing for a window of opportunity to detect failure of the
system as whole. Specific inspections, based on the CADEs identified and their vulnerability to
failure, may also be included. The inspection is followed by maintenance activities, which are
defined based on the system design FMEA. Table 8-11 suggests a list of maintenance activities
that should occur for each system (CA) listed.

Table 8-11: Example maintenance strategy using SmartRA

System

Component

Timer

Electric wiring

Mixer

Impeller

Automation
recipe

Coding

Floor and
bench scales

Weigh pan
positioning

Maintenance activity
Inspect wiring for damage. Replace as needed (not to
exceed 10 years, based on metallurgical properties of
the wiring). Follow with calibration.
Inspect impeller for damage. Ensure all surfaces are
smooth with no gashes, warping, or metal damage (such
as rust). Replace when the impeller integrity is
compromised (not to exceed 15 years based on material
of construction lifespan).
Test impeller to ensure it is properly positioned within
vessel. The shaft of the impeller should be positioned
perpendicular with respect to the vessel floor and
parallel with the vessel walls. Follow with calibration.
Review audit trail associated with the code to ensure it
has not changed. Take appropriate action based on
findings.
Clean under the weigh pan to remove any particulate
that may alter the positioning of the weigh pan on the
sensors. Inspect weigh pan to ensure the metal is not
warped and the surface remains level. Follow with
calibration.
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The frequency at which system maintenance and instrument calibration should occur can also be
derived from the SmartRA approach. While the initial maintenance and calibration intervals for
new systems or instruments may be established based on supplier recommendations combined
with the firm’s historical of similar systems, any increases in failure rates (manifesting as increases
in frequency ranking) identified during risk review should trigger a review and potential increase
of the frequency at which maintenance and calibration is performed, or the system replaced.

The SmartRA approach offered as an example of maturity of risk assessment may appear to be
quite an obvious model for pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies. Indeed, it is.
Despite its elegant simplicity, the researcher has not identified companies making use of this or
similar approaches during the Phase 2 or 3 research. Quite the contrary—philosophical dialogues
and literature reviews revealed that many firms spend time and energy performing process and
system design FMEA and fail to evaluate critical elements at all. The researcher infers that risk
assessments of non-critical things likewise fail to add value, either to the organization or the
patient. The SmartRA approach offers a direct connection to the patient by using critical elements
as the foundation for risk assessment (and therefore subsequent risk control, risk review, and risk
communication). It also provides an operational benefit—streamlining the QRM process and
minimizing “noise” that may result from excessive numbers of risk assessments can ensure that
QRM is simplified, but not simplistic. It allows the organization to focus on managing risk to the
patient, rather than “doing QRM.” It is therefore set as the benchmark of maturity with regard to
risk assessment.
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8.4 Maturity with regard to risk control
As discussed in Chapter Six with respect to ISO 14971, risk control is perhaps the most important
aspect of the risk management lifecycle. It is when companies must act to improve (or maintain)
product quality and reduce risk to the patient, and is therefore deserving of a proportionate level
of analysis, resource commitment, and intellectual energy within a QRM program. Yet many
companies do not treat risk control with the appropriate attention, choosing instead to implement
questionably effective controls such as procedural revisions and re-training of operators or analysts
instead of striving for more effective and permanent solutions. (128) Maturity with regard to risk
control would assure careful consideration, vetting, and implementation of measures to reduce
risk.

8.4.1

Fundamentals of risk control

Vesper distinguishes between two fundamental types of risk control (also described as
“mitigation”): preventive and protective. Preventive mitigation aims to prevent the risk from
occurring. These types of mitigation activities are typically designed to eliminate the risk
completely or to reduce the likelihood of a given risk. Protective mitigation seeks to protect the
product or patient in the event the risk occurs, through either increasing the detectability of a failure
that has already occurred, or breaking the causal chain between hazard and harm. (61) Preventive
mitigation is typically preferred over protective mitigation, as it targets underlying quality issues
within the process or system being assessed and can increase reliability accordingly.

For example, in the FMEA shown in Table 8-12, a preventive mitigation might be one that reduces
the frequency score (e.g., increasing the frequency of gasket replacement or changing the gasket
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material to one that generates fewer particles). A protective mitigation would reduce the
detectability score (e.g., improve visual inspection for particulates) or break the causal chain
between the failure mode and failure effect (e.g., implementing a downstream filtration step that
would remove particles from the product prior to patient exposure). In this example, the preventive
mitigations are a better choice than the protective, although a combination may be used to better
manage the risk to patient.

Table 8-12: Example FMEA to illustrate preventive and protective mitigation activities
Failure Mode
Particulates
present in product

Detectability
3

Failure
Cause
Degradation
of gasket

Frequency
4

Failure
Effect
Adverse
event in
patient

Severity

RPN

5

60

As discussed in Chapter Six, ISO 14971 describes several general risk mitigation techniques,
listing them in priority order according to effectiveness. This list, as interpreted by the researcher
for the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, includes:

•

Design/process changes - This type of mitigation involves the alteration of the product,
equipment, or process design to redefine the overall risk profile (e.g., through the
addition of fail safes, process simplification, automation). Design changes are typically
the most effective type of mitigation that can reduce or eliminate risk; however,
substantial cost and resources are often involved and the design changes may introduce
new risks to the overall process.

•

Safeguarding - This type of mitigation focuses on shielding the hazard to contain its
impact, installing redundant backups, implementing in-process or release testing to
confirm quality prior to further processing, or implementing alarms/warning that allow
for immediate intervention. Safeguarding tends to be less effective than design changes at
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reducing risk, although when used judiciously to impact specific risks can successfully
reduce risk to the patient.
•

Descriptive safety means - This type of mitigation focuses on providing written and
verbal instruction regarding the presence of certain risks and offers methods to avoid or
otherwise control them when they occur. Examples include instruction within an SOP,
production record, or literature accompanying the product, and the associated training.
Due to the reliance on human intervention, this mitigation technique tends to be less
robust than design changes or safeguarding, however, due to the relative ease of
implementation, this technique is often the most widely used in pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries.

The risk control options available to reduce a given risk will, of course, vary, depending on the
nature of the risk.

8.4.2

Selecting risk controls

One approach to the selection of risk controls entails an evaluation of each option as to the impact
it would have on risk reduction. The tool below can be used to illustrate the strengths and
limitations of each risk control option to better communicate the rationale for selection of a given
risk control strategy. The scoring model has been developed to apply a weighting to the effect of
each risk control option, in that more effective results (such as elimination of one or more risks)
carries more weight than do less effective results (such as improving the detectability of one or
more risks). The scoring method is optional; while scoring adds a layer of complexity to the risk
control option analysis, it allows for a more objective relative ranking of each option which may
be desired in certain circumstances. It is important to note that the mathematical result from the
scoring model shown below has no meaning in itself; it exists merely to demonstrate the relative
benefit of each risk control option in the context of QRM. In the event a qualitative (rather than
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semi-quantitative) method is desired, a simple check box approach may be used. In example
provided in Table 8-13, risk control option #2 provides the greatest benefit in terms of risk
reduction and would be the best option of those listed.

Table 8-13: Example approach to risk control option analysis

Consideration
Eliminates the risk
Alters the harm
(reduces severity)
Prevents, but does
not eliminate, the risk
from occurring
Increases the
detectability of the
risk before it causes
harm
Introduces new
risk(s)
Increases severity of
one or more risks
Increases likelihood
of one or more risks
Reduces detectability
of one or more risks

Scoring

Risk Control
Option #1
+ (4 x 3) =
+ 12

Risk Control
Option #2

Risk Control
Option #3

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

+ (2 x 8) =
+ 16

N/A

N/A

N/A

+ (1 x 10) =
+ 10

- [4 x [number of new
risks introduced]
- (3 x [number of risks
with increased severity])
- (2 x [number of risks
with increased severity])
- (1 x [number of risks
with increased severity])

- (4 x 2) =
-8

N/A

- (4 x 1) =
-4

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Total

4

16

6

+ (4 x [number of risks
eliminated])
+ (3 x [number of risks
with reduced severity])
+ (2 x [number of risks
with reduced
likelihood])
+(1 x [number of risks
with improved
detectability)

While the risk control option analysis model enables QRM practitioners to critically evaluate
mitigation activities and select amongst them, there is core vulnerability associated with the
method—that a single risk control option should be selected. The review of defense in depth
principles in Chapter Six revealed that layered controls, or combinations of controls, often offer
more complete and reliable risk control than does a single option. Where resources and technical
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feasibility permit, combinations of risk controls should be explored in order to more fully manage
risk to the patient.

8.4.3

Additional points to consider in the development of a risk control strategy

Anticipated effectiveness of each mitigation activity (or combination of mitigations) is only one
consideration in the selection of risk controls. Improvements in risk maturity require the mitigation
of individual risks to be considered as component parts of an overarching risk control strategy,
comprised of:

•

“GMP” controls, such as those required to achieve compliance with international and
local law (90)

•

Existing controls that were taken into consideration during the risk assessments, such as
those incorporated in the quality system and existing process and equipment design

•

Newly identified mitigation activities as determined through the risk assessment

In a mature QRM program, optimized risk control strategies will be developed in consideration of
several points, including which activities should be prioritized for implementation, what aspect of
the risk should be targeted for control, the anticipated completeness of risk control, the anticipation
of any new or changed risks that might be introduced through implementation of the risk controls,
the need for interim controls, and the availability of resources.

Prioritizing risk control

For risks identified through a qualitative risk-ranking scale (e.g., high, medium, low; as in Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Points and Risk-Based Impact Assessment), mitigation of high risks
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should take priority over mitigation of medium risks, which are further prioritized over mitigation
of low risks. For example, in the HACCP shown in Table 8-14, mitigation of Risk #2 should take
priority over Risk #1.

Table 8-14: Example HACCP to illustrate the prioritization of risk control

Risk #
1
2

Hazard
Introduction of microbial contamination
Introduction of particulate contamination

Likelihood
Remote
Average

Severity
Critical
Critical

Risk Ranking
Medium
High

For risks identified through a semi-quantitative ranking scale (e.g., Risk Priority Number or RPN;
as in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) mitigation priority is from the highest RPN to the lowest
RPN. For example, the FMEA shown in Table 8-15, the priority for mitigation, from highest to
lowest, is Risk #1, Risk #2, then Risk #3.

Table 8-15: Example FMEA to illustrate the prioritization of risk control

Risk
#
1
2

3

Failure Mode

Detectability

Introduction
of microbial
contamination
2

Failure
Frequency Failure Severity RPN
Cause
Effect
HEPA
Loss of
4
32
failure
100% of
batch
Poor
aseptic
3
24
4
technique
Breach of
closed
2
16
system
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Determining the target of risk control

Where there are opportunities to implement design changes to the system or process that was
evaluated through the risk assessment, risk control should seek to eliminate the hazard/risk
altogether. In the FMEA shown in Table 8-16, for example, the mitigation effort should focus on
eliminating the use of animal-derived raw materials, thereby eliminating the source of the risk.

Table 8-16: Example FMEA to illustrate elimination of the risk

Failure Mode Detectability Failure Cause
Transmissible
Use of animalSpongiform
derived raw
Encephalopathy
5
material
(TSE) present
(serum)
in finished
product

Frequency

Failure Effect

Severity

RPN

5

Severe
adverse event
or death
(unsafe
product)

5
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In the event the risk cannot be completely eliminated, risk controls should be tailored to directly
impact the element of risk that is driving the unacceptable ranking (e.g., frequency or detectability).
For example, risk controls for the example FMEA in Table 8-17 should focus on increasing the
detectability of the failure mode (reducing the detectability ranking; making the pH level more
detectable), while risk control for the HACCP in Table 8-18 should focus on reducing the
likelihood that the hazard will occur (preventing metal particulates from being introduced into the
solution).
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Table 8-17: Example FMEA to illustrate the target of risk control

Failure
Mode
pH too low

Detectability Failure Cause Frequency
5

Too much
HCl added

1

Failure
Effect
Cell death

Severity RPN
4

20

Table 8-18: Example HACCP to illustrate the target of risk control

Hazard
Introduction of metallic particulates in
solution to be sterile filtered

Likelihood
Frequent

Severity
Minor

Risk Ranking
High

Anticipating the completeness of risk control

When planning mitigation activities for a given risk, QRM practitioners should consider whether
the proposed activity will be sufficient to reduce the risk to an acceptable level (i.e. whether the
anticipated residual risk will fall within acceptable limits defined by the firm’s risk tolerance). If
the proposed activity will be insufficient to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, alternative or
additional risk control should be proposed and implemented in parallel. For example, in the FMEA
shown in Table 8-19, a mitigation activity of "implement a Preventive Maintenance (PM) program
or HEPA filters" may have been proposed by the team. This control is expected to reduce the
frequency score to a 2 (once PM is implemented, the HEPAs will fail less often). However, the
RPN will remain at an unacceptable level (in this example, 32), due to low detectability. Therefore,
the anticipated residual risk is not acceptable and additional mitigation activities (such as air-borne
particulate monitoring) should be explored.
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Table 8-19: Example HACCP to illustrate completeness of risk control

Failure Mode Detectability
Unacceptable
levels of airborne
particulates
present

Failure
Cause

Frequency

Failure Effect

4

Contamination of
product with
viable or nonviable
particulates

HEPA filter
failure

4

Severity RPN

4

64

Anticipating the introduction of new risks

As the risk control strategy is being planned, the QRM practitioner should consider whether the
proposed activity will introduce any new risks into the system or process, and take to minimize
these new risks. Prior to the acceptance of residual risk, these new risks must be further analyzed
in the risk assessment and will be subject to risk control, based on the associated risk level. In the
example FMEA in Table 8-20, a mitigation activity of "eliminate the use of serum in the cell
culture process" has been proposed by the team. While this mitigation successfully eliminates the
hazard of concern, there may be additional risks that arise when serum is no longer used (such as
slow or no cell growth due to the absence of necessary growth factors). The additional risks should
be explored and further mitigation (replacement of missing growth factors) implemented.

Table 8-20: Example FMEA to illustrate the introduction and prospective mitigation of new risks

Failure Mode
Transmissible
Spongiform
Encephalopathy
(TSE) present in
finished product

Detectability

5

Failure
Cause
Use of
animalderived raw
material
(serum)
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Frequency

Failure Effect

5

Severe
adverse event
or death
(unsafe
product)

Severity RPN

5
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Anticipating an impact to other risks

In addition, proposed risk controls may affect the risk level or state of control for other identified
risks. Care should be taken to minimize a negative peripheral impact of a mitigation activity. The
impact to any other risks must be further analyzed in the risk assessment and may necessitate the
need for re-ranking of affected risks. In the HACCP shown in Table 8-21, for example, a
mitigation activity of "sanitize work surface with a sporicidal solution prior to each use" may have
been proposed by the team to reduce the likelihood of microbial contamination of the lab bench.
However, if the particular sporicidal solution is corrosive, it might increase the likelihood of
surface pitting of the lab bench. If this is the case, an alternative risk control should be explored,
or if there are no other viable alternatives, the likelihood rating of rouging should be increased to
reflect the actual level of risk.

Table 8-21: Example HACCP to illustrate changes to other risks introduced through risk control

Hazard
Microbial contamination of lab bench work surface
Rouging / pitting of stainless steel lab bench work
surface

Likelihood
Frequent
Unlikely

Severity
Serious
Minor

Risk Ranking
High
Low

Evaluating the need for interim controls

In certain instances, the length of time necessary to implement sufficient risk control warrants the
design or definition of interim controls. This is due to the continued exposure of the product,
process, system, and patient to the risk until mitigation activities are in place and proven effective;
the implementation and evaluation of interim controls may be necessary to contain the problem
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and adequately manage the risk to the patient until full control has been achieved. For example,
in the FMEA shown in Table 8-22, the team proposed design changes (machining of the filling
needles to reduce the diameter) to mitigate the associated risk. These design changes are expected
to span a significant period prior to full implementation. While the supporting data is being
gathered, the unacceptable risk continues to be a concern, and interim controls (such as increased
inspection for metal particles or glass damage prior to product release) should be employed to
reduce the vulnerability until the long-term risk control can be fully vetted, validated, and
deployed.

Table 8-22: Example FMEA to illustrate the need for interim controls

Failure Mode
Filling needle
may contact inner
rim of vials
during filling

Detectability

4

Failure
Cause
Filling
needle
diameter
too large

Frequency

Failure Effect

4

Metallic
particulates
present in
finished product
Glass damage to
vial

Severity

RPN

5

80

5

80

Resourcing

The amount of available resources should be considered during the development of a risk control
strategy; after all, a firm with infinite resources would have little need to prioritize risks and
associated controls. (127) Resources often include money, time, and expertise—each of which is
limited to some extent in a business environment. While the prioritization of risks for reduction,
described earlier in this section, provides a mechanism to allocate resources in risk control,
companies mature in QRM implementation will also consider whether the level of effort and
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amount of resources to be expended are proportional to the level of risk. In the FMEA shown in
Table 8-23, for example, the team proposed that the process be automated, which could eliminate
the failure mode altogether. However, automating the process would require large amounts of
resources that might be better spent reducing other risks more relevant to the patient. The team
should explore the benefits of automation in reducing the risk, the total associated resource
expenditure, and alternate risk reduction options to assist with decisions on risk mitigation.

Table 8-23: Example FMEA to illustrate the consideration of available resources for risk control

Failure Mode

Failure to follow SOP

Detectability

3

Failure
Cause
Operator
error
Procedure
unclear

Frequency
3
2

Failure
Effect
Loss of
100%
of
batch

Severity RPN
36
4
24

A risk control strategy indicative of a high level of risk maturity takes into account the
effectiveness of proposed controls and the completeness of control and the need for combinations
of controls, as well as other factors. The application of controls is prioritized based on the level
of risk, and tailored to directly impact the element of risk that is driving an unacceptable
classification. Any new or changed risks that may be introduced through the implementation of
risk controls are actively anticipated and prospectively mitigated. In this way, the patient is best
protected.

8.4.4

Accepting the residual risk

Residual risk acceptance is not a topic that has merited much discussion in industry or regulatory
circles. ICH Q9 offers minimal guidance on this step, simply stating:
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“Risk acceptance can be a formal decision to accept the residual risk or it can be a passive
decision in which residual risks are not specified. For some types of harms, even the best
quality risk management practices might not entirely eliminate risk. In these circumstances,
it might be agreed that an appropriate quality risk management strategy has been applied
and that quality risk is reduced to a specified (acceptable) level. This (specified) acceptable
level will depend on many parameters and should be decided on a case-by-case basis.” (45)

Curiously, of those responsibilities of decision makers listed in ICH Q9, risk acceptance is not
included. Not surprisingly, the dearth of information on risk acceptance in the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries has led to some practices that indicate a lack of understanding of
QRM principles and the need for patient protection. Lorianne Richter, Senior Consultant with
ValSource, notes that signs of a mature QRM program include “…understanding risk reduction
versus risk acceptance, documenting risks that have been accepted, and really understanding risk
tolerance.” (129)

Philosophical dialogues from the Phase 2 and 3 research revealed that a typical company (having
a low-to-moderate level of risk maturity as discussed in Chapter Five), accepts residual risk
through a comparison between the risk level and risk acceptance tables or action levels. (128)
Where the risk level exceeds a defined threshold, the risk is considered unacceptable and additional
risk reduction must be pursued. Risks below that threshold are considered acceptable with no
further inquiry. (130) This practice does not evaluate residual risks case-by-case, as suggested by
ICH Q9, nor does it distinguish between risks with a potential impact to the patient and those that
do not. In addition, this practice does not assign responsibility and accountability for risk
acceptance to any individual party—policies and procedures do not accept risk; people do. It is
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the opinion of this researcher that decision makers, rather than documents or lower-level personnel,
should be held responsible for risk acceptance.

Industries mature in risk management offer some insight into mature practices for the evaluation
and acceptance of residual risk, as reviewed in Chapter Six. The first learning that can improve
risk maturity and the management of risks to the patient is including both an evaluation of
individual residual risks and the overall residual risk posed by the product, process, or system.
The overall residual risk should be evaluated in light of the medical benefits offered to the patient,
as discussed in ISO 14971 and the external (patient) context, as discussed in ISO 31000. For
example, if there are numerous identified risks that could jeopardize product quality or patient
safety, the decision maker should determine whether, on balance, the patient would be better
served through exposure to those risks given the benefits they would expect to receive through the
medicinal product, or whether the risks outweigh those benefits.

In some cases, the scope of the risks subject to acceptance may not be of the nature that the patient
is affected; for example, those that may manifest as product loss or production delays. However,
in certain circumstances, such in instances of drug shortage or where product time directly relates
to product efficacy (as is the case with radiological therapies), those same consequences may
extend to the patient. Decision makers should therefore evaluate the external context with respect
to the patient when making risk acceptance decisions.

Individual residual risks are also subject to acceptance, in a slightly different context. Mature
QRM programs can employ the “acceptance threshold” approach described earlier in this section,
provided the thresholds were developed in an appropriate way. Risk acceptance thresholds should
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directly reflect the firm’s risk tolerance for the particular product, patient population, and external
context. The acceptance thresholds should be carefully compared with the specific risk rating
criteria and algorithm inherent in all risk tools to ensure that the derivation of the risk level (i.e.
the specific combinations of likelihood, severity, and where used, detectability) are appropriate
given the threshold. This is particularly challenging for risk tools that apply arithmetic to ordinal
ranking scales, such as FMEA. 57

For example, an RPN of 20 in an FMEA that employed 1-5 rating scales for frequency,
detectability, and severity can be the result of eight possible combinations, as shown in Table
8-24 58:

Table 8-24: FMEA risk rating combinations with identical RPNs

Scenario
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H

Frequency
1
1
2
2
4
4
5
5

Detectability
4
5
2
5
1
5
2
4

57

Severity
5
4
5
2
5
1
2
1

RPN
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

It should be noted that FMEA, as described in IEC 60812, results in a Risk Priority Number, or RPN, and not a risk
level such as high, medium, or low. The intent of the RPN is just as it sounds—to prioritize risks relative to one
another. FMEA was not designed to be used with such qualitative measures of risk or risk acceptability thresholds.
Despite this, many pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies add on the artificial construct of acceptability,
dividing RPNs into “buckets” intended to represent high, medium, and low risks. This practice tends to bias towards
lower risk scores and therefore may not motivate the firm to take action where needed. Without a complete
understanding of the tool design and the shortcomings of ordinal risk ranking scales, it is unlikely that these companies
will reach a high level of maturity with regard to risk acceptance.
58
The discussion of risk acceptance through ordinal ranking scales was previously published by the researcher. (69)
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While the RPN is the same in each case, the eight situations above represent quite different risk
scenarios that should be considered individually with regards to acceptability. For example,
scenarios A, C, and E all represent instances in which the consequences are incredibly dire
(severity = 5). However, the narratives associated with these scenarios differ significantly. In
scenario A, for example, we have what might be considered a “black swan” event—one that is rare
yet catastrophic. The scenario is very unlikely to occur (frequency = 1), however if it did, it’s
improbable we would know about it (detectability = 4) before the catastrophic outcome (severity
= 5) is realized. Conversely, in scenario E, we have a risk or failure that occurs quite often
(frequency = 4), but we can detect it readily (detectability = 1) before the catastrophic consequence
(severity = 5) transpires. Scenario C represents a middle ground, where a failure that could pose
a severe consequence (severity = 5) is fairly infrequent (frequency = 2) and readily detectable
(detectability = 2). These risk scenarios are of course all different, but this is not evident when
one only considers the RPNs, without taking into account the individual scores that gave rise to
those RPNs. The RPNs alone do not indicate where the differences lie.

Thus, when RPN

thresholds are used to determine whether risk reduction or acceptance is warranted, flawed
decision-making is often the result.

In order to ensure the appropriate risk acceptance decisions are made, companies mature in QRM
apply a second set of considerations to be used in concert with the RPN. For example, a company
may require any risk with a severity score of 5 to be reduced as low as possible, irrespective of the
RPN, since such scenarios could result in a significant impact to process, product, or patient and
should be handled with those consequences in mind. A company may also require risks with a
frequency or detectability of 5 to be reduced as well, as in many cases these are indicative of lack
of effective process controls. These considerations can be added to an analysis of the RPN to assist
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with decisions regarding residual risk acceptance, to ensure the firm’s risk tolerance is adequately
and consistently represented.

8.5 Maturity with regard to risk review
As mentioned briefly in Chapter Four, risk review tends to be the most neglected portion of the
QRM lifecycle. Risk review is when new knowledge gained over the product lifecycle is used to
reflect upon the risk, and is performed to determine whether QRM has been effective and whether
updates to the risk assessment or risk control strategy are warranted in light of changing conditions.
ICH Q9 notes of risk review:

“A mechanism to review or monitor events should be implemented… Once a quality risk
management process has been initiated, that process should continue to be utilized for
events that might impact the original quality risk management decision, whether these
events are planned (e.g., results of product review, inspections, audits, change control) or
unplanned (e.g., root cause from failure investigations, recall). The frequency of any review
should be based upon the level of risk.” (45)

The understanding of the purpose and process of risk review throughout the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries is rather weak. The lack of literature on the topic, as well as multiple
philosophical dialogues throughout the Phase 2 and 3 research, attest to this. At the PDA Annual
Meeting in April 2017, one delegate from a large pharmaceutical company stated, “[my company]
doesn’t see the value in risk review. We just figure that if the process hasn’t changed, there is no
need to update the risk assessment.” Several other delegates confessed that their companies have
not yet performed risk review, with one noting that their company “just got [cited by a regulatory
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agency] on that… Most of our risk assessments were put on the shelf and never looked at again.
Most of [the assessments] are over six years old.”

These anecdotes are clearly indicative of immature QRM programs—programs missing the
opportunity to exploit risk review for the purposes summarized in ISO 31000:

•

“…ensuring that controls are effective and efficient in both design and operation;

•

obtaining further information to improve risk assessment;

•

analyzing and learning lessons from events (including near-misses), changes, trends,
successes and failures;

•

detecting changes in the external and internal context, including changes to risk criteria
and the risk itself which can require revision of risk treatments and priorities; and

•

identifying emerging risks.” (15)

Mature programs acknowledge the value risk review offers both as a continuous improvement tool
and for ongoing protection of the patient. One need only to refer to complacency at NASA, as
discussed in Chapter Six, to understand how building new information into an existing risk
assessment can help save lives. There are several considerations into risk review that are addressed
in increasingly robust ways as risk maturity increases: when risk review is performed, the data and
knowledge that serves as an input to the review process, and how those data impact previouslyconducted risk assessments and QRM decisions.

8.5.1

Types of risk review– periodic v. event-driven

Risk review is the process where the output/results of the risk management process are reviewed
to ensure the risks remain acceptable considering changing conditions and new knowledge and
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experience. As mentioned in section 8.1, living risk assessments cover an entire product, process,
or system over its lifecycle and are therefore subject to risk review. Ad hoc risk assessments, on
the other hand, are performed to address a specific event at a given point in time and need not
continue through the QRM lifecycle to risk review. The objective of risk review is to ensure that
living risk assessments continue to reflect the current state of the product, process, or system with
regard to identified risks, risk levels, and acceptance decisions. Risk review also provides
assurance that the identified risk controls continue to effectively maintain risk within acceptable
limits.

Risk review should be performed following residual risk acceptance; in the event the risk has not
yet been accepted, other aspects of the QRM lifecycle are still in play and the review phase has
not yet been reached. While this is evident based on the flow of the QRM lifecycle in ICH Q9,
some companies begin risk review before risk reduction is complete, which may confuse the
objectives of the effort. (128) As one delegate at the April 2017 PDA Annual Meeting noted, “[my
company] has [historically] used risk review to follow up on open mitigation activities and close
out the risk assessment.” This practice changes the intent of risk review from one of reflective
learning to one redundant to an earlier QRM process step—namely, risk control.

In order to glean the greatest benefit from risk review, two types should be employed: periodic and
event-driven. Periodic risk reviews occur at a defined interval, based on the level of risk associated
with the topic of the QRM effort. Periodic risk reviews are comprehensive and include an
evaluation of all data, information, and knowledge gained since the prior periodic risk review.
Event-driven risk reviews, on the other hand, occur based on a trigger within the quality system,
operating condition, or internal or external business climate. These types of reviews should
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generally be more targeted and specific that periodic risk reviews, and entail an evaluation of the
impact of a particular data set or event on the risk assessment.

ICH Q9 implies that the frequency of periodic risk review be based upon the level of risk identified
in the risk assessment; it is the opinion of this researcher, however, that the frequency of periodic
risk review should be established based on the risk inherent to the topic and the anticipated rate at
which the risk assessment contents might become stale or obsolete. After all, it is unlikely that a
critical or complex manufacturing process, having reached the point where all identified risks are
well-controlled and acceptable, will suddenly become static both in the process details and the
firm’s knowledge and understanding of that process. It is therefore fruitful to assign a discrete
periodic risk review interval to each living risk assessment based on the criticality of the topic and
the anticipated (or actual) rate of change and knowledge accrual. The researcher proposes that a
simple risk tool be used to facilitate this decision. The tool includes the assignment of a topic
criticality rating using the criteria in and a rate of change rating using the criteria in Table 8-25
and Table 8-26. The intersection of these two ratings in Figure 8-K offers an appropriate periodic
risk review interval for the particular living risk assessment.

Table 8-25: Topic criticality ratings and criteria

Rating

Criteria
Product: Product intermediate

Minor

Process/System: Support processes and associated equipment/systems, such as
solution/media preparation, packaging and labeling processes and equipment,
component preparation, or general use utilities.

Facility: Uncontrolled and controlled-not-classified (CNC) cleanrooms.
Product: Non-sterile products, or non-life-saving/life-sustaining product that are not
Moderate at risk of shortage.
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Process/System: Upstream processing and associated equipment, such as API
production, and quality control methods not associated with product release.
Facility: Grade C cleanrooms
Product: Sterile products, non-life-saving/life-sustaining products at risk of shortage,
or life-saving/life-sustaining products.
Critical

Process/System: Downstream processing and associated equipment, such as
purification and fill/finish, and quality control methods associated with product
release.
Facility: Grade A and B cleanrooms.

Table 8-26: Rate of change ratings and criteria

Rating

Criteria
Product, process, or system is mature (in the commercial phase of the product
lifecycle); additional learnings have plateaued.

Rare
Actual (historical) or anticipated rate of change of the product, process, system, or
facility under assessment is rare (e.g. less than two significant changes per year).
Product, process, or system has recently entered the commercial phase of the
product lifecycle; additional learnings are expected as experience is gained.
Average

Frequent

Actual (historical) or anticipated rate of change of the product, process, system, or
facility under assessment is average (e.g. between two and four significant changes
per year).
Product, process, or system is in the development phase of the product lifecycle;
significant and frequent knowledge gains are expected.
Actual (historical) or anticipated rate of change of the product, process, system, or
facility under assessment is frequent (e.g. more than four significant changes per
year).
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Average Frequent
Rare

Rate of Change

Topic Criticality
Minor

Moderate

Critical

2 years

1 year

1 year

3 years

2 years

1 year

3 years

3 years

2 years

Figure 8-K: Periodic risk review interval determination matrix

As with all risk tools, the specific numerical criteria and examples, as well as the periodic risk
review intervals themselves, should be evaluated in the context of a given firm’s product portfolio
and quality system conditions and tailored as appropriate.

In addition, companies should also define circumstances, events, and data trends that should trigger
an event-driven risk review, for example:

•

A critical deviation occurs that represents a previously-unknown risk

•

A significant change is proposed that may introduce new risks to the overall process or
system

•

A trend is identified that may warrant adjustment of the identified risks/risk levels in the
living risk assessment

•

A significant complaint is received that may affect the identified risks/risk levels in the
living risk assessment
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•

Changes in inventory levels with the product (or similar competitor products) render the
drug more or less susceptible to shortage

•

The indication or patient population for the drug changes (e.g. approved for use in
pediatrics)

•

A request for an event-driven risk review is received from internal or external
stakeholders

Such events would require a reevaluation of identified risks, risk levels, or risk tolerance and
resultant risk acceptance decisions given the new information.

8.5.2

Performing a risk review

Despite the fact that information on risk review in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
industries is sparse, once again industries mature in risk management have many lessons to offer.
ISO 14971, for example, lists a variety of data that should be reviewed as part of the product/postproduction phase of the medical device risk management lifecycle. A basic list of information
inputs into periodic risk review includes:

•

Related deviation/investigation data

•

Related customer complaint and adverse event data

•

Related change management data

•

Related ad hoc risk assessments

•

Documented sources of high uncertainty in the original risk assessment

•

Recommendations or “parking lot” issues from the original risk team

•

Related regulatory trending data, such as new or changed standards and guidance
documents

•

Related industry trending data and scientific publications (e.g. applicable data from
scientific journals, industry magazines, technical reports, whitepapers, or conferences)
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•

Related data from suppliers, sister sites, contract manufacturers, service providers, and
business partners

•

Additional quality system data as applicable to the topic of the risk assessment (e.g.
quality control, computer systems, validation and qualification, automation records)

Event-driven risk reviews are typically smaller in scope than periodic risk reviews, may only
require those data related to the trigger event to be evaluated.

These data should be reviewed to determine what impact, if any, the data and resultant new
knowledge has on the living risk assessment. For example, hazards might be present that were
previously unknown or unrecognized—these hazards might be reactively identified where
realized, or they may be proactively identified through data sources that allow for such
anticipation. The risk levels, or individual risk ratings, may have changed, as might be the case
when moving from a likelihood scale based on probabilities to a frequency scale based on historical
failures. Assumptions made during the original assessment may have been confirmed or refuted
through the data. The firm’s (or patients’) risk tolerance may have changed, or the internal or
external context may have evolved, calling previous risk acceptance decisions into question.
Finally, the QRM program might have reached a more mature state such that the original risk
assessment no longer meets current standards or objectives. In the event the living risk assessment
is affected in any way based on the learnings from the event (for event-driven risk review) or over
time (for periodic risk reviews, the risk assessment and associated documentation should be
updated to reflect the current state of the art. Incorporating these practices and perspectives of risk
review will enhance risk maturity and better protect the patient.
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8.6 Maturity with regard to risk communication
As discussed in the context of the nuclear industries in Chapter Six, communication is an art not
to be taken lightly; this is particularly true of risk communication, where sensitive technical
information may be misinterpreted if not communicated appropriately. ICH Q9 defines risk
communication as “the sharing of information about risk and risk management between the
decision maker and other stakeholders,” noting:

“The output/result of the quality risk management process should be appropriately
communicated and documented… Communications might include those among interested
parties; e.g., regulators and industry, industry and the patient, within a company, industry
or regulatory authority, etc. The included information might relate to the existence, nature,
form, probability, severity, acceptability, control, treatment, detectability or other aspects
of risks to quality. Communication need not be carried out for each and every risk
acceptance. Between the industry and regulatory authorities, communication concerning
quality risk management decisions might be effected through existing channels as specified
in regulations and guidances.” (45)

There is little guidance offered in ICH Q9 regarding what, specifically, needs to be communicated,
to whom, and for what purpose. To answer these question, other sources must be evaluated.

Fischhoff, Brewer, and Downs describe three objectives of risk communication: to share
information, to change beliefs, and to change behaviors. (151) Based on the definition of risk
communication offered in ICH Q9, it appears that the first of the objectives was considered critical
to QRM; the other two objectives are not addressed. Companies mature in QRM, however,
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recognize that these goals are not mutually exclusive. Informing people about risks without
providing sufficient context to enable them to make their own decisions and act accordingly is sure
to be ineffective.

Where included context is weak or absent, the recipients of the risk

communication will apply their own context—their values, belief systems, risk tolerance, and
heuristics. This may blur the intent of the message and have unintentional, negative results.

8.6.1

Understanding stakeholders

As counseled by the NRC in Chapter Six, the first step in effective risk communication is to
determine the objective of the communication—to share information, change beliefs, or change
behaviors (or a combination of these). The stakeholders must then be identified, and their risk
perceptions, risk tolerances, and existing knowledge evaluated. These stakeholders will be the
recipients of the risk communication, and may include individuals both internal and external to the
company, such as:

•

Internal stakeholders
o Decision makers and leadership
o Operators, analysts, and specialists
o Personnel from other manufacturing sites

•

External stakeholders
o Suppliers, service providers, and partners
o Regulators
o Public/shareholders
o Physicians, pharmacists, or other healthcare providers
o Patients and their families
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The existing perceptions of risk will vary for each of these stakeholder groups, and may be
influenced by key heuristics, such the “degree of dreadfulness” of the risk 59 and expert-lay bias.
The communicator should take care to diffuse any inflammatory language and avoid overly
technical jargon where these heuristics and perceptions might be at play.

Communicating risk to internal and external stakeholders may also fulfill additional objectives that
are worth mentioning here. External risk communication often fulfills commitments to these
parties. For example, contractual obligations with third party partners may require communication
of significant known or anticipated issues. Regulatory bodies may have explicit or implicit
requirements to communicate certain information within certain timeframes. Healthcare providers
might need additional information regarding the drug or course of treatment in order to best support
their patients. And of course, patients and their families have a right to understand the risks
associated with their care. Risk communication to internal stakeholders, on the other hand, is a
critical form of knowledge management, offering opportunities for improvement and risk
avoidance. One delegate at the June 2017 PDA QRM for Manufacturing Systems workshop
summarized this function of risk communication with a relevant anecdote, explaining how his site
had been working for several months to solve a persistent manufacturing problem. At a company
party, he met a colleague who worked at a sister site that employed a similar technology platform,
and shared his challenge. The colleague had experienced a similar issue and described the solution
his site had implemented, which led to a longer conversation between the two parties. As it turned

59

This researcher recalls viewing a direct-to-consumer television advertisement that disclosed a known side effect of
the drug: “urgent diarrhea with fainting”—quite a dreadful and embarrassing side effect in her opinion. It would have
been interesting and helpful to have the prevalence of that particular side effect disclosed in the advertisement.
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out, the delegate noted, both sites were solving the same problems over and over and were never
aware of the shared experience.

Vesper describes important considerations for mature, successful risk communication in his article
“Q9 + Ten Years: Examining Risk Communication.” These include building transparency and
trust, establishing credibility, and communicating the big picture, among others. With regard to
transparency, trust, and credibility, Vesper explains:

“One of the most important elements in risk assessment and risk management is the
credibility – the trustworthiness and competence, as perceived by the stakeholders – of
those involved. If the stakeholders do not have confidence in those conducting, managing,
or sponsoring the activities, the stakeholders may demand higher levels of control or decide
to accept only the lowest levels of risk. Conversely, if there is trust, the stakeholders may
be willing to accept more risk. Open, honest, two-way communication between all the
stakeholders is essential when working to assess and manage risks.” (152)

Vesper also recommends the use of visual aids, such as heat maps and Pareto diagrams in risk
communication, as these can help position the risk information in a broad context. (127) For
example, where several risks have been found to be unacceptable and are being communicated to
decision makers, providing a diagram to show that these unacceptable risks are but a small portion
of all assessed risks may temper any immediate emotional response and enable a more fruitful
discussion on next steps. In addition, visual aids of risk communication can be employed on a
continuous basis, using icons to highlight hazards to users. (153) In the pharmaceutical and
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biopharmaceutical industries, such icons may be embedded within batch records or standard
operating procedures to communicate risks associated with the process described in the document.

Companies mature in risk communication will identify their stakeholders and take time to
understand their interests and perceptions. Trust and credibility will be established and maintained
through frequent, transparent communication of risk information. These companies see internal
risk communication as a form of knowledge management, and acknowledge their obligation to
external stakeholders through risk communication.

8.6.2

Planning for risk communication

The nuclear industry has embraced planning as key to successfully risk communication, and avails
itself of the documentation of thoughtfully constructed plans for transmitting risk information to
stakeholders in an organized and controlled manner. Pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
companies seeking to increase their risk maturity might likewise develop such plans, which may
include information such as:

•

Groups, roles, or individuals responsible for initiating communication,

•

Groups, roles, or individuals responsible for receiving communication (stakeholders),

•

Groups, roles, or individuals responsible for reviewing messages prior to communication
(e.g. medical, legal, or public relations experts for external communication)

•

The nature of the communication (e.g. the types of information to be communicated),

•

The method of communication (e.g. meetings, email, formal report distribution), and

•

A mechanism to document that the communication has taken place (e.g. meeting minutes,
printed email)
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Table 8-27 offers an example internal risk communication plan that may help firms increase their
risk maturity.

A risk communication plan can be valuable in many situations, as it informs individuals of the
expectations for communicating certain types of QRM information, helping build a culture of
transparency. However, it is reasonable to expect certain situations to arise that are not covered
by a communication plan. For example, Krivkovich and Levy claim that “the most effective risk
management we have observed act quickly to move risk issues up the chain of command as they
emerge, breaking through rigid governance mechanisms to get the right experts involved whether
or not…they sit on a formal risk-management committee.” (154)

276

Table 8-27: Example of a risk communication plan for internal stakeholders 60
QRM
Activity
•
•
QRM Plan
•
•
QRM
Initiation

•
•

What needs to be
communicated
Objectives
Roles and
responsibilities
Activities and
timing
Risk question/
objective and scope
Team membership
Target timeframe
for completion

Communicator

Recipient
•

Head of QRM

System/
Process Owner

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
Risk
Assessment

•
Risk Control

Risk Review
Ad Hoc

•
•
•
•

Unacceptable risks
Recommended
control measures
that will require
resources not at the
disposal of the team

System/Process
Owner

Unacceptable
residual risks
Risk acceptance
decisions

System/
Process Owner

Outcomes of risk
review
Realized risks
Newly identified
risks

•

•
•

System/Process •
Owner
Person who
identified the
risk

•
•

Leadership (decision
makers)
System/ Process Owners
Facilitators
Subject Matter Experts
Facilitators
Subject Matter Experts
Leadership (decision
makers)
Leadership (decision
makers)
Internal customers (e.g.
functional groups that
may be affected by the
unacceptable risk or be
involved in
implementation of the
risk controls)
Leadership (decision
makers)
Subject matter experts
Leadership (decision
makers)
System/Process Owner
Leadership (decision
makers)
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Format

When to communicate

Circulation of
approved QRM
Plan
Presentations

•
•
•

Upon approval of the plan
Upon changes to the plan
Upon completion of
activities within the plan

•

•

Circulation of
approved risk
assessment
request
Email, phone, etc.

During planning of the
risk assessment request
Upon approval of the risk
assessment request

•
•

Presentations
Email, phone, etc.

•
•
•
•
•

Circulation of
final report
Presentations
Email, phone, etc.
Presentations
Email, phone, etc.

•

Email, phone, etc.

•
•
•

•

•

Upon completion of the
risk assessment, prior to
finalization of the interim
report

•

Upon completion of risk
control
•

•

Upon completion of
the risk review

As soon as possible
following identification

Portions of this plan were previously constructed by the researcher during her work with the PDA QRM Task Force and published in PDA Technical Report No.
54-5. (223)
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8.7 An optimized QRM lifecycle
Once the ideal state of QRM was defined, the researcher recognized a key point—that
the QRM lifecycle as proposed by ICH Q9 did not seem sufficient to enable the ideal
state to be achieved. Being that the ideal state was defined as a synergy of techniques
from multiple authoritative documents (including ICH Q9, ISO 14971, and ISO 31000)
as well as learnings for industries with a history of excellence in risk management, it
follows that the QRM lifecycle would need to be revisited to incorporate learnings from
each of these sources. Indeed, the quality system-centric ICH Q9, product-centric ISO
14971, and business-centric ISO 31000 are simultaneously complementary and
different, each having advantages over the other. To maximize the value that arise from
a QRM mindset and associated activities, these lifecycles must be synthesized to yield
an optimal lifecycle.

An important first step, described in ISO 31000, is to establish both the internal and
external context under which QRM will be performed. (15) The approach taken, and
the risk tolerance used, should be founded in an understanding of patients being served,
the regulatory climate, and business considerations such as the availability of lifesaving product and their vulnerability to shortage. This context will inform QRM
strategies, such which activities should be prioritized for QRM and the risk tolerance
that would be most appropriate given the circumstances. Therefore, an optimized QRM
lifecycle would certainly begin with this critical step.

Once the context has been understood and a related strategy has been established, the
QRM process should be initiated and then continue with risk assessment, broken down
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into three sub-steps of risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation. A risk
control option analysis would follow, to plan for risk reduction.

Based on the length of time that may pass between the identification of the risk control
strategy and its implementation, an interim report would be written. This report
documents the QRM efforts up to that point, including the applicable internal and
external context, the QRM initiation, the risk assessment, and the risk control strategy.
Approval of this report serves as a gating mechanism to reinforce ownership and
accountability, and triggers the population of the risk register.

The lifecycle would continue with the risk control phase, which would consist of four
separate steps: risk reduction, evaluation of new or changed risks, residual risk
evaluation, and residual risk acceptance. Risk reduction entails the implementation of
the risk control strategy. Once risk reduction is complete, the new/current state is
evaluated for new risks or changes to existing risks, which facilitate the calculation and
evaluation of the residual risk. Finally, the residual risk is evaluated (for both individual
risks and the risk portfolio as a whole), and a decision as to acceptability is made based
on the risk tolerance.

A final report is then written to summarize the QRM lifecycle to this point, including
the risk assessment and risk control activities and outcomes. This would also detail the
outcomes of the risk-based approach to identify the periodic risk review interval.

Risk review occurs at the frequency defined by the periodic review interval, as well as
when triggered by an event within the quality system. The risk review is intended not
only to incorporate lifecycle data back into the QRM process but also as an opportunity
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to augment the QRM efforts based on new knowledge (of both the topic assessed and
of risk management in general). Throughout the lifecycle, risk communication occurs
according to the Risk Communication Plan.

The optimized QRM lifecycle, as described above, is illustrated in Figure 8-L. In this
way, ICH Q9, ISO 14971, and ISO 31000 are synthesized with lessons from multiple
industries to capitalize on best practices and engender a holistic risk culture.
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Figure 8-L: Optimized Quality Risk Management Lifecycle
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This chapter outlined how the QRM process can be performed effectively to manage
risk to the patient, including the living risk assessment library, QRM initiation, risk
assessment, risk control, risk review, and risk communication. Chapter Nine aims to
characterize maturity with regard to QRM governance—the leadership, oversight, and
accountability associated with a QRM program.
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9 Chapter Nine: What QRM Maturity Looks Like Governance

This chapter marks the third and final pillar of effective QRM—governance.
Governance plays a critical role in managing risk to the patient, ensuring QRM
activities are as effective as possible. Governance has as many definitions as there are
sources.

Merriam-Webster provides the mundane and grammatical definition of

“government.” (155) The Business Dictionary offers an explanation with a bit of
context:

“[the] establishment of policies, and continuous monitoring of their proper
implementation, by the members of the governing body of an organization. It
includes the mechanisms required to balance the powers of the members (with
the associated accountability), and their primary duty of enhancing the
prosperity and viability of the organization.” (156)

The International Risk Governance Council 61 offers definitions of governance and risk
governance: “Governance refers to the actions, processes, traditions and institutions by
which authority is exercised and decisions are taken and implemented. Risk governance
applies the principles of good governance to the identification, assessment,
management and communication of risks.” (157)

61

Despite the enticing name for this organization, the risk governance framework developed and
promoted by the International Risk Governance Council is closer to the risk management processes and
lifecycle from ICH Q9, ISO 31000, and ISO 14971 than a governance structure over risk management.
As a result, the utility of this organization’s work to the research described in this thesis is limited to
these definitions only.
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For the purposes of this thesis, the researcher proposes the following operational
definition of governance with regard to QRM:

QRM governance is the set of organizational policies, practices, and norms necessary
to ensure QRM is performed effectively.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the purpose of governance in a QRM context.
A discussion of the infrastructure and governance processes needed to successfully
execute QRM follows. The chapter continues to briefly describe the content of a mature
QRM plan, and finishes with a discussion of metrics and key performance indicators
for QRM.

9.1 The role of governance in QRM
All programs need law and order. Established governance structures and processes
ensure there is a level of oversight and accountability for QRM, and that its principles
and practices are widely and effectively deployed. In a typical organization, senior
management serves as the governing body, tasked with defining policies and ensuring
they are followed as intended. Many regulatory standards make the link between senior
management and governance. For example, the EU GMPs point out:

“The attainment of [product quality] is the responsibility of senior management
and requires the participation and commitment by staff in many different
departments and at all levels within the company... To achieve this quality
objective reliably there must be a comprehensively designed and correctly
implemented

Pharmaceutical

Quality

System

incorporating

Manufacturing Practice and Quality Risk Management.” (158)
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Good

ICH Q10 notes that “senior management has the ultimate responsibility to ensure an
effective pharmaceutical quality system is in place to achieve the quality objectives,
and that roles, responsibilities, and authorities are defined, communicated, and
implemented throughout the company.” (52)

ISO 14971 prescribes that “top

management shall… review the suitability of the risk management process at planned
intervals to ensure continuing effectiveness of the risk management process and
document any decisions and actions taken.” (101) In addition, ISO 9001, Quality
management systems, requires that

“top management … provide evidence of its commitment to the development
and implementation of the quality management system and continually
improving its effectiveness by communicating to the organization the
importance of meeting customer as well as statutory and regulatory
requirements, establishing the quality policy, ensuring that quality objectives
are established, conducting management reviews, and ensuring the availability
of resources.” (159)

In their article devoted to the role of senior leadership in QRM, Richter and Haddad
state that “…senior leadership must empower the organization to implement the QRM
program and obtain support throughout the company to bring the program to
realization.” (160)

Within a mature QRM program, the purpose of governance

includes:

•

Establishing and maintaining the appropriate infrastructure, including policies,
procedures, and personnel

•

Overseeing the QRM program and its deliverables
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•

Setting strategic direction for QRM and planning work to support it

•

Measuring the performance of QRM (161)

Each of these is discussed in detail in the remainder of this chapter.

Three-quarters of the experts interviewed in the Phase 3 research cited management
commitment as the one key thing that secures success or failure in QRM. (125) (129)
(130) (132) (134) (142) (144) (162) (163) A study of risk management professionals
from a variety of industries, conducted by the Harvard Business Review, echoed this
sentiment, with an overwhelming majority of respondents citing the “tone at the top”
as critical to establishing effective risk management. (164) Unfortunately, as discussed
in Chapter Five, the current maturity level of industry with regard to QRM governance
is rather low. Bishop McFarland offers her opinion as to why:

“The primary challenge that exists, from my perspective, is the lack of
leadership within our industry. This is to say, there are individuals that are
running firms; however, there is, based on my experience, a lack of leading.
Organizations are still very much focused on metrics and compliance. This
‘tunnel vision’ approach to leadership fails to acknowledge the value of the
culture of an organization. Without top management engaged with the quality
culture of their organization and without a true intent of changing it, they will
not move toward achieving the benefits of Q9 and Q10 simply because they will
not be interested in what the outcome of those guidance documents represent:
an exploration of uncertainty. Leadership may appear to be risk averse but this
is not true... they are not risk averse, they are uncertainty averse. Risk
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management has the potential to expose uncertainty but often the [management]
culture interrupts…this very critical role.” (134)

In this quote, Bishop McFarland alludes to the potential impact on risk maturity that
may be realized through incomplete management commitment—the dedication of
senior management to the conduct of QRM and the consistency of their words and
actions to that dedication. The expert interviews, philosophical dialogues, and the
researcher’s own experience show evidence of a lack of management commitment at
companies with immature QRM programs. This often manifests as a disconnect
between senior management’s vernacular and the fundamental principles of QRM. For
example, throughout the philosophical dialogues for the Phase 2 and 3 research, the
researcher noted several “catch phrases” that seem to have become ubiquitous with
senior leaders of pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies. These include:

•

“Risk it out,” meant to communicate that QRM should be used to justify a
reduction in requirements like sampling or testing

•

“There’s no risk in <x>,” meant to communicate that QRM would be useless
in the specific situation

•

“[We performed] a risk assessment to justify,” meant to communicate that the
risk assessment would be reverse engineered to support a pre-determined
outcome (as discussed in Chapter Eight with respect to risk questions)

The use of these phrases implies a lack of knowledge of QRM and quality principles at
the senior management level, a situation to be remedied through the role-based
leadership training described in Chapter Seven. In addition, because personnel often
take their cue from their management, these sorts of catch phrases can be damaging the
risk culture of the organization.
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In addition, there are often gaps between senior management’s espoused values for
QRM and their actions. This was most often mentioned by conference delegates in the
context of resourcing QRM activities—when resources are in short supply, those that
are earmarked for supporting QRM are often redirected towards more urgent matters.62
(128)

This phenomenon is not unique to QRM, nor the pharmaceutical and

biopharmaceutical industries, as illustrated by Srinivasan and Kurey in their Harvard
Business Review article: “Even when executives have the best intentions, there are
often gaps between what they say and what they do. As a result, employees get mixed
messages about whether quality is truly important. Company leaders must first buy into
quality improvement initiatives and clearly demonstrate their own personal
commitment to this effort to employees.” (165)

A strong portfolio of governance policies and processes can minimize the impact of
these mixed signals from management by ensuring that risk-centric behaviors are
exhibited at a defined frequency and understood across the organization. In addition,
senior management may also evolve their own thinking and level of QRM knowledge
by following the governance models they, themselves, have established. In this way,
governance offers stability and focus to organization as it increases its level of risk
maturity.

9.2 Establishing QRM infrastructure
One purpose of QRM governance is to establish the appropriate infrastructure to enable
the organization to perform QRM effectively.

62

Such infrastructure consists of

The irony of this is not lost on the researcher, nor the conference delegates who participated in the
philosophical dialogues. Though QRM is the very thing that can prevent quality crises from occurring,
quality crises often limit the organization from performing QRM. This cycle is very difficult to break,
particularly in the traditional “fire-fighting” cultures described in Chapter Seven.

288

documents (policies and procedures) as well as human resources.

This section

describes the characteristics of a mature QRM infrastructure, designed to better enable
QRM and protect the patient.

Pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies are familiar with the use of
documents to guide everyday operations; all cGMP regulations worldwide require
procedures to be written and followed. Industry executes these requirements in a
variety of ways. For example, some companies elect to have different “levels” of
documents depending on the scope and intent; these may include, listed from broad
application to specific application, policies, standards, global operating procedures that
apply to all sites within a company, and standard operating procedure (SOPs) that apply
to a single site or department within a site. Other companies may elect to only use
SOPs to govern their cGMP activities. Regardless of such document hierarchies, the
content to be described for QRM remains the same.

The QRM benchmarking survey (discussed in Chapter Five) found that at least 90% of
the respondents’ companies currently have a document that describes the use of QRM,
with at least 86% of those complying with ICH Q9.

What is not clear from the

benchmarking survey is whether these documents enable risk maturity and
effectiveness as well. The minimum content for an effective primary QRM document
includes:

•

Purpose and scope of the document, including a list of which product lifecycle
phases and quality system elements are within scope of QRM

•

Roles and responsibilities for QRM, including the training requirements for
each role
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•

Principles of QRM, including statements of and related program design to
ensure;
o QRM cannot be used to attempt to justify not following applicable law
o QRM formality should be proportional to the risk of what is evaluated
through QRM
o QRM must be based on scientific evidence, but not a surrogate for
science in decision-making
o QRM must ultimately link to the patient

•

Description of when and how QRM should be initiated

•

Description of the minimum requirements for risk assessment, including the
distinction between living and ad hoc risk assessments

•

List of risk tools that may be employed

•

Description of risk tolerance for each applicable product or product family and
associated levels (where used)

•

Requirements for risk control and residual risk acceptance, based on the risk
tolerance(s)

•

When and how risk review should be undertaken

•

When, how, and to whom risk communication should occur, including the
urgent escalation of critical risks to decision makers

•

Descriptions of governance processes

Based on the current and desired levels of risk maturity of the organization, additional
procedures may need to be installed to guide the organization. For example, the
creation of a guidance document or whitepaper to describe best practices for risk
assessment, risk control, risk review, and risk communication (using the learning from
Chapter Eight) may be advisable for companies with a moderate level of maturity who
seeks to gain efficiencies and expand knowledge. For companies will low levels of
maturity, it is advisable to standardize practice of risk tools through the creation of
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procedures, to ensure consistency of execution and to augment the training facilitators
have received, until such time as the procedures are no longer necessary. 63 (138)

The other aspect of QRM infrastructure to be established through governance is the
personnel who will work within the program. As discussed in the benchmarking survey
in Chapter Five, there is a widespread misconception in the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries that the quality unit or department “owns” QRM. While
the quality unit has an important role to play, the actors in a QRM program may come
from any number of functional groups.

After all, “siloed approaches to risk

management create dangerous blind spots for business.” (166) In companies with
mature QRM programs product quality and patient safety risks are ultimately owned
by those who own the product. Who else should be more invested in managing risk to
the patient? These individuals are called System or Process Owners and often work
within manufacturing functions. (138) In owning the risks associated with their portion
of product manufacturing (such as solution preparation, component preparation,
upstream processing, or fill/finish), the System or Process Owners carries the following
responsibilities under the QRM program:

•

Initiates the QRM process for his or her scope of responsibility (i.e. system or
process)

•

Participates on the risk team for all applicable risk assessments

•

Directs implementation of mitigation activities

•

Authors risk reports

•

Initiates and participates in all applicable risk reviews

•

Communicates risks to the appropriate stakeholders

63

It is the researcher’s opinion that SOPs on risk tools should never become irrelevant, provided they are
not so restrictive to prevent customized tool creation or thoughtfully conceived and appropriately
documented alteration. To better manage risk to the patient, consistency is key.
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•

Ultimately accountable for the application of QRM principles and practices for
his or her scope of responsibility

While System/Process Owners are accountable for the risks associated with their area
of responsibility, they are not accountable for the functioning of the overarching QRM
process as a whole. In mature QRM programs, this privilege is granted to the Head of
QRM. This role is likely to align functionally within quality, and preferably reports
into the head of quality for the site or organization. (130) (138) This allows the
individual a direct line of access to senior management and associated governance
forums.

It also appears, based on philosophical dialogues, that there may be a

correlation between the number of “full time equivalent” (FTE) resources dedicated to
QRM and the organization’s risk maturity. 64 For example, QRM warrants at least one
FTE at most companies. Larger sites or campuses may require multiple FTEs to fully
support the QRM program, while small companies may not be able to financially justify
a fully dedicated person and may instead allocate a fraction of an FTE to the role.
Regardless of resource allocation, the responsibilities of the Head of QRM (or QRM
department) include:

•

Accountable for the design and deployment of the QRM program

•

Authors policies and procedures

•

Oversees QRM training and education

•

Provide ongoing mentoring and coaching of personnel on QRM principles
and practices

•

Leads QRM governance processes (refer to section 9.3)

64
In the US, one FTE is generally equivalent to 40 hours of work per week, as it assumes that one person
would be solely dedicated to the work topic, with the average workweek spanning 40 hours.
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In addition to the Head of QRM and System/Process Owners, QRM governance
requires the identification of a Facilitator role. These are highly trained QRM experts
(refer to Chapter Seven for a discussion of the applicable educational program) who are
responsible for leading risk assessments using particular risk tools and serving as QRM
SMEs for the organization. Companies mature in QRM resource facilitators from a
variety of functional groups, who commit a portion of their time (perhaps 20%) to
QRM. This model ensures that QRM knowledge is spread throughout the company in
a way that enhances risk culture and maturity. (138)

QRM governance must also define roles and responsibilities for Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs) and the quality unit. SMEs are those individuals with expertise in a particular
topic who will share their knowledge and data analyses in risk assessments and risk
reviews, as described in Chapter Eight. While personnel from the quality unit may
serve as experts in quality and compliance as an input into a risk assessment or review,
an independent quality professional should also be required to ensure the output of these
align with applicable internal and external quality standards.

Finally, it is a purpose of governance to not only defines roles and responsibilities for
the QRM program, but also to ensure that the individuals who fulfill these roles to be
aware of it. Companies with immature QRM programs often have requirements for,
for example, System/Process Owners or SMEs, but are not clear on who fills these roles,
often because the roles do not directly correlate with job titles. (128) This can lead to
quite a few false-starts and much finger-pointing.

All System or Process Owners,

Facilitators, and SMEs should be aware of their role in QRM and should have the
associated responsibilities listed in his or her job description. This will ensure that
accountability for QRM is directly and explicitly associated outlined.
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9.3 Overseeing the QRM program
The second purpose of QRM governance is to oversee the QRM program, including
ensuring that decision makers and senior leadership have a direct line of sight to risks
that may affect product quality and patient safety. This is accomplished, in part,
through risk communication, as described in Chapter Eight, which should complete
governance processes and forums that focus specifically on QRM. In an effective QRM
program, these should cover both tactical risks, such as those identified through living
or ad hoc risk assessments, and more strategic or systemic quality risks. There are two
such processes that can enable this holistic view when performed in parallel: the risk
register, which is designed for tactical risks, and the quality risk profile, intended for
strategic risks. Figure 9-A illustrate these QRM governance processes, which merge as
part of overall quality management to be reviewed during Quality Management
Review.

Figure 9-A: Parallel governance processes for QRM
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Though many pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies perceive the risk
register as a regulatory requirement, the origins the risk register as a QRM governance
tool are unclear. (138) (128) ICH Q9 does not mention a risk register in any form, nor
is a risk register explicitly discussed in any authoritative document in the US or EU.
The mention of the use of such a register for QRM can be traced back to a question and
answer webpage from the Medicines and Health Product Regulatory Agency (MHRA)
in the United Kingdom, posted in 2010. (62) (167) In response to the frequently asked
question (FAQ) “should site have a formal risk register and management process?”, the
MHRA responded:

“Yes, a risk register (or equivalent title document) should list and track all key
risks as perceived by the organisation and summarise how these have been
mitigated. There should be clear reference to risk assessments and indeed a list
of risk assessments conducted should be included or linked to the register. A
management process should be in place to review risk management – this may
be incorporated into the quality management review process.” 65 (168)

Irrespective of the regulatory basis for the risk register as a requirement of QRM, it
remains a vital governance tool to inform decision makers of critical risks identified
through QRM and for tracking risk reduction and mitigation activities.

65

MHRA has since removed any reference to the risk register from its webpage. As of May 1, 2017, the
MHRA FAQs on Risk Management remained available through the UK’s National Archives at:
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120913151405/http://mhra.gov.uk/Howweregulate/Medici
nes/Inspectionandstandard/GoodManufacturingPractice/FAQ/QualityRiskManagement/index.htm.
However, as of this writing, this webpage is no longer available at this link, and a search of the archives
for these FAQs yielded no results. The FAQs remain available through International Pharmaceutical
Quality (IPQ), however, at the link provided in the citation.
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Living and ad hoc risk assessments serves as inputs into the risk register, which
compiles selected information from each risk assessment into a single list, serving as a
quality risk “executive summary” of sorts. Information is usually filtered prior to
transcription into the risk register; for example, some firms may choose to log only
those risks that exceed a given risk tolerance, while others may log all risks that are
being mitigated, regardless of level. Typical information included in the risk register
is:

•

Hazard/Risk

•

Risk level (e.g. RPN)

•

Source (e.g. risk assessment number and title)

•

Risk owner (e.g. applicable System/Process Owner)

•

Mitigation activities, responsible parties, and target implementation dates

•

Risk closure date (e.g. mitigation plan completion date)

•

Residual risk level

Some of the experts interviewed for the Phase 3 research indicated that companies
mature in QRM would also track those risks that were accepted, including the
acceptance rationale, date, and applicable decision maker, to ensure full transparency
and accountability. (130) (129) The risk register should be made available to all
employees, to increase awareness of critical quality risks throughout the organization.
(132) A risk register template, designed to enable enhanced risk maturity, is offered in
Appendix II.

Proper QRM governance would include periodic reviews of the risk register by senior
management. Figure 9-B illustrates a general process, proposed by the researcher, for
maintenance of the risk register.
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Living and ad hoc risk
assessments

Communicate risks to
applicable stakeholders

No

Do any risks exceed
the risk tolerance of
the organization?

Yes
Include applicable risks
and associated data in
risk register

Risk Register governance
forum: review register
and update status

Accepted
risks

“Close” risk
(remove from risk
register)

No
Do any risks
require
escalation?

Yes

Escalate to Quality
Management
Review forum

Figure 9-B: Risk register process flow

The Head of QRM (or QRM staff) should be responsible for the construction of the risk
register and will serve as the meeting lead for the risk register governance forum—a
meeting dedicated to the review of the register contents. The meetings should be
conducted frequently, based on the rate at which risks are added to the register and
status updates are expected. A typical meeting agenda may include a review of newly
populated risks, risks targeted for acceptance (and subsequent removal from the risk
register), status updates on the progression of mitigation activities, and a general
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discussion on which risks, if any, require escalation to Quality Management Review.
In a mature QRM program, escalated risks should meet one or more of the following
criteria:

•

Risks that place the patient in jeopardy (urgent escalation required)

•

Risk control strategy has not been defined

•

Risk control strategy is delayed in its implementation

•

Interim controls for unacceptable risks have not been defined

•

Resources not at the disposable of the risk assessment team are needed (for
example, capital for large design projects or resources from outside the site)

Directing these types of risks to broader forums ensures that senior leadership has the
information and ability to hold System/Process Owners accountable for reducing risks
in their area of responsibility, and can facilitate the removal of obstacles that might
prevent risks from being reduced to an acceptable level.

While the risk register ensures that senior leadership is aware of tactical quality risks,
strategic risks require a different governance process. In many cases, systemic risks are
often not captured through individual living or ad hoc risk assessments, which are based
on a specific scope and risk question as discussed in Chapter Eight. Two experts
interviewed for the Phase 3 research suggested that these types of risks are captured in
a quality risk profile. While these two experts could only cite one instance each of the
quality risk profile in use, both proclaimed it a best practice that could help industry
advance in risk maturity and fill a potentially significant gap in perspective between
“traditional” QRM and the patient. (127) (125) A proposed template, prepared by the
researcher, for the quality risk profile is offered in Appendix III.
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The primary objective of the quality risk profile is to assess the quality and compliance
status of the site or organization through the review of trends and prospective indicators
that may represent quality or compliance risks.

The quality risk profile builds

awareness of site vulnerabilities and their gravity, in an effort to continually improve
the quality system and pinpoint those risks that require strategic intervention to reduce
to within the organization’s risk tolerance. (125) (127) Unlike the risk register, whose
data is created by others and reviewed during the governance forum, the quality risk
profile is created by the governing body itself—it should capture all of the things that
keep leadership awake at night, or perhaps more appropriately, the things that should
keep them awake.

Issues that represent, or have the potential to represent, quality or compliance risks may
arise from various sources and contain both reactively and proactively identified risks
as illustrated in Figure 9-C. 66

Figure 9-C: Proactive vs. reactive risks
66

A modified version of Figure 9-C was created by the researcher for the PDA QRM Task Force and
was published in PDA Technical Report No. 54-5, Quality Risk Management for the Design,
Qualification, and Operation of Manufacturing Systems. (256)
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Quality and compliance risks are identified using data trends of systems and processes
or through subjective assessments of changing conditions. Examples of data feeder
streams for the quality risk profile include:

•

Site review forums such as metric reviews or Quality Management Review
(reactive)

•

Deviation/investigation trends that represent a systemic issue within the
quality system (reactive)

•

Internal audit and external inspection observations and/or comments, either
specific to the site (reactive), communicated from other sites in the
organization (proactive), or identified through benchmarking exercises with
other organizations (proactive)

•

Intelligence information regarding potential changes to organizational
capability, processes, and regulatory or business requirements (proactive)

•

Regulatory and business intelligence information regarding evolving
expectations of health authorities and industry best practices (reactive or
proactive, depending on the nature of the information)

•

Gaps between current processes, technology, and/or infrastructure and
industry standards (proactive)

From these data, risks can be identified and populated on the quality risk profile, along
with supporting details such the risk owner, type of risk identification
(proactive/reactive), type of risk (patient safety/product quality/compliance/other), and
applicable quality system element (aligned to ICH Q10). These data can facilitate
trending and metrics calculation, as discussed later in this chapter. Each risk is then
ranked for likelihood or frequency and severity, and a risk level is calculated. Example
ranking criteria for the quality risk profile is offered in Table 9-1: Example severity
ranking criteria for the quality risk profile are offered in Table 9-1and Table 9-2. The
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associated risk level is determined by locating the intersection of these two rankings in
a simple “9-box” matrix, as shown in Figure 9-D.

Table 9-1: Example severity ranking criteria for the quality risk profile

Ranking
Critical

Moderate

Minor

Definition
Extremely significant impact. Indicative of a systemic issue that permeates
multiple aspects of the Quality System. Risk could result in a critical product
quality or safety impact to patient/user. Could result in a shortage of a lifesaving drug.
Moderately significant impact. May extend to another aspect of the Quality
System, but the impact can be contained. Risk could result in a moderate
product quality impact that is unlikely to affect patients. Not likely to result in a
shortage of a life-saving drug, or likely to result in a shortage of a non-lifesaving drug.
Risk has no impact to product quality or patient safety.

Table 9-2: Example likelihood/frequency ranking criteria for the quality risk profile

Ranking

Frequent/
Likely

Intermittent/
Average

Rare/
Remote

Criteria
Proactively-identified risks
Realization (occurrence) of risk is
inevitable
unless
immediate,
sweeping
reform/mitigation
is
implemented.
Realization (occurrence) of risk is
likely but may be avoided with the
implementation of targeted mitigation
activities within the site.
Realization (occurrence) of risk is
moderately likely to unlikely; existing
Quality System controls expected to
restore steady state.
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Reactively-identified risks
Trend occurred in the past, either in
consecutive intervals or with a clear
pattern (e.g., seasonal) and/or risk is
likely to recur without mitigation.
Risk may have occurred in the past
but in a non-consecutive/sporadic
interval and/or risk may recur without
mitigation.
Risk isolated in time and/or highly
unlikely to recur.

Minor

Moderate

Critical

Frequent/Likely

Medium

High

High

Intermittent/
Average

Low

Medium

High

Rare/Remote

Frequency/Likelihood

Severity

Low

Low

Medium

Figure 9-D: Risk matrix for the quality risk profile

The risk level is used to determine the need for risk reduction, and the QRM process
continues, as discussed in Chapter Eight. Vesper applauded the visualization of the
quality risk profile in a “heat map” plotted by quality system element. (127) This can
show the relative distribution of strategic quality risks by risk level, as well as enable
the onlooker to understand which aspects of the quality system are most vulnerable for
the organization. An example heat map is provided in Figure 9-E.
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Severity

Intermittent/ Average
Rare/Remote

Frequency/Likelihood

Frequent/Likely

Minor

Moderate

Critical

•

Personnel
and
Training

•

Process
Validation

•

Change
Management

•

Equipment
Qualification

•
•

Risk
Management

Supplier
Management

Figure 9-E: Example of a quality risk profile heat map

.

Through the application of governance processes covering both strategic and tactical
quality risks, the oversight of key risks for the organization and the patients it served
can be achieved.

9.4 Setting strategic direction and planning activities to achieve it
The third purpose of QRM governance is to identify a strategy for QRM and develop
plans to achieve it. In a company with a mature QRM program the strategy will, of
course, be linked to managing risk to the patient, and may also include elements that
describe how this will be achieved. The development of a vision and mission for the
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QRM program may best articulate the strategy in a form that can energize the
organization. For example, a mature QRM program might have the following vision
and mission:

Vision: To protect the patient through the management of quality risks

Mission: To fully understand and manage critical risks to product quality, to integrate
risk-based thinking throughout the organization, and to foster a proactive, anticipatory
culture in which quality risks are anticipated and avoided.

As discussed in the context of medical device risk management in Chapter Six, the
planning of QRM objectives and activities is critical to the realization of a QRM
strategy. In addition, a QRM plan can be a valuable communication vehicle to inform
the organization of management’s commitment to and intentions for QRM, and how
each QRM practitioner’s work relates to these strategic goals. A QRM plan, therefore,
must explicitly address strategies, objectives, tactics, and associated activities over a
defined timeframe to serve as a guiding light for all things risk. Figure 9-F illustrates
the relationship between these critical components of a QRM plan.
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Figure 9-F: Components of a QRM Plan

The remainder of this section describes the content of a QRM plan as proposed by the
researcher that can be used by the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries to
enhance risk maturity and better manage risk to the patient.

Purpose section

The purpose section of the QRM Plan should describe the goal and intent of the plan.
Depending on the individual firm’s current level of risk maturity, the goals might differ.
For example, less mature firms may elect to focus on the development of a QRM
process, governance structure, and training, while more mature firms may wish to focus
on expanding an existing QRM program to additional aspects of the quality system.
This section serves to ground the reader in the primary objectives of QRM over a
defined time period.
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Scope

The scope section should describe the boundaries of the QRM Plan, and should use
exclusionary language where necessary to describe elements or areas that are out of
scope. This section may include, for example:

•

The site or sites to which the QRM Plan applies,

•

Products, product lines, and/or systems to which the plan applies,

•

Product lifecycle phases to which the plan applies (e.g. development through
Phase I, commercial only, etc.),

•

Quality system elements included in the plan (e.g. change control, deviation
management, etc.)

•

Timeframe covered in the plan

It is recommended that the QRM Plan cover a timeframe spanning one to three years,
enabling both short-term “quick wins” as well as longer-term strategic objectives to be
outlined.

Roles and responsibilities section

This section of the QRM plan should outline the roles and responsibilities for those
working or interacting with the QRM program. It is recommended that the following
roles be addressed in order to align with the ideal QRM program model proposed in
this thesis:

•

Senior leadership

•

Head of QRM

•

Facilitators
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•

System/Process Owners

•

Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)

•

Quality Unit (QU)

Many firms have experienced success with the use of a Responsibility Assignment
(RACI) matrix which maps each role to a given activity according to whether they are
Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and/or Informed. (130) (129)

The

responsibilities and tactics or activities outlined in this section should directly correlate
to the content of the plan; that is, all activities within the plan should be assigned to a
specific role, and each responsibility listed should likewise have specific actions
associated with it. This practice ensures clarity is provided to both the readers and users
of the plan. For example:

Table 9-3: Example RACI Matrix for QRM Plan

Tactic
Complete defined
living risk
assessments
Integrate QRM
principles into
quality system
Establish risk register
Establish quality risk
profile

System/
Process SMEs QU
Owners

Leadership

Head of
QRM

Facilitators

I

C

R

A

R

C

C

A/R

N/A

R

C

C

I

A/R

N/A

R

C

I

I

A/R

N/A

R

C

C

Strategy mapping and activity list

The bulk of the QRM plan should include a discussion of strategies, objectives, tactics,
and activities for the QRM program, as described in the purpose and scope sections.
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The objectives and activities defined in the plan will vary according to the level of
maturity of the firm’s QRM program, as well as the length of time the QRM program
has been in use. The researcher suggests that mature QRM programs might employ a
strategy of “implement a robust quality risk management program to better protect the
patient.” A resultant QRM plan may be structured as shown in Table 9-4.
Table 9-4: Example strategy mapping for QRM plan as proposed by the researcher

Objectives

Evaluate risks
associated with
all critical
operations on
site

Tactics
Design ideal living
risk assessment
library
Perform gap analysis
between ideal living
risk assessment
library and risk
assessments currently
in place

Complete defined
living risk assessments

Integrate QRM
in the quality
system
Understand
portfolio of
quality risks for
the site

Integrate QRM into
third party
management
Establish quality risk
profile

Establish risk register

Activities
Define critical operations
Development and document critical
operations

Perform and document gap analysis

Complete HACCP for warehouse
Complete process FMEA for fill/finish
operations
Complete HACCP for fill/finish facility and
equipment
Complete process FMEA for solution
preparation
Develop QRM approach to supplier
management

Develop QRM approach for contract
manufacturers
Develop baseline quality risk profile
Develop process to maintain the quality
risk profile
Develop baseline risk register
Develop process to maintain the risk
register

The activities in the QRM Plan should be prioritized using a risk-based framework,
such that all stakeholders will understand the rationale for the cadence of tasks. Such
a risk-based prioritization tool might involve the ranking of each activity for the
criticality of the topic and the complexity of the effort, as follows:
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Table 9-5: Topic criticality ranking criteria, for QRM activity prioritization

Ranking
Critical

Criteria
Topic directly impacts product quality and the health and safety of the
patient.
Moderate Topic indirectly impacts product quality and the health and safety of the
patient.
Minor
Topic does not impact product quality or the health and safety of the
patient.

Table 9-6: Effort complexity ranking criteria, for QRM activity prioritization

Ranking
Complex
Average
Simple

Criteria
Significant resources and expertise required.
A moderate amount of resources and expertise required.
Minimal resources and expertise required.

The intersection of the individual rankings for topic criticality and effort complexity is
then located in the prioritization matrix to determine the relative priority of the activity.

Minor

Moderate

Critical

Simple

Priority 7

Priority 4

Priority 1

Average

Priority 8

Priority 5

Priority 2

Complex

Effort Complexity

Topic Criticality

Priority 9

Priority 6

Priority 3

Figure 9-G: QRM activity prioritization matrix
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The relative priority of each QRM activity can be used, in addition to an analysis of
activity interdependencies, critical path identification, and other considerations, to
determine an appropriate timeframe for completion. This enables the firm to allocate
resources towards the most appropriate activities to enhance QRM maturity and deliver
a direct benefit to the patient. An example activity list using the above principles is
shown in Table 9-7.

Table 9-7: Example activity list for QRM Plan
Activity

Resources
required
Complete
process As
FMEA for fill/finish appropriate
operations
Complete HACCP for As
fill/finish facility and appropriate
equipment
Develop
QRM As
approach to supplier appropriate
management
Complete
process As
FMEA for solution appropriate
preparation
Complete HACCP for As
warehouse
appropriate
Develop
baseline As
quality risk profile
appropriate

Criticality

Complexity Priority

Critical

Average

2

Target
completion date
Q1, Year 1

Critical

Complex

3

Q2, Year 1

Moderate

Simple

4

Q3, Year 1

Critical

Simple

1

Q1, Year 1

Moderate

Average

5

Q2, Year 2

Minor

Average

8

Q4, Year 1

A thoughtfully constructed QRM plan translates the strategy established by leadership
into actionable tasks, thereby ensuring the organization remains centered upon the
things that matter most—protection of the patient.

9.5 Measuring QRM performance
The final function of governance—to measure performance of the QRM program—is
one that has confounded risk management experts for some time. Organizations often
calculate metrics, a subset of which are christened “key performance indicators” or
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KPIs, to evaluate the performance (and changes in performance) of various business
and operational measures. Risk management experts at Protiviti note:

“Improved risk measures, metrics, and monitoring integrated with key
performance indicator (KPI) reporting facilitates the shift from ‘guessing’ to
‘knowing’ or ‘understanding’ as well as from ‘reacting’ to ‘being prepared’ or
‘proactive’ or ‘forward looking’. These shifts provide evidence of improved
risk management over time.” (169)

There are two questions to be answered through the calculation and review of metrics
and KPIs: (a) is QRM being performed effectively? and (b) is QRM effective at
managing risk to the patient? The first of these questions focuses on whether QRM
principles and practices are being implemented in an effective manner; that is, whether
the QRM process is being followed in a manner conducive to risk maturity. The second
question focuses on measuring whether QRM is achieving its objective—protecting the
patient. This second question is notoriously difficult to answer, primarily because truly
effective QRM, integrated throughout the quality system, would be seamless. When
QRM is properly designed and deployed, there are fewer problems in the organization.
Processes are better controlled.

There are fewer deviations and associated

investigations. Changes are more effective. Reactive CAPA is replaced with proactive
risk control. Right-first time efforts abound. While there are obvious challenges with
measuring an absence of data; as would be the case when QRM is applied from the start
of the product lifecycle, measuring changes in these parameters following the
application of QRM can be misleading. Attributing improvement in quality and
reliability solely to QRM is riddled with assumption—in many cases, other quality
improvement efforts, such as deeper investigations and root cause analyses, more
311

effective CAPA, human error prevention programs, or technology enhancements may
also contribute to improvements. While the establishment of precise metrics to measure
the direct impact of QRM on enhancing product quality and patient protection can be a
futile endeavor due to the number of variables involved, measuring product quality
improvements over time can provide valuable information on the relative influence of
QRM in managing risk to the patient. A measure of this kind is therefore critical to any
set of metrics for QRM. (170)

The second question to be answered through metrics and KPIs, “is QRM being
performed effectively?,” is perhaps less noble than measuring patient protection.
However, in a well-designed QRM program, it is equally important to evaluate
performance related to program implementation as program impact.

Many

organizations, unfortunately, fail to establish meaningful metrics—those that provide a
perspective on performance that highlights vulnerabilities, opportunities, and success.
A majority of industry conference delegates involved in philosophical dialogues with
the researcher mentioned only one metric for QRM at their companies—the number of
risk assessments performed. This metric is weak for a number of reasons. First, it fails
to measure QRM performance, focused only on the volume of activity. Second, as
discussed in Chapter Eight, the number of risk assessments should reflect the strategic
design of the living risk assessment library and therefore should be largely predictable.
Finally, conclusions based solely upon a single metric are likely to be myopic, failing
to provide decision makers and other stakeholders with the information needed to make
strategic decisions regarding the QRM program.
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Instead, the researcher recommends that a small portfolio of metrics be established and
measured on a periodic (monthly) basis. In order to ensure a balanced approach, QRM
metrics should:

1. Measure activities in each key phase of the QRM lifecycle (risk assessment,
risk control, risk review, and risk communication) as well as programmatic
elements (infrastructure and risk maturity)
2. Include a mix of leading (predictive of future success) and lagging (reflective
on past performance) indicators
3. Include a mix of trend (measurement over time to understand organizational
progress) and target (measurement over time with a defined goal) models
4. Provide meaningful information that can enable decision making by multiple
stakeholder groups (e.g. leadership, middle management, QRM practitioners)
5. Be easily calculated; data required to complete the metrics should be readily
available and should not pose an undue burden on those who report data nor
those who compile the metrics (171) (172) (173) (174)
The first objective of the development of a meaningful set of metrics is to ensure that
all QRM lifecycle phases—risk assessment, risk control, risk review, and risk
communication—are represented. The need for this is clear—the organization must
ensure that QRM as a whole is functioning effectively. The inclusion of metrics around
QRM infrastructure is critical to ensure that the program is appropriately resourced and
that expertise within the organization is proliferating. In addition, a measure of risk
maturity is beneficial to evaluate not only what is being done, but how it is being done.
Chapter Ten presents a measurement tool for risk maturity developed by the researcher
that can be used to calculate associated metrics.

Including both lagging and leading indicators in the metrics set is listed as the second
objective. Lagging indicators are the most common form of metrics used in the
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pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, and measure past performance using
data gathered from the quality system. (128) (175) While lagging indicators are
informative, they are not always predictive of future performance; leading indicators
perform that function. Deloitte defines leading indicators as “information that has a
predictive quality in that it measures current events highly correlated to the future
results or that directly drive future results through cause-and-effect relationships.”
(172) Knowledge gained through an analysis of leading metrics can enable coursecorrections in real time, to influence future outcomes. Leading indicators are therefore
proactive in nature—a fitting perspective for QRM.

The third objective centers upon whether the metric is more conducive to trending or
goal setting. Metrics used to set targets, such as a specific percent reduction in quality
defects, can mobilize the organization towards a shared objective and influence
behaviors accordingly. Where targets are established for the wrong metrics, however,
these same attributes can have negative effects; for example, setting a target for a
percent reduction in manufacturing deviations may result in under-reporting from
personnel who are incentivized more strongly to meet the target than to follow the rules.
In these instances, it is wiser to trend the metric over time to see patterns, and working
on activities associated with leading metrics to improve future performance.

A common pitfall in metrics creation, as reported in the philosophical dialogues, is the
failure to fully understand what the data means; that is, what conclusions can be drawn
from the information and whether these conclusions offer insight needed by the
organization. As described above, for example, the number of risk assessments
performed over time is merely indicative of the amount of work being done. It does
not reflect the quality of the work, or whether there are redundancies or inefficiencies
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between risk assessments. Nor is it representative of the number of risks identified,
which would require a complete understanding of each risk assessment’s scope to fully
characterize. Other metrics measure compliance with regulatory standards or companyspecific requirements; as discussed in Chapter Five, while compliance is essential, it is
only a portion of overall quality. Rather, organizations should focus on measuring and
understanding the effectiveness of the work done, regardless of the volume, and
whether the patient is better protected as a result.

The fifth and last objective of metrics creation is that the data must be easy to retrieve
and the metrics easy to compile. It is far better to spend resources and intellectual
energy to manage risk to the patient than to labor over metrics.

A subset of metrics should be selected as KPIs, to be reviewed at the appropriate
governance forums.

The researcher recommends a maximum of three KPIs for

companies of any size, to keep attention focused on the most meaningful performance
measures and prevent “paralysis by analysis.” In addition, KPIs should measure the
effectiveness of the QRM program and its use, rather than compliance with the
program. This will allow stakeholders to make the appropriate linkages with other
business and quality objectives, and will reinforce the role of QRM as an enabler of
quality systems as per ICH Q10. Finally, the selected KPIs should be those metrics
most indicative of the strategic role of QRM—to protect the patient. Table 9-8 offers
an example of QRM metrics and KPIs that may be useful in providing insight into the
QRM performance of an organization.
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This chapter sought to characterize maturity with regard to QRM governance, including
the supporting infrastructure, governance mechanisms, QRM plan, and metrics and
KPIs. Chapter Ten will synthesize the learnings from the complete research effort
through the development of a QRM maturity measurement tool and associated
assessment program.
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Table 9-8: Example QRM Metrics and KPIs
Metric 67
Number of full-time equivalent dedicated QRM
staff
Number of qualified facilitators
Percent of risks identified proactively vs.
reactively (from Quality Risk Profile)
Number of unacceptable risks (from Quality Risk
Profile) categorized by quality system elements
Number of external inspection observations of any
type not previously identified on SRP
Percent of risk assessments from QRM Plan
completed on time, completed late, or incomplete
Number of unacceptable risks with no risk control
plan
Percent of risk control measures/mitigation
activities proven effective
Percent of periodic risk reviews completed on
time
Number of external inspection or internal selfinspection observations related to QRM program
Risk register tracking by month – number of high
risks, number of medium risks, number of new
(opened)
risks,
number
of
closed
(accepted/mitigated) risks, total number of risks
QRM maturity assessment results, over time 68
Number of quality defects over time

67
68

Provides information on…
Organizational
progress,
leadership
commitment
Organizational
progress,
leadership
commitment
Organizational and cultural progress
Common pain points, opportunities for
improvement
Level of self-awareness achieved through
QRM
Vulnerability of site during inspections
Passive acceptance of risk through
inaction
Progress in risk control option analysis and
implementation
Whether risk assessments reflect current
state
Whether QRM program and/or use of the
program meets regulatory expectations
Effectiveness of risk identification and
risk control, organizational progress with
regard to the amount of attention paid
towards QRM program
Organizational and cultural progress
Influence of QRM in improving product
quality and patient protection

KPIs are shown in yellow.
The QRM measurement tool and associated assessment is discussed further in Chapter Ten.
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Measures…

Type

Trend / Target

QRM lifecycle phase

Effectiveness

Leading

Trend

Infrastructure

Effectiveness

Leading

Trend

Infrastructure

Effectiveness

Leading

Trend

Risk Identification

Effectiveness

Lagging

Trend

Risk Identification

Effectiveness

Lagging

Target

Risk Identification

Compliance

Lagging

Target

Risk Assessment

Compliance

Lagging

Target

Risk Reduction

Effectiveness

Lagging

Trend

Risk Reduction

Compliance

Lagging

Target

Risk Review

Compliance

Lagging

Target

All

Effectiveness

Lagging

Trend

All

Effectiveness

Leading

Trend

All

Effectiveness

Lagging

Target

All

10 Chapter Ten: Measuring QRM Maturity

With the current state of QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries
defined, and the future, mature state envisioned, the research effort sought to outline
the path towards excellence through the construction of a QRM maturity measurement
tool to be used to evaluate the effectiveness of QRM as applied by a drug manufacturing
site. As mentioned in Chapter Nine, measuring risk maturity, and the progress towards
the ideal state, is a useful means to evaluate efforts towards patient protection and
ensure the appropriate oversight of the effectiveness of the QRM program as a whole.
This chapter discusses the QRM maturity measurement tool that has been developed by
the researcher based on the learning from all phases of the research, which was piloted
with several candidate sites from the biopharmaceutical industry to confirm validity
and utility. The tool design, usage, benefits, and outcomes of the pilots are discussed.
Appendix IV offers the complete measurement tool described in this chapter.

10.1 QRM maturity measurement tool overview
The QRM maturity measurement tool is structured in a similar way to the chapters in
Section Three, beginning with an evaluation of the people pillar of QRM, followed by
each step in the QRM process, and ending with QRM governance. The tool is therefore
organized around headings representative of the three pillars of QRM, with associated
sub-headings as delineated in Table 10-1.
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Table 10-1: Headings and sub-headings of the QRM maturity measurement tool

Heading
People

Risk culture

QRM Initiation

Risk Assessment

Risk control
Risk review
Risk communication
QRM Infrastructure

Governance

Sub-heading
Organizational awareness
QRM expertise
Application of QRM
Cultural motivation
Personnel engagement
Reward and recognition
Risk question
Tool selection
Expert representation
Living risk library
Risk identification
Risk analysis
Risk evaluation
Risk control option analysis
Risk reduction
Residual risk appraisal
Risk review structure
Risk review execution
Risk communication plan
Communication of risks
Roles and responsibilities
Dedicated QRM staff
Qualified facilitators
Risk register
Quality risk profile
QRM plan
Metrics and KPIs

Each sub-heading has four levels of criteria that define the level of maturity for that
aspect of QRM. Each level has an associated score, ranging from 1 – 4, as shown in
Table 10-2.

Learnings from Phase 2 of the research, as discussed in Chapter Five, led the researcher
to re-envision the structure of the maturity model for the Phase 3 research to facilitate
a more meaningful evaluation of maturity. The first pillar of QRM, “people,” has been
separated into two distinct headings—one to capture organizational knowledge of QRM
and the other to evaluate risk culture. The second pillar of QRM, “process,” has been
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broken out in the QRM maturity measurement tool to capture each stage of the QRM
lifecycle independently. The third “governance” pillar of QRM was also separated into
QRM infrastructure and overall governance. This separation enables decision makers
to better distinguish strengths and vulnerabilities in the implementation of QRM
program than the Phase 2 maturity model and represents an evolution in the researcher’s
thinking as the research effort progressed.

Table 10-2: QRM maturity levels and associated scores

Score
1
2

Maturity Level
Absent
Novice

3

Intermediate

4

Expert

Interpretation
QRM program element not acknowledged or performed.
Application of QRM program element is immature.
Application of QRM program element is moderately
mature, with room for improvement.
Application of QRM program element is very mature.
Tangible benefits to both the site and patients are
realized.

In addition, a level 0 is available for situations in which the site is unaware that such a
practice should be acknowledged—that is, the program element represents a blind spot
for the organization.

The QRM maturity measurement tool is used through a detailed assessment of the QRM
program on site, including both the design of the program, as evidenced by policies and
procedures, and application of the program, as evidenced by completed QRM
documentation and interviews of site personnel. The mean of the scores for each subheading represent the overall maturity score for the related heading, which is then
plotted in a chart or “dashboard” to allow for further analysis.
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10.2 Recommended use of the QRM maturity measurement tool
10.2.1 Assessment process
The QRM maturity assessment is performed using an evidence-based approach in
which randomly-selected samples of QRM documentation are reviewed, and individual
QRM practitioners interviewed, to enable the selection of the best-fit maturity score for
each sub-heading in the measurement tool. As it not practical (nor valuable) to review
every piece of evidence related to the QRM program, the random sampling is presumed
to be representative of the population, and therefore allow for characterization of QRM
practices as a whole.

The QRM maturity assessment is intended to be performed for a single site within a
given pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical company, rather than the organization as a
whole.

Because, as seen in Chapter Five, QRM practices can vary within an

organization based on factors such as geographical location, assessing risk maturity at
the site level provides the most accurate, and actionable, results.

In order to ensure an un-biased evaluation, the QRM maturity assessment should be
performed by a party independent of the QRM program and ideally, the site. This may
include an independent functional group within the site, as is often the practice for
quality self-inspections or internal audits, or an external party such as a consultant may
be used. Over time, the site may elect to integrate the maturity assessment into the selfinspection program as an additional means to measure the effectiveness of the quality
system through the lens of QRM.
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Once identified, the assessor (or assessment team) should begin with a review of the
QRM policy, to familiarize themselves with the landscape in which the site has elected
to apply QRM. From there, the assessor may request specific documents to review,
such as individual procedures, risk assessments, risk reviews, training materials and
records, and job descriptions. The assessor may also wish to interview specific
individuals regarding their opinions of QRM and how they practice of QRM on site.
Table 10-3 suggests various forms of evidence for each sub-heading that may prove
useful in the maturity assessment.

With the evidence reviewed, the assessor moves on the selecting the most appropriate
maturity score for each sub-heading based on the criteria defined in the measurement
tool. Once all scoring is complete, the results are averaged for all sub-headings within
a given heading, providing a total of eight individual scores—one each for People,
QRM Initiation, Risk Assessment, Risk Control, Risk Review, Risk Communication,
QRM Infrastructure, and Governance. These scores are then plotted on a QRM
maturity dashboard for further analysis.
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Table 10-3: Evidence to review during QRM maturity assessment

Heading
People

Risk Culture

QRM Initiation

Risk Assessment

Risk Control

Risk Review

Risk
Communication

QRM Infrastructure

Governance

Sub-heading
Organization awareness

Evidence to review
Training materials, training
records, personnel interviews
QRM expertise
Training materials, training
records, personnel interviews
All elements
Personnel interviews, QRM
plan, risk assessment reports
Risk question
QRM initiation form, risk
assessment reports
Tool selection
SOPs, QRM initiation form, risk
assessment reports
Expert representation
QRM initiation form, risk
assessment reports
Living risk library
SOPs, QRM plan
Risk identification
SOPs, risk assessment reports
Risk analysis
SOPs, risk assessment reports
Risk evaluation
SOPs, risk assessment reports
Risk
control
option SOPs, risk assessment reports
analysis
Risk reduction
CAPA lists, risk assessment
reports
Residual risk appraisal
Risk assessment reports
Risk review structure
SOPs, risk review reports
Risk review execution
Risk review reports, updated risk
assessment reports, meeting
minutes
Risk communication plan SOPs,
QRM
plan,
risk
communication plan
Communication of risks
Meeting
minutes,
email,
memorandums, correspondence
with external stakeholders
Roles and responsibilities Organizational
charts,
job
descriptions
Dedicated QRM staff
Organizational
charts,
job
descriptions
Qualified facilitators
Organizational
charts,
job
descriptions, training plans
Risk register
SOPs, risk register
Quality risk profile
SOPs, quality risk profile
QRM plan
SOPs, QRM plan
Metrics and KPIs
Meeting minutes, dashboards
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10.2.2 QRM maturity dashboard
The researcher chose a dashboard, rather than a single “rolled-up” maturity score, as
the mechanism for analysis. The dashboard takes the form of a radar or “spider”
diagram, with each heading plotted as a “spoke” in the diagram and the results of the
maturity assessment as points on the chart, as illustrated in Figure 10-A.
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Figure 10-A: Example QRM maturity dashboard

The spider diagram used for the QRM maturity dashboard enables the viewer to see the
overall level of QRM maturity, the individual levels of maturity for each pillar of the
QRM program, and to explore the balance of maturity to determine where to focus
efforts or expand best practices. For example, “risk communication” is shown as an
area of relative weakness in the example dashboard from Figure 10-A. However,
because the “people” and “QRM infrastructure” headings are more mature, there are
opportunities to mobilize the people at the site and leverage the associated infrastructure
to improve risk communication within the site. The dashboard therefore serves as a
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visual aid to help identify where more mature elements of the QRM can be repurposed
to improve maturity in areas that are struggling.

The use of the spider diagram for the QRM maturity dashboard also allows easily
comparison of results of the maturity assessment. Figure 10-B, for example, shows
how two years of data for the same site can be overlaid to enable the identification of
improvements and backslides over time. A similar approach may be used to compare
results between sites to evaluate where knowledge and best practices may be transferred
from a more mature site to a less mature one.
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Figure 10-B: QRM maturity dashboard illustrating a year-over-year comparison

In this way, the QRM maturity dashboard can provide far more insight into the true
level of QRM effectiveness than a simple, overall risk maturity “score.”

10.3 Results of the pilots for the QRM maturity measurement tool
As the final inquiry in the research effort, the researcher had the opportunity to pilot the
QRM maturity measurement tool and process with two separate biopharmaceutical
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companies, for a total of eight sites (seven sites from one company and one site from
the second company).

Access to each site was granted by senior leadership

(specifically, the network Vice President of Quality for one company and the site head
of quality for the other).

Following the QRM maturity assessment using the

measurement tool, each site’s head of quality was queried regarding his or her opinions
on the structure of the measurement tool and QRM maturity assessment process.
Specifically, they were asked:

•

Did you find the QRM maturity assessment valuable?

•

Do the results of the QRM maturity assessment accurately reflect your
opinions of the maturity of your site’s QRM program?

•

Do you plan to take action based on the results of the QRM maturity
assessment?

Both companies requested anonymity with regard to this research, and will therefore be
referred to as Company A and Company B. All company and site details were relayed
to the researcher during the QRM maturity assessments by each site’s Head of Quality.

Company A is a global pharmaceutical firm with a 2016 annual revenue in excess of
US $39.2B (33.8B euro) and over 110,000 employees worldwide. The company has
divided its business based on product type, with separate business units covering the
production of API, small molecule pharmaceuticals, biopharmaceuticals, medical
devices, veterinary products, and consumer health products. All seven sites included
in the Phase 3 research pilot were operating under the biopharmaceutical arm of the
business; however, some of the sites also manufacture medical devices. Company A
has a centralized QRM program run by corporate quality that has been tailored by each
site to meet their specific needs.
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Site 1 within Company A is staffed by an estimated 1200 employees, focused solely on
the manufacture and related support of one sterile biological drug substance. At the
time of the pilot (September 2016), the site had been performing QRM for
approximately five years. Prior to the assessment, the head of quality cited the site’s
primary struggle with QRM as the shift in site culture away from seeing QRM as a boxticking exercise necessary for compliance towards one in which the value is fully and
broadly understood. The QRM maturity dashboard for Company A, Site 1 is provided
in Figure 10-C.
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Figure 10-C: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 1

Site 2 within Company A has fewer employees than Site 1, totaling an estimated 350
employees within manufacturing and related support functions. Site 2 has an extensive
history of medical device design and manufacturing, and had been performing risk
management in accordance with ISO 14971 for over fifteen years at the time of the
assessment (May 2016). The site’s inclusion of quality risk management principles and
practices in the spirit of ICH Q9 into their overarching risk management program was
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more recent, introduced four years prior to the pilot. During the opening meeting for
the assessment, the site’s head of quality reported no challenges with his QRM program
and anticipated it to be best-in-class. Figure 10-D illustrates the QRM maturity
dashboard for Company A, Site 2.
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Figure 10-D: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 2

The third pilot site from Company A (referred to as Site 3) employs an estimated 75
people and focuses solely on raw material receipt, testing, and release for other sites in
the biopharmaceutical network as well as finished product packaging and distribution.
The site had been performing QRM for only one year at the time of the pilot (May
2016) but had established QRM program deployment as the site’s primary quality
objective for the prior year. At the start of the assessment, the site’s head of quality
acknowledged that the program was young, and was primarily interested in learning the
site’s vulnerabilities to enable goal setting for the following calendar year. The QRM
maturity dashboard for Company A, Site 3 is shown in Figure 10-E.
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Figure 10-E: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 3

Site 4 within Company A employs an estimated 2500 employees and focuses on the
production and associated support of four sterile biopharmaceutical drug substances.
The QRM program at Site 4 had been in effect for four years at the time of the QRM
maturity assessment in February 2016. The site’s head of quality expressed concern in
the opening meeting with the number of unacceptable risks reported by the site and the
lack of “movement” on those risks—described as either risk reduction or risk
acceptance. The QRM maturity dashboard for Site 4 is provided in Figure 10-F.

329

People
Governance

4

Risk culture

3
2

QRM Infrastructure

QRM Initiation

1

Risk Communication

Risk Assessment

Risk Review

Risk Control

Figure 10-F: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 4

The fifth pilot site from Company A was new to the company, having been acquired by
the large pharmaceutical firm two years prior to the QRM maturity assessment (March
2016). Formerly a small start-up firm, the site had only been applying QRM over the
prior six months, largely as a result of the integration efforts into its parent company.
The site employs a mere 50 people, and manufactures one aseptically-produced sterile
drug substance. The site’s head of quality had no prior experience with QRM himself,
and was interested in understanding where the site ranked in QRM maturity in
comparison to its peers in the company network. The QRM maturity dashboard for Site
5 is provided in Figure 10-G.
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Figure 10-G: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 5

Site 6 of Company A is a rather interesting case, being under consent decree in the US
at the time of QRM maturity assessment in October 2016. 69 The site employed
approximately 700 employees, an additional 500 external quality consultants, and 30
external consent decree verifiers, to support the production of one sterile
biopharmaceutical drug substance at 100% capacity. The site had been performing
QRM since the finalization of the consent decree terms six years prior to the pilot.
Because the site’s QRM program had been developed by external quality consultants
and was cited by the consent decree verifiers as an example of excellence for the rest
of the site, the site’s head of quality was exceedingly confident in the opening meeting
that the level of risk maturity would be the highest in the company’s network, although

69

Consent decree is one of the more severe regulatory sanctions available to the FDA, exceeded only by
revocation of a drug manufacturing license and physical seizure of drug manufacturing assets. Consent
decree entails, among other requirements, the hiring of full time quality consultants to guide
reconstruction of the site’s quality system, continuous verification of quality system improvement by a
separate consulting body, and disgorgement of profits to FDA from the sale of products manufactured in
violation of regulatory requirements.
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admitted that the site culture is one of urgent reaction rather than anticipation. Figure
10-I shows the QRM maturity dashboard for Site 6 of Company A.
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Figure 10-H: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 6

Site 7 of Company A employs an estimated 120 people to manufacture and support a
medical device. Having performed risk management in accordance with ISO 14971
since 2003, the site had incorporated QRM principles four years prior to the QRM
maturity assessment date (July 2016). The head of quality at the site appeared mildly
disinterested when the assessment commenced, and did not express any concerns with
his site’s QRM program. The QRM maturity dashboard for Site 7 of Company A is
provided in Figure 10-J.
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Figure 10-I: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 7

The final site used in the QRM maturity measurement tool pilot was a single site from
Company B. Company B is also a global pharmaceutical firm headquartered in the EU,
although the site included in the pilot is located in the US. Company B’s 2016 annual
revenue exceeded US $54.2B (46.7B euro) with over 115,000 employees
internationally. Similar to Company A, Company B has organized its diversified
product portfolio into business units based on product type, including crop science,
pharmaceuticals, consumer health, and animal health. The pharmaceutical division in
sub-divided into small molecule products and biopharmaceuticals. The site included in
this pilot is organized with the biopharmaceutical subdivision.

Site 1 of Company B employs an estimated 2,500 employees to manufacture and
support three sterile drugs, including both drug substance and drug product. The site
had become interested in QRM following the hiring of a new site head of quality who
was particularly interested in the topic. The site had been performing QRM for ten
years leading up to the pilot, performed in May 2017. At the start of the maturity
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assessment, the new head of quality was distressed by the site’s QRM program when
compared with her prior experience, though no specific areas of concern were voiced.
Figure 10-K shows the QRM maturity dashboard for Site 1 of Company B.
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Figure 10-J: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company B, Site 1

The results of QRM maturity assessment pilots validated the measurement tool as an
accurate and constructive means to measure, understand, and improve QRM maturity
and effectiveness. All eight heads of quality involved in the pilots agreed that the
assessment was valuable, with seven expressing interest in repeating the assessment in
one year’s time to gauge improvement. All heads of quality noted that they intend to
share the results of the QRM maturity assessment with their staff, some noting that they
would include the topic in upcoming town hall-type meetings with all site employees.
Seven of eight heads of quality agreed that the QRM maturity measurement tool
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accurately reflected their opinions of their site’s QRM effectiveness, 70 with one head
of quality (for Company A, Site 6, involved in consent decree activities) acknowledging
that he may have been overconfident in the program currently in place at this site. All
eight heads of quality noted that they plan to take action to improve the level of QRM
maturity within their site based on the outcomes of the measurement tool. The QRM
maturity assessment and associated measurement tool are therefore considered to
provide an adequate measure of QRM maturity that can help ensure an organization can
effectively use QRM to protect the patient.

The QRM maturity measurement tool development and pilots marks the end of the
Phase 3 research, and closure of the overarching research effort. The implications of
the research, including conclusions, recommendations, and suggested areas for
additional research are discussed in the fourth and final section of this thesis.

70

One quality head (for Company A, Site 2) did not feel that the random sampling of evidence was
representative of the population, as it was his opinion that the site was very mature in QRM application.
The researcher would like to draw the reader’s attention to the low “governance” score associated with
this site (Figure 10-D), as there appears to be a lack of knowledge and oversight of the QRM program at
the leadership level. While the researcher cannot definitively state that the head of quality was
misinformed regarding the true state of QRM at his site, the results of the QRM maturity assessment
indicate that this may be a factor influencing his opinion.
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Section Four: Implications of the
Research
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“When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.”

- Will Rogers

“Don`t be afraid to take a big step when one is indicated. You
can`t cross a chasm in two small steps.”

- David Lloyd George
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11 Chapter Eleven: Focus Areas for Future Research

Perhaps one of the most difficult challenges for any researcher is to stay within the
boundaries of the chosen research topic. As the research progresses, ideas abound. The
researcher may be left with an unsettling sort of intellectual restlessness when faced
with the prospect that those ideas must, in many cases, be left unexplored, if a final
body of knowledge were to ever be shared. This researcher, in particular, suffers
gravely from this affliction. This chapter aims summarizes the most critical and
potentially valuable of these ideas to inspire future researchers.

Future research topic #1

Skeptics within industry require proof, in the form of both statistical correlation and
case studies, that QRM will improve product quality and profitability. Future work in
QRM should focus on determining whether there is a direct correlation between those
companies with mature QRM programs (per the QRM maturity measurement tool) and
those with higher quality products, as evidenced by defect rates, recall rates, and other
quality metrics. In addition, profitability and cost of goods sold (COGS) should be
measured and compared with each firm’s QRM maturity levels. Such an analysis will
enable an understanding of the benefits of QRM using tangible outcomes by answer the
following questions:

•

Do companies with robust, consistent product quality tend to have more
mature QRM programs?
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•

Do companies with more mature QRM programs tend to have more robust
product quality?

This will further solidify whether QRM maturity levels are an appropriate leading
indicator of patient protection in the form of high quality, more readily available
medicinal therapies.

Future research topic #2

Additional research is needed to develop a framework to characterize and improve
individual QRM maturity. While the research effort described in this thesis focused on
organizational QRM maturity, it did not explore in detail how individuals can
contribute to QRM effectiveness. Such a research effort should seek to identify whether
there are specific personality types that are more conducive to excellence in QRM, such
as introverts or extroverts, or those inclined to be detail-oriented or “big picture”
thinkers. Such a research study should also expand upon, and pilot, the education
required to cultivate QRM expertise, building upon the model suggested in Chapter
Seven of this thesis.

Future research topic #3

While this thesis focused primarily on preventive risk management in the context of
accident avoidance, additional research is needed regarding business continuity
programs that can accelerate a pharmaceutical manufacturing plant’s return-to-service
(or more appropriately, return-to-cGMP) in the event a catastrophe occurs. This is
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particularly pressing in light of recent natural disasters that have devastated countries
like Puerto Rico, which has a high concentration of drug manufacturing plants.

Future research topic #4

It is this researcher’s opinion that additional research into the application of defense in
depth principles and practices, such as those described in Chapter Six in the context of
the nuclear power industry, to QRM and cGMP. It would be of particular interest to
explore the relationship between defense in depth and Lean, which seeks to eliminate
redundancy and idle capacity where defense in depth may seek to add it as a risk control
measure.

Future research topic #5

Future research into QRM should aim to expand the existing QRM toolkit with other,
proven risk tools, such as the Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques mentioned in
Chapter Six.

The exploration of the above-listed topic through a rigorous academic framework will
further enhance knowledge of pharmaceutical quality and enable the patient to be better
served.
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12 Chapter Twelve: Conclusion and Recommendations

This thesis has explored the application of quality risk management principles and
practices within the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, in an effort gauge
its effectiveness in managing risk to the patient. Through the use of multiple research
methods, the research effort examined the current implementation of quality risk
management in these industries and characterized a mature state of QRM
implementation, all the while seeking to answer the fundamental question of:

“How can industry recode QRM to better manage risks to the patient?”

12.1 Conclusion
Chapter One of this thesis introduced the reader to the research effort, beginning with
an exploration of the context in which patients live—relying on medicines to sustain
their life and health, supported by the companies that make these medicines, and hoping
that those organizations are working hard to protect them. Protecting patients is
simultaneously a privilege and a grave responsibility—a core function of the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. After a brief review of the general
principles of risk management, Chapter One described how the practice can be applied
to medicinal products to ensure patient protection. Different types of risks, intrinsic
and extrinsic to the medicinal product, were discussed. While intrinsic risks are
relatively well understood and well controlled for the patient, the management of
extrinsic risks, particularly quality risks, has been historically neglected by comparison.
Recent regulatory modernization efforts have opened the door for the use of risk
management in assuring and improving medicinal product quality, thereby better
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managing the risk to the patient. The research effort is centered upon exploring
whether, and how, this may come to fruition.

Chapter Two of this thesis summarized the initial literature review performed in support
of the research effort. The history of risk management in the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries was reviewed, and the emergent regulatory climate
towards one of risk-based, rather than rule-based, quality and compliance was
described. The reader was then familiarized with ICH regulation, specifically the four
most recent guidelines, ICH Q8(R2), ICH Q9, ICH Q10, and ICH Q11 which grounded
the research effort. Finally, a critical review of authoritative industry reports and books
on the field of QRM was performed. The literature review described in Chapter Two
was just a portion of the overall literature review performed in support of the research.

Chapter Three of this thesis described the researcher’s worldview, the research
question, the structure of the research effort, and the research methods to be employed.
The researcher discussed her pragmatic worldview and described its fit with the
research effort, given the focus on utility rather than ontology. The researcher disclosed
her insider perspective as a member of industry, and acknowledged the potential bias
that may result as well as the advantages that may be offered. A review of the controls
used to conduct the research in alignment with ethical principles and protect research
subjects’ privacy was then discussed. The chapter then transitioned to describe the
history of the risk question, as the researcher evolved her thinking from the initial
research proposal, through the confirmation examination, and ultimately to the writing
of the thesis. Finally, the research phases and methods were discussed. The research
effort was divided into three phases: the first phase sought to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to confirm that the patient is better protected since the inception
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of quality risk management in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries; the
second phase aimed to characterize the extent to which current QRM practices in
industry effectively manage risk to the patient; and the third and final phase sought to
frame what effectiveness and maturity in QRM looks like to improve patient protection.
A mixed methods approach was used throughout the research, consisting of both
qualitative and quantitative research methods including literature review, philosophical
dialogues, benchmarking surveys, data analysis, semi-structured expert interviews, and
pilot case studies.

Chapter Four documented the results of the Phase 1 research, focused on determining
whether the patient has reaped the benefit of better quality products since the advent of
QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, marked by the
publication of ICH Q9. The research used literature review of quality-related medicinal
product recalls in Ireland and the US, which were then analyzed to determine the
presence of any trends that may cast insight into the state of patient protection. In both
represented countries, there was an increasing trend in quality-related recalls over the
time period included in the research. While there may be other variables involved, such
as increased reporting of quality defects or increasing volume of product on the market,
the data did not support a claim that the patient is better protected following the
publication of ICH Q9.

Chapter Five described the results of the Phase 2 research, which explored the ways in
which industry is currently applying QRM and the extent to which these practices
effectively manage risk to the patient. The first research inquiry in Phase 2 explored
whether QRM has improved industry compliance with cGMP, and whether QRM itself
is applied in a compliant manner. This inquiry employed literature review of cGMP343

related warning letters issued by the US FDA and an analysis of the results, which
revealed an increasing trend in warning letters over the examined time period. Warning
letter citations against QRM practices likewise increased over the same time period,
revealing that industry’s compliance with cGMP has not improved since the
introduction of quality risk management. In addition, regulators do not seem to have a
high level of confidence in the way violative firms have employed QRM, as evidenced
by the trend and nature of QRM-related citations seen in the data.

The second research inquiry in Phase 2 sought to identify industry’s current level of
risk maturity—envisioned by the researcher as the effectiveness of QRM, the behaviors
and motivations of QRM practitioners, and the oversight and accountability of QRM
implementation. A benchmarking survey was conducted to reveal these insights. The
survey results were flush with learnings, most of which were rather disappointing given
the tenure of QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. For
example, the overall perspective of the people working with and within QRM is rather
apathetic, with pockets of people engaged in QRM but few “true believers” who
actively advocate for its use. QRM has not permeated the product lifecycle and quality
system to the extent one might expect, and is applied most often in ways that fail to
proactively protect the patient. A large proportion of respondents indicated that QRM
is often misused, such as to justify current practices or decisions that had already been
taken. In addition, ownership and accountability for QRM and the promise it holds for
patients is lacking. Philosophical dialogues held during the Phase 2 research indicated
a culture of fear, blame, confusion, and excuses. The results of this research inquiry
exposed the burning platform that should incite action. The need for the development
of a mature model for QRM that can be implemented by pharmaceutical and
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biopharmaceutical firms was clear. The researcher forged ahead to address this solution
in the Phase 3 research.

Chapter Six described the interim research inquiry that would bridge the Phase 2 and
Phase 3. This chapter explored other industries with a history of strong and effective
risk management: medical devices, aerospace, and nuclear power. This research
inquiry was performed via literature review; the researcher extracted key learnings from
the literature that would inform the construction of the mature QRM program
desperately needed by industry. These key learnings included:

1. Acknowledge uncertainty associated with the risks being explored and the
operating climate in which they manifest themselves. Seek to minimize
uncertainty by gaining knowledge and understanding.
2. Define the context in which the risks are identified, analyzed, and controlled.
Acknowledge that the context may change and that decisions should be
reassessed accordingly.
3. Focus QRM efforts on the product—the most direct link to the patient.
4. Control risks like someone’s life depends on it. Because the patient’s life
does.
5. Plan for QRM. Identify gaps impeding a mature state from being realized, and
bridge them.
6. Acknowledge the two forms of QRM—continuous QRM and risk-informed
decision making. Master both.
7. Culture is key. Learn from mistakes. Avoid making the same mistake twice.
8. Communicate with purpose. Plan for what to communicate, to whom, when.
Make sure everyone who needs to know, knows.

Chapter Seven marked the first chapter addressing the Phase 3 research, and defined a
mature state of QRM with respect the people working within it. A combination of
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literature review, semi-structured expert interviews, and philosophical dialogues were
used to define how people can be more effective in applying QRM to protect the patient.
The use of role-based QRM was deemed critical, as it ensures that all QRM
practitioners, and the organization as a whole, possess a working knowledge of QRM
commensurate with their interaction with the program. A high-level framework for
developing QRM expertise was proposed by the researcher, seeking to fill a commonly
cited gap in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. Finally, the role of
risk culture in enabling QRM effectiveness was discussed, and recommendations from
the researcher to improve risk culture were offered.

Chapter Eight explored maturity and effectiveness with respect to the QRM process,
beginning with a discussion of the strategic creation of a living risk assessment library
to ensure that all elements critical to the patient would be included in the QRM program.
The chapter went on to discuss best practices for QRM initiation, followed by an
introduction to a risk assessment model developed by the researcher to provide a direct
line of sight to the patient.

The topic of risk control came next, including an

examination of best practices to ensure robust risk reduction, residual risk appraisal,
and risk acceptance. The chapter then turned to an inquiry into a mature state of risk
review, in which knowledge gained is fed back into the QRM process to ensure
continued effectiveness of managing risk to the patient. Risk communication was then
explored, including an inquiry into stakeholder perception and the creation of a plan to
guide risk communication. The chapter closed with a proposed, modified QRM
lifecycle to better enable risk maturity and effective patient protection.

Chapter Nine sought to characterize maturity with respect to QRM governance,
discussing the importance of leadership commitment and their role in effectively
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managing risk to the patient. An effective QRM infrastructure was then proposed,
including policies, procedures, and human resources necessary to mobilize the
organization to the management of quality risks. Two governance mechanisms were
described—the risk register and the quality risk profile—along with process flows and
templates created by the researcher. The construction and use of a QRM plan to set and
communicate QRM strategy, objectives, tactics, and activities was then described.
Finally, a set of proposed metrics and key performance indicators was offered to enable
the governing body to measure the conduct and effectiveness of the QRM program.

Chapter Ten finalized the Phase 3 research with a discussion around a QRM maturity
measurement tool and assessment process developed by the researcher.

The

development of the measurement tool synthesized learnings from prior phases of the
research into a simple approach to gauge the current level of QRM maturity of a site
and define a path towards improvement. The QRM maturity measurement tool and
assessment process was piloted at eight separate biopharmaceutical manufacturing
sites, validated the tool as an appropriate means to measure QRM effectiveness.

Finally, Chapter Eleven outlined areas where additional research is warranted to more
fully characterize and improve QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
industries.

According to Harvard Business Review Analytic Services, risk management programs
cannot be successful without six organizational capabilities:

1. “Linking risk information to strategic decision making
2. Establishing a risk aware culture at all levels
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3. Embedding risk management practices and responsibilities within strategy and
operations
4. Ensuring that all decisions remain within the organization’s risk tolerance
5. Driving risk mitigation activities
6. Proactively identifying current and emerging risks” (164)

This thesis, and the research effort it described, sought to address each of these
capabilities in turn, recoding QRM principles and practices to better manage risk to the
patient.

In her learnings over the course of the research, the researcher has identified several
recommendations for both regulators and industry to better support the common goal
of applying QRM to manage risk to the patient. It is at this stage that the researcher
chooses to exercise the advantages of her insider status, as summarized above and
discussed at length in Chapter Three, and issue both parties an untitled letter. 71 As the
FDA as found untitled letter an effective means to incite action, so too hopes the
researcher.

12.2 An untitled letter to regulators
Dear Sir or Madam:

Thank you for your service in protecting the public health. Patients the world
over rely on you as the gatekeepers for the drug manufacturing industries,
trusting they are safe under your watchful eyes. Your regulatory strategy is

71
An untitled letter is a regulatory communication vehicle used by the US FDA to warn manufacturers
of violative conditions that may, if left unresolved, trigger future regulation action.
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evolving in ways that acknowledge emergent concepts, demonstrating your
commitment to modernizing your way of thinking. Kudos to you and best of
luck in this endeavor. I know it is difficult to change.

It has come to my attention that the use of quality risk management in the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries has not been successful in
managing the risk to patients. This is alarming, particularly in light of your
evolving regulatory strategy which relies on this very topic to supplement
traditional regulation. If QRM fails to manage risk to patient, what good will it
do? What will become of modern regulation if it so heavily relies on ineffective
programs? What will happen to the patients?

There are actions that you, as regulators, can take to help make QRM successful
and ensure its goal is met. Please consider the following as you continue along
your mission:

•

Several QRM experts have suggested that regulators may be confusing
industry with regard to appropriate QRM application. (134) (132) (127)
(125) One expert even went so far as to say that “regulators are part of
the problem” with the immature state of QRM in industry. (134) For
example, you often issue warning letters for cGMP violations, requiring
a risk assessment to be performed in response. This implies to industry
that it is your desire that QRM be performed retrospectively, perhaps,
even, to justify the quality of a product already on market. Of course,
this is the wrong impression. As a first step, please seek out better and
more complete education on QRM principles and practices. This will
enable you to ensure that your requests do not encourage improper
practices within industry.
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•

Please review QRM in all inspections you perform. Industry has heard
your message that QRM is an enabler of the quality system, and yet,
many firms never get feedback on how their enabler is working. Please
make a distinction between risk assessments and QRM in these
inspections.

Risk assessments are not representative of risk

management. Training, governance, risk control, risk review, and risk
communication must also be reviewed. After all, what can one make of
a quality system that is not adequately enabled?

•

Please be cautious of the language you select when issuing new
regulation or guidance.

For example, rather than requiring a risk

assessment to be created for a given topic, consider requiring the risk to
be assessed. This will allow industry to use their living risk assessment
libraries to evaluate risks in the context of other risks to the patient,
minimizing the number of individual, narrowly-scoped risk assessments
that confound patient protection.

•

Please take the time to review all regulations and guidance that you have
issued to ensure they accurately reflect your intended message. Where
discrepant points or inconsistencies are found, make industry aware of
what you have learned and how you intended to resolve it. Risk
communication can also flow from regulators to industry, you know.

•

Please try to avoid suggesting a particular risk tool be used to assess
certain types of risks. Frankly, you don’t have a great track record in
getting this right (refer to sections 2.2.3 and 5.3.2), and it absolves
industry from the responsibility to understand QRM well enough to
select a tool on their own.

I know these recommendations and the concerns that inspire them may be hard
to hear. They come from a good place—a place of devotion to well-done QRM
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and a place of concern for the patient. Please, take these recommendations to
heart. The patient depends on it.

Sincerely,
The Researcher

12.3 An untitled letter to industry

To Whom It May Concern (which, of course, means all of us):

I am sorry to inform you that QRM isn’t working. I don’t mean to say that
QRM doesn’t work—indeed, it does—but rather the way we have tried to
implement it has been unsuccessful.

I’m sure many of you have sensed this. We have been working so hard, doing
the best QRM we know how to do. But it is like we are on an exercise wheel in
a hamster cage—running, running, running, yet getting nowhere. We are
creating a lot of risk assessments, a lot of deliverables, and yet our patients are
no better protected. Things have got to change.

Please, stop doing what you’re doing. Review this thesis, dissolve your current
QRM programs, and replace it with this one. I know some of us are doing good
things with QRM, that there are pockets of best practices out there. I do not ask
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those companies to take a step backward. What I ask is that we look critically
at our QRM programs, that we gauge our maturity using the QRM maturity
measurement tool provided in Appendix IV, and that, if we’re not where we
need to be, we take a drastic leap forward.

This will require a lot from you. It will require some of us to stop managing
and start leading.

It will require us to invest in prevention, to invest in

education, and to let some fires burn while we seek to prevent others. But ours
is an industry of intelligent, resourceful, and resilient people. We are far more
capable of managing quality risks than our patients.

Remember, people, processes, and governance need to work together to make
QRM effective, and QRM is needed to support the patient. We can do this, and
we shall.

Kind regards,
The Researcher
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14 Appendix I: Template for QRM Initiation
This appendix offers a template that may be used by pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical firms to enhance their maturity in QRM Initiation. The use of this
template will ensure that all aspects of the QRM Initiation process are performed in a
concise and organized manner.
Section 1: General Information

Risk Assessment Topic: ____________________________________________

Product/Process/System under assessment: _____________________________

Risk Assessment Type:  Living

 Ad hoc

Applicable Product(s): _____________________________________________

In scope: ________________________________________________________

Out of scope: ____________________________________________________

Objective/Risk Question: __________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________
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Section 2: Team Identification

Expertise Needed

Subject Matter Expert Name(s)

 Manufacturing Process
 Quality
 Microbiology
 Chemistry
 Manufacturing Science
 Validation
 Engineering
 Facilities
 Maintenance
 Calibration
 Computerized Systems
 Automation
 Medical / Clinical
 Toxicology
 Other (specify)

System/Process Owner: ____________________________________________
Print / Sign
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Date

Section 3: Risk Assessment Decision Tree
Scope and Objective/
Risk Question

Is there a
procedural
requirement to use
a specific risk
tool?

 Yes

Use tool
defined in the
applicable
procedure

 No
 No

Is this a
living risk
assessment?

 Yes

Risk
Assessment
Formality =
Formal

Is the
development of a
sampling plan a
primary
objective?

 No

Is the objective of this
risk assessment to
determine patient impact
following an event?

 Yes

 Yes

Risk
Assessment
Formality =
Formal

 No

Is the objective of this
risk assessment to
determine root (or
potential) cause?

 Complex

 Yes

Use Five Whys or
other less formal
root cause analysis
tool

Is the issue simple and
loosely coupled or
complex and tightly
coupled?

 No

Is this risk assessment
related to a process or
system that is critical to
product quality or patient
safety?

Use Hazard
Analysis and
Critical Control
Points (HACCP)

Use Risk-based Impact
Assessment (RBIA)

 Simple

 Yes

Use Failure
Modes and
Effects
Analysis
(FMEA)

Risk
Assessment
Formality =
Formal

Use Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) or
other formal root
cause analysis tool

Use Failure
Modes and
Effects Analysis
(FMEA) tool

 No

Risk
Assessment
Formality =
Less Formal

Use Risk Estimation Matrix (REM), Risk
Ranking and Filtering (RRF), decision tree,
Ishikawa diagram, or other risk-based
approach
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Level of Formality:  Formal

 Less Formal

 Customized

Risk Tool: _______________________________________________________

System/Process Owner: _____________________________________________
Print / Sign

Date

Section 4: Request Disposition

 Risk Assessment is approved to proceed based on the details of this template
and site objectives as defined by the QRM Plan.

 Risk Assessment is NOT approved to proceed. Information in this template is
incomplete or inaccurate, or request conflicts with the site objectives as defined by
the QRM Plan.

Comments:

Approved by: ____________________________________________________
Quality Risk Management; Print / Sign
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Date

15 Appendix II: Template for Risk Register

Origin Information

Risk ID Report #

Report
Title

Acceptance
Information

Risk Information

Mitigation Activities

Residual Risk

System/
Failure
Target
Approval
Failure Failure
Rationale for Mitigation Responsible
Completion
Acceptance
Mode /
Implementation
Revision Process
Likelihood Detectability Severity Risk Level
Residual Risk
Date
Cause Effect
Acceptance Activity
Party
Date
Date
Owner
Hazard
Date
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16 Appendix III: Template for Quality Risk Profile

Risk Identification

Risk Classification
Quality
Risk
Date
Risk
Risk ID
Risk Owner
Risk Type System
Description
Identified Identification
Element

Risk Analysis

Risk Control

Residual Risk
Risk Acceptance
Mitigation
Rationale for Risk
Overall Mitigation Responsible Target Interim
Actions
Residual
Plan
Risk
Acceptance
Likelihood Severity
Likelihood Severity
Risk
Plan
Parties
Date Controls
Taken
Risk
Status
Acceptance Date
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17 Appendix IV: Quality Risk Management Maturity Measurement Tool

People
Sub-heading

Maturity
Level 1:
Absent

Maturity Level 2:
Novice

Maturity Level 3: Intermediate

Maturity Level 4: Expert

All employees are provided with training commensurate with
their level interaction with risk management, including those
with no direct responsibility for performing or participating in
risk assessments (e.g. those who only require training on the
role of QRM in GMP). Training is updated and refreshers are
provided periodically; retraining frequency is predefined and
documented.
QRM facilitator training is considered an ongoing education.
Facilitators undergo a rigorous qualification process
consisting of the maturity level 3 coursework, and are required
to apprentice under a seasoned QRM expert. QRM experts
are expected to mentor apprentices and continue growing in
their role.

Organizational
awareness

There is no
QRM training
provided for
most
employees on
site.

QRM training is
provided at the site
at an undefined
frequency to those
who request the
training.

All employees are provided with
training commensurate with their
level interaction with risk
management, including those with
no direct responsibility for
performing or participating in risk
assessments (e.g. those who only
require training on the role of QRM
in GMP).

QRM expertise
(facilitators)

There is no
training
available to
develop QRM
experts.

QRM facilitator
training focuses on
the basic principles
of QRM and the use
of QRM tools.

QRM facilitator training includes
QRM principles, QRM tools, best
practices over the QRM lifecycle,
and facilitation skills.
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Risk Culture
Sub-heading

Maturity Level 1: Absent

Maturity Level 2: Novice

Maturity Level 3: Intermediate

Maturity Level 4: Expert
QRM fully integrated throughout the
quality system and is applied proactively
to design systems and assess risks

Application of
QRM

Reactive only

Primarily reactive (80%
reactive / 20% proactive)

Primarily proactive (80% proactive
/ 20% reactive)

Cultural
motivation

achieve compliance; "the
regulations require it"

foster more consistent
decision-making

learning organization; continuous
improvement of operations and
business processes through risk

protecting the patient

Personnel
engagement

individual heroics and silos

organization acknowledges
QRM value proposition;
pockets of personnel are
engaged in QRM

organization is engaged in QRM;
pockets of personnel advocate for
QRM

organization advocates for QRM

Recognition and
reward system

Heroic efforts for solving
existing problems are
rewarded exclusively;
proactive QRM
consciously deprioritized

Efforts for proactive QRM go
unnoticed by the organization

Informal acknowledgement /
rewards for proactive QRM, or
rewards exist in pockets only

Formal recognition / reward system in
place for proactive QRM
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QRM Initiation
Sub-heading

Risk question

Tool selection

Expert
representation

Maturity Level 1:
Absent
Individual risk
assessments do not
have clearly defined
risk question or
objective and scope.
There are no QRM
tools defined, or only a
single QRM tool is in
use.

Teams of SMEs are not
used to conduct a risk
assessment.

Maturity Level 2: Novice

Maturity Level 3: Intermediate

Some risk assessments have
a defined risk question and
scope, however the risk
question may imply a
forgone conclusion.
A QRM toolkit is in place,
but tool selection is
inconsistent based on the
risk question.

Some risk assessments have a
clearly defined risk question and
scope, phrased in a way to
encourage an assessment that is
agnostic to the outcome.
A QRM toolkit is in place.
Guidance is available to ensure
the tool selected is appropriate
for the risk question.

Team selected for
individual risk assessments
do not adequately represent
the technical expertise
required.

Team selected for individual risk
assessment represents the
technical expertise required for
the completion of a robust
assessment.

396

Maturity Level 4: Expert
All risk assessments have a clearly defined risk
question and scope, phrased in a way to
encourage an assessment that is agnostic to the
outcome.
A QRM toolkit is in place. There is a clearly
defined mechanism to select an appropriate tool
based on the risk question, with an allowance to
use an alternate tool with appropriate rationale.
Team selected for individual risk assessment
represents the technical expertise required for
the completion of robust assessment, and the
team members are empowered to make
judgments representing their area of expertise.
SME representation is consistent throughout the
risk assessment.

Risk Assessment
Sub-heading

Maturity Level 1: Absent

Living risk
assessment library

The living risk assessment
library has not been defined.

Risk identification

Risks identified without any
systematic mechanism. Clear
gaps exist between site
experience and identified
risks. There is no link
between the identified risks
and elements critical to the
patient (i.e. CQAs, CPPs,
CAs, and CADEs).

Maturity Level 2: Novice
The living risk assessment
library has been defined.
Between 0 - 50% of required
risk assessments are complete.

Maturity Level 3: Intermediate
The living risk assessment library
has been defined. Between 51 80% of required risk assessments
are complete.

Maturity Level 4: Expert
The living risk assessment library has been
defined. Over 80% of required risk
assessments are complete and the remainder
are planned.

Risks are systematically
identified and aligned with site
experience, however there is a
weak link between the
identified risks and elements
critical to the patient.

Risks are systematically identified
and aligned with site experience.
Risk associated with most
elements critical to the patient
have been identified.

Potential risks are identified in a systematic
way, consistent with the identified scope,
perspective, and risk question. Identified risks
are comprehensive with respect to reasonable
expectations when compared with site
experience. Risks associated with all
elements critical to the patient have been
identified.

Risk analysis

Individual risk assessments
are based on undocumented
or invalid assumptions and
are largely subjective with no
references to supporting data.

Individual risk assessments
have some undocumented
assumptions. Supporting data
is referenced but there is no
discussion of the how the data
relates to the analysis.

Individual risk assessments
include a general discussion of
assumptions. Supporting data is
referenced and discussed in the
context of the analysis.

Individual risk assessments performed using
clearly referenced data sources, with
documented rationale connecting the related
data to each risk that was analyzed. All
assumptions are valid and documented.

Risk evaluation

The risk evaluation is not
connected to the risk
analysis. Claims of risk
acceptability are made
without consideration of risk
tolerance.

The risk evaluation is derived
from the results of the risk
analysis but does not
adequately align with the
associated risk tolerance.

The risk evaluation is derived
from the results of the risk
analysis and is aligned with the
applicable risk tolerance.

Risk evaluation is derived from the results of
the risk analysis and is aligned with the
applicable risk tolerance. Individual risks are
evaluated and accepted on a case-by-case
basis rather than through a comparison with a
risk threshold.
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Risk Control
Sub-heading

Maturity Level 1: Absent

Maturity Level 2: Novice

Maturity Level 3: Intermediate

Risk control
option analysis

Risks deemed unacceptable
through risk evaluation do
not continue to risk control.

All unacceptable risks
continue to risk control,
however there is no
consistent or documented
rationale for the selection of
mitigation activities.

All unacceptable risks continue
to risk control, and the selection
of mitigation activities is
appropriate and includes a
documented rationale.

Risk reduction

Documented risk mitigation
activities are not
consistently implemented.

Documented risk mitigation
activities are implemented as
defined, and presumed to be
effective in reducing the risk.

Documented risk mitigation
activities are implemented as
defined, and evaluated for
effectiveness in reducing the
risk.

Residual risk
appraisal

Residual risk is not
evaluated following
mitigation.

Appraisal (acceptance or
rejection) of residual risk is
documented with no
rationale.

Appraisal of residual risk,
including rationale, is
documented in every
assessment.
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Maturity Level 4: Expert
All unacceptable risks continue to risk
control. Evidence that the mitigation
strategy selected is optimal based on the
anticipated effectiveness of the risk control,
the individual risk or group of risks that are
targeted for reduction, the root cause of
those risks, anticipated residual risk, and
new risks that may arise as a result of each.
Rationale for selection of mitigation
strategy is documented.
Documented risk mitigation activities are
implemented as defined, and evaluated for
effectiveness in reducing the risk. There is
an analysis and appropriate action taken in
the event new risks are introduced (or
existing risks affected) through the
implementation of the mitigation activities.
Comprehensive, documented rationale
included to describe the acceptability of
both individual and overall residual risk.

Risk Review
Sub-heading
Risk review
structure

Risk review
execution

Maturity Level 1: Absent
There is no defined process
for risk review.

Risk review has not been
performed.

Maturity Level 2: Novice
There is a defined process
for risk review, but data
sources and expectations for
analysis and conclusions are
weakly defined.

Maturity Level 3: Intermediate
There is a defined process for
risk review. Internal data
sources and expectations for
analysis and conclusions are
clearly defined.

There is limited evidence of
data being analyzed during
risk review.

There is evidence of internal
data sources (e.g. deviations,
change control, related ad hoc
risk assessments) analyzed
during risk review. The
rationale behind conclusions
drawn is documented and is
aligned with the data reviewed.
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Maturity Level 4: Expert
There is a defined process for risk review,
including both periodic and event-driven
reviews. Internal and external data sources
are defined, and expectations for analysis
and conclusions are clear.
There is evidence of both internal (e.g.
deviations, change control, related ad hoc
risk assessments) and external data sources
(e.g. regulatory intelligence, industry
benchmarking, etc.) analyzed during risk
review. The rationale behind conclusions
drawn is documented and is robust,
identifying specific connections between
sources of information and related updates
to the living risk assessment.

Risk Communication
Sub-heading

Risk
communication
plan

Communication
of risks

Maturity Level 1: Absent
No formal or defined
requirements associated with
communication relative to the
person performing the
communication, the parties
receiving the communication,
or the content, format, intent,
or frequency of
communication.

Risks are not communicated.

Maturity Level 2: Novice

Maturity Level 3: Intermediate

Maturity Level 4: Expert

Mechanism for
communication is defined,
however is uniform with
respect to the form and
audience of
communication vs. what is
being communicated.

Several different mechanisms
for communication are defined.
Mechanism outlines
communication pathways
throughout the organization as
well as with external
stakeholders.

A formalized risk communication plan
exists, which defines several
communication pathways based on nature
of the communication, the intent of the
communication, the format of
communication, and the communicator and
recipient.

Risk communication is
performed frequently between
necessary parties.

Continuous risk communication occurs.
Format of communication is tailored to
what is being communicated (e.g. email,
phone call, meeting discussion, formal
documentation). Communication is clear
in terms of what the expected result will be
(e.g. to inform or to initiate action). All
communication forms a closed loop so there
is no ambiguity regarding whether the
message has been understood.

Risk communication is
infrequent, passive,
unclear, or sporadic.
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QRM Infrastructure
Sub-heading

Maturity Level 1:
Absent

Maturity Level 2: Novice

Roles and
responsibilities

Roles and
responsibilities within
the QRM program are
not defined.

Roles and responsibilities are defined
but are isolated to a single functional
group.

Dedicated QRM
staff

There are no staff
responsible for the
QRM program.

One or more staff is responsible for the
QRM program as a portion of their job
description.

Site has a defined group of qualified
facilitators, however either:
Qualified
facilitators

There are no qualified
facilitators on site.

•
•

there are insufficient numbers of
facilitators to meet site needs, or
facilitators have not actively led a
risk assessment for an extended
period of time
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Maturity Level 3:
Intermediate
Roles and responsibilities are
defined, including the Head
of QRM, System and Process
Owners, Subject Matter
Experts, Quality Unit, and
senior management.

There is a defined Head of
QRM.

Site has an optimal number
of qualified facilitators that
is sufficient to meet site
needs and ensure the
facilitator's knowledge and
experience remains current.

Maturity Level 4: Expert
Roles and responsibilities are defined,
including the Head of QRM, System and
Process Owners, Subject Matter Experts,
Quality Unit, and senior management.
All personnel fulfill their responsibilities
under the QRM program.
There is a functional group dedicated to
the QRM program, of an appropriate
number based on site need. The Head of
QRM has direct access to senior
management through his or her reporting
structure.
Site has an optimal number of qualified
facilitators that is sufficient to meet site
needs and ensure the facilitator's
knowledge and experience remains
current. Several of the facilitators are
experts in QRM and can be relied upon
to improve the effectiveness of the QRM
program.

Governance
Maturity Level 2:
Novice

Maturity Level 3: Intermediate

Maturity Level 4: Expert

There is no
risk register
for the site.

There is a risk register at
the site that is updated
sporadically or contains
minimal information.

There is a risk register in place that
is updated consistently. The register
contains adequate information to
enable the tracking of the site's most
critical risks.

There is a risk register in place that is updated consistently. The
register contains adequate information to enable the tracking of
the site's most critical risks and to facilitate metrics. The risk
register is reviewed at the appropriate governance forum. There
is a defined escalation pathway to ensure the register is visible
to senior management.

Quality risk
profile

There is no
quality risk
profile for the
site.

There is a quality risk
profile at the site that is
updated sporadically or
fails to capture key
strategic quality risks.

There is a quality risk profile in
place that is updated consistently.
All strategic quality risks are
captured and addressed as
appropriate. The quality risk profile
is created by the appropriate
governing body.

There is a quality risk profile in place that is updated
consistently. All strategic quality risks are captured and
addressed as appropriate. The quality risk profile is created by
the appropriate governing body. Decisions regarding strategic
site objective, such as project planning and budgeting, are made
in consideration of the quality risk profile.

QRM Plan

The site does
not have a
defined QRM
plan.

The site has a QRM Plan
that focuses primarily at
the activity level.

The site has a QRM Plan that fully
maps strategy to individual QRM
activities over a defined timeframe.

Metrics and KPIs

The site has
not defined
metrics for the
QRM
program.

QRM metrics focus on
compliance and lagging
indicators rather than
effectiveness and leading
indicators.

QRM metrics include a mix of
compliance and effectiveness
measurements as well as lagging
and leading indicators.

Sub-heading

Risk Register

Maturity Level
1: Absent
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The site has a QRM Plan that fully maps strategy to individual
QRM activities over a defined timeframe. All personnel have
visibility to the QRM Plan and the way in which their work
influences the achievement of objectives is both clear and well
understood.
The site has defined metrics and KPIs representative of all
stages of QRM, compliance and effectiveness, and lagging and
leading indicators. Metrics and KPIs are tracked on a defined
frequency and reviewed by applicable governing body. KPIs
indicate that QRM effectiveness is stable or improving.
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